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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5191
This paper provides a systematic, empirical assessment 
of the impact of infrastructure quality on the total 
factor productivity (TFP) of African manufacturing 
firms. This measure is understood to include quality 
in the provision of customs clearance, energy, water, 
sanitation, transportation, telecommunications, and 
information and communications technology (ICT). 
Microeconometric techniques to investment climate 
surveys (ICSs) of 26 African countries are carried out 
in different years during the period 2002–6, making 
country-specific evaluations of the impact of investment 
climate (IC) quality on aggregate TFP, average TFP, 
and allocative efficiency. For each country the impact is 
evaluated based on 10 different productivity measures. 
Results are robust once controlled for observable 
fixed effects (red tape, corruption and crime, finance, 
innovation and labor skills, etc.) obtained from the 
ICSs. African countries are ranked according to several 
This paper—a product of the Sustainable Development Department, Latin American and the Caribbean Region—is part 
of a larger effort in the department to advocate and support the development and improvement of infrastructure services. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted 
at jguasch@worldbank.org.  
indices: per capita income, ease of doing business, firm 
perceptions of growth bottlenecks, and the concept of 
demeaned productivity (Olley and Pakes 1996). The 
countries are divided into two blocks: high-income-
growth and low-income-growth. Infrastructure quality 
has a low impact on TFP in countries of the first block 
and a high (negative) impact in countries of the second. 
There is significant heterogeneity in the individual 
infrastructure elements affecting countries from both 
blocks. Poor-quality electricity provision affects mainly 
poor countries, whereas problems dealing with customs 
while importing or exporting affects mainly faster-
growing countries. Losses from transport interruptions 
affect mainly slower-growing countries. Water outages 
affect mainly slower-growing countries. There is also 
some heterogeneity among countries in the infrastructure 
determinants of the allocative efficiency of African firms.Assessing the Impact of Infrastructure 
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1. The wide-ranging effects of infrastructure quality 
For Africa’s awaited growth resurgence to occur, a broad range of factors—political, institutional, and 
economic—must be improved. The World Bank’s landmark Africa Competitiveness Report (ACR) 
(2004 and 2007) focuses on problems that, in the words of Artadi and Sala-i-Martin (2003), constitute 
the most important growth tragedy of the twentieth century—a phenomenon that has received special 
attention in recent growth literature, such as that of Ndulu and O’Connell (2005). It is agreed that 
improving Africa’s infrastructure is a crucial step toward penetrating international markets and meeting 
the goals of continuous growth and poverty reduction.  
Infrastructure quality  has a pervasive influence on all areas of an economy. Low-quality 
infrastructure and limited transport and trade services increase logistical and transaction costs, 
rendering otherwise competitive products uncompetitive, as well as limiting rural production and 
people’s access to markets—with adverse effects on economic activity and poverty reduction. A large 
number of empirical studies illustrate the impact of infrastructure on economic performance, including 
those of Calderón et al. (2003a and b), Calderón and Serven (2003), Canning (1998), Reinikka and 
Svensson (1999), Prud’homme (2004), Escribano and Guasch (2005), Escribano et al. (2005), and 
Guasch (2004). All suggest that Africa’s infrastructure gap is an important growth bottleneck with a 
negative impact on productivity and the overall competitiveness of the region. Furthermore, several 
studies using the methodology of Escribano and Guasch (2005, 2008) and Escribano et al. (2008a and b 
and 2009) have found empirical evidence—in cases such as Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Turkey, 
and several southeast Asian countries—that improvements in investment climate (IC) conditions in 
general, and in infrastructure quality in particular, may lead to important gains in productivity and in 
other economic performance measures: employment, real wages, exporting activities, and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) inflows.  
Disentangling the ways that infrastructure affects Africa’s economic growth poses several 
difficulties because of the special characteristics of the African region. The comprehensive analysis 
found in Estache (2005) takes stock of the basic characteristics of infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and the impact of 1990 reforms, pointing out that the impact of infrastructure in Africa may be different 
than in other regions. As Brunel (2004) signals, the colonial period has had a lasting effect on the use of 
space in the region, resulting in a productive structure that consists, in most cases, of coastal cities 
connected inland by railways designed to carry raw materials to main ports. This and other factors that 
are progressively modifying the continent’s productive structure—such as continuous urbanization, the 
movement of economic activity from the agricultural to manufacturing and service sectors, and the 
increasing openness of African economies—has caused both a quantitative and qualitative mismatch 
between the current supply of infrastructure and ever-increasing demand. Factors such as inequality 
across income levels (affecting the affordability of infrastructure services), large and unoccupied areas, 
and regional variations in climate are increasingly becoming a concern for African policy makers 
managing infrastructure. 3 
 
In addition to furthering the regional integration needed to support infrastructure investment, 
African governments made important contributions to infrastructure development in the decades 
following independence. The majority of African state monopolies were, however, characterized by 
inefficient bureaucracies. These became increasingly unable to satisfy customer demands, with 
increasing deficits. By the beginning of the 1980s, most African countries embarked on infrastructure 
sector reforms, with the aim of increasing private sector participation in provision. Despite attempts to 
introduce more competition and to attract private investors, Africa continues to trail the world in both 
the quantity and quality of its infrastructure, with bottlenecks particularly in the management of current 
stock. 
 
Figure 1.1 Geographical locations of the 26 countries considered in the investment climate assessment 
(ICA) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Figure 1.1 shows the geographical distribution of the countries considered in this study, both in 
North and Sub-Saharan Africa. The countries studied are divided into five main geographical areas, 
identified in some cases by the major multilateral organization of each region: (a) the North African 
region, or Maghreb, includes Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt; (b) the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) includes Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Benin, Cameroon, 
and Cape Verde; (c) the Horn of Africa region is composed of two countries, Eritrea and Ethiopia; (d) 
the East African Community (EAC) includes Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, and Burundi; and (e) the South 
African Development Community (SADC), for which we have data for Malawi, Zambia, Namibia, 
Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, and Madagascar. South Africa and Mauritius are the last two individual 
countries included in the report. 
The 26 countries show enormous heterogeneity due to (a) geographical factors, such as whether 
a nation is landlocked (Cape Verde, Madagascar, and Mauritius), tropical (with landmass for the most 
part covered by rainforests), or dominated by deserts (such as the North African countries Mauritania 
and Namibia); (b) social or political factors, such as civil wars, armed conflicts, early democracies, 
dictatorships, and colonial heritage; and (c) economic factors, which this paper discusses for all 
countries, from the most affluent (Mauritius) to the poorest (Eritrea). 
Figure 1.2 clarifies the different evolutions of per capita income across the countries included in 
this analysis. Of the 26 African countries analyzed, Mauritius was, in 1950, the country with the highest 
per capita income (measured in terms of per capita gross domestic product, GDP), followed closely by 
South Africa, and, by a wider gap, Namibia and Algeria. But the per capita income situation in 2003 
was somewhat different; Mauritius was still ranked first, followed by Swaziland, South Africa, and 
Botswana—and, by a wider gap, Algeria, Cape Verde, Egypt, and Morocco. Panel B of figure 1.2 
shows the five-year growth rate of per capita income. Mauritius and Botswana are the countries that 
have experienced the highest, sustained per capita income growth during the recent years. Lesotho is 
the median country, splitting the cross-section into two blocks. The first block comprises countries with 
faster and steadier growth rates (Mauritius, Swaziland, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, and Lesotho 
in the south; Algeria, Morocco, and Egypt in the north; and Cape Verde and Cameroon in central 
Africa). In the second are countries with lower and more irregular growth rates (Mauritania, Senegal, 
Benin, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso in the central west; Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi, 
Burundi, Madagascar, Ethiopia, and Eritrea from the central east), periods of positive expansion 
fluctuate with those of persistent reductions in per capita income. 5 
 
Figure 1.2 The evolution of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and ranking based on the ease 
of doing business in African countries 
 
 
Source: Source: Penn World Table, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, 2006 
and World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2007. 
 
 
A. Country by country evolution of GDP per capita, 1950 - 2003 
B. Country by country five-year rate of growth of GDP per capita, 1950 - 2003 
  MUS  SWZ  ZAF  BWA  DZA  NAM  CPV  EGY  MAR  CMR  LSO  MRT  SEN  BEN  KEN  MLI  UGA  BFA  ZMB  TZA  NER  MWI  BDI  MDG  ETH  ERI 
2007  32  76  29  48  116  42  125  165  115  152  114  148  146  137  83  155  107  163  102  142  160  110  166  149  97  170 
2006  32  67  28  44  123  39  125  165  117  147  116  146  152  139  80  166  103  171  92  150  170  106  160  148  96  168 
 
C. Ranking of countries on the ease of doing business, World Bank’s Doing Business Report 
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These per capita income rankings are correlated with the rankings obtained from the World 
Bank’s 2007 Doing Business Report (DBR), presented in panel C of figure 1.2. In 2007 Mauritius, 
Swaziland, South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia rank 32nd, 76th, 29th, 48th, and 42nd
 in the world 
based on the ease-of-doing-business indicators. This index considers questions such as the number of 
days required to start a business and the ease of dealing with licenses, registering a property, trading 
across borders, employing workers, and so on. Other 2007 rankings include 83rd for Kenya, 97th for 
Ethiopia, 165th for Egypt, and 170th for Eritrea. 
To better understand the convergence or divergence of trends, we plotted the per capita income 
of each African country relative to the per capita income of the United States (see panel A of Figure 
1.3). Convergence is observed only in Mauritius, Swaziland, and Botswana. For all other study 
countries, including South Africa, per capita income is diverging from the United States, while in a few 
(Egypt, Morocco, and Cape Verde) the ratio has remained stable. While persistently positive GDP 
growth allowed Mauritius’s per capita income to reach 45 percent of the United States in 2003, this is 
clearly the exception (together with Swaziland and Botswana). For the rest of the countries, including 
South Africa, relative per capita income was much lower in 2003 than in 1960 (indicating divergence). 
In fact, the 2003 per capita income of several countries was no larger than 5 percent of the per capita 
income of the United States. As expected, labor productivity is the main factor explaining this 
divergence in per capita income in Africa (panel B of Figure 1.3), given that labor force participation 
has a steady influence (panel C of Figure 1.3).
5
                                                 
5 The per capita income of country J (Y
J/P
J) is decomposed into labor productivity (Y
J/L
J) and the employment-population 
rate (L
J/P






J), where Y is GDP, L is total labor force, and P is total 
population. 
 Since TFP is usually a key factor explaining the 
evolution of labor productivity, in this paper we seek to use investment climate surveys (ICSs) to 
identify the main infrastructure-related TFP bottlenecks in Africa.  7 
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Source: Penn World Table, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, 2006. 
     
 
 
Figure 1.4 shows the percentage of firms that perceive telecommunications, electricity, customs 
clearance, and transport as major obstacles to their economic performance. Only in Benin, Kenya, and 
Zambia do more than 50 percent of firms identify telecommunications as a severe obstacle. The quality 8 
 
of electricity provision is a major problem for more than 50 percent of firms in more than half of the 
countries in our sample. In Burundi, Cameroon, Benin, Burkina Faso, and Cape Verde, the percentage 
of firms considering electricity as a severe or very severe obstacle exceeds 80 percent; on the other 
hand, only 20 percent of firms in Morocco, South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia consider electricity a 
severe obstacle. Customs clearance is considered an acute problem in Benin, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Senegal, and Algeria. Finally, transportation is considered a severe obstacle by more than 70 percent of 
firms in Burkina Faso and Benin. 
Figure 1.4 Percentage of firms that consider telecommunications, electricity, customs, and 
transport as severe or very severe constraints on economic performance (by country) 
 
A. Telecommunications
























































































































                 
 
            
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IC data. 
Note: No data are available for perceptions of transport in Algeria. 9 
 
Figure 1.5 offers another view of the state of infrastructure in Africa. The World Bank’s ACR 
(2007) evaluates a wide range of factors related to economic activity, infrastructure among them. Once 
again there are clearly different performance levels across the two blocks  of countries. While in 
Namibia, South Africa, Botswana, Egypt, and Morocco the quality of infrastructure exceeds the 
approval level; in the remaining countries this quality is rated low in most cases. The same holds for the 
disaggregated results, including the number of telephone lines and the quality of ports, air transport, 
and electricity supply. 
       Figure 1.5 The state of infrastructure in Africa, at first glance 
 
A. Quality of overall infrastructure























B. Quality of railroad infrastructure























E. Quality of electricity supply













































Total number of telephone lines per 100 inabitants
 
C. Quality of port infrastructure
























                        
                
D. Quality of air transport infrastructure

























       Source: Africa Competitiveness Report (2007), World Bank, Washington, DC.  
       Note: No data are available for Cape Verde, Eritrea, Niger, Senegal, Swaziland, or Zambia. 10 
 
The difference between the two blocks becomes even clearer in figure 1.6, where the cross-plots 
between GDP per capita relative to the United States and firms’  perceptions are presented. A 
preliminary analysis of the cross-plots suggests two points: first, that there is an intuitive and negative 
relation between income level and infrastructure constraints; and, second, that the diversion of the two 
blocks of countries remains intact, showing now the largest dispersion in the constraint perceptions of 
figure 1.6 for the lowest per capita income group. 
Figure 1.6 A simple illustration (cross-plots) of the relation between per capita GDP and 
infrastructure perceptions of severe or very severe obstacles to growth in Africa 
GDP per capita relative to United States 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on IC data. 
Note: No data are available on perceptions of transport in Algeria. 
 
The objective of this paper is to assess the impact of the quality of existing infrastructure on the 
TFP of African firms. This measure is understood to include quality in the provision of the following 
services: customs clearance, energy, water, sanitation, transportation, telecommunications, and 11 
 
information and communications technology (ICT). We also want to identify infrastructure factors with 
statistically significant impacts on TFP, country by country. In the econometric evaluation we use 10 
different measures of TFP and show that the results are robust—no matter what measure of TFP is 
used—if we follow the econometric methodology of Escribano and Guasch (2005, 2008), and 
Escribano et al. (2008). 
For the empirical analysis of infrastructure’s constraints on TFP, we go down to the firm level 
since infrastructure is one of the key elements of a country-specific IC, and a significant component of 
country competitiveness. To provide reliable and robust estimates of the impact of infrastructure on 
economic performance is not a straightforward task. As we will see later on, we have to deal with the 
heterogeneity of the countries included in our sample, and the endogeneity of explanatory variables 
(inputs and IC variables) in several dimensions due to unobservable fixed effects, measurement errors, 
missing observations, and so on. To solve these problems, we take advantage of the useful and rich 
firm-level information provided by the ICSs undertaken by the World Bank in Africa from 2002 to 
2006. These surveys capture firm-level information in a range of areas related to economic 
performance: infrastructure, financing, governance, corruption, crime, regulation, tax policy, labor 
relations, conflict resolution, supplies and marketing, quality, technology, and training, among others. 
These surveys offer information on the production function (PF) variables over one, two, or three years, 
depending on the African country. But for infrastructure and other IC and plant control (C) variables 
they only provide information for a single year. We will see how we can use this valuable information 
to evaluate how firms operate in Africa and to identify the main obstacles to productivity 
improvements.  
Section 2 of this report clarifies the link between this type of empirical work and existing 
literature on infrastructure and productivity. The properties and quality of the ICSs are analyzed in 
section 3. Why we classify the IC factors in broad categories or groups will also be discussed, together 
with the infrastructure variables (INFs) used. In section 4 we present the econometric methodology we 
use to estimate the impact of infrastructure and other IC variables and C characteristics on TFP. Once 
we have estimated the infrastructure and other IC elasticities and semi-elasticities on productivity, we 
evaluate the effects of infrastructure on aggregate productivity and on allocative efficiency, using the 
Olley and Pakes (O&P, 1996) decomposition. The main empirical results are described in the 
remaining sections. In particular, section 5 focuses on the relative importance of infrastructure in the IC 
of each country. Section 6 presents the empirical results country by country, and section 7 includes the 
main conclusions. Most of the tables and figures are included in the Appendix at the end of the paper. 
2. How does infrastructure quality affect economic performance? 
Much literature discusses the different ways that infrastructure affects growth and other development 
outcomes at the macroeconomic level. For example, the World Bank’s landmark World Development 
Report (1994) highlighted multiple links between infrastructure and development and emphasized how 12 
 
policy can improve not only the quantity, but also the quality, of infrastructure services in developing 
countries.  
As Straub (2008) signals, macro level literature has too often sought to obtain the elasticity of 
infrastructure capital and compare it with the elasticity of private capital. Few papers go beyond 
measures of infrastructure spending and infrastructure stocks to consider the issue of infrastructure 
efficiency. Since the seminal paper of Aschauer (1989) found that infrastructure capital has a large 
impact on aggregate TFP, this finding has been replicated by a number of earlier studies: Munnell 
(1990a, 1990b, 1992) for the United States, Mitra et al. (2002) for that of India, and Easterly and 
Rebelo (1993) for cross-sectional country data. Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Calderón (2002) find that a 
telecommunications indicator is robustly related to growth in a large panel data set that includes both 
industrial and developing countries. 
For the case of Africa, studies exploring the relation between infrastructure and growth are 
scarce.
6
The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) Report (2005) and Sachs et al. (2004) have 
explored the African need for new investments in infrastructure, but without a properly systematic 
cross-country analysis. Estache et al. (2005) makes one of the first attempts to conduct a more 
systematic, quantitative assessment of the importance of Sub-Saharan Africa’s infrastructure. The main 
finding of this paper is that electricity, water, roads, and telecommunications are crucial factors in 
promoting growth, with colonial and postcolonial histories also being important factors explaining 
some of the differences among countries. On the other hand, Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) estimate that 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s poor growth performance is, in part, related to under-investments in electricity 
and telecommunications infrastructure. Estache (2005) estimates that if Africa had enjoyed Korea’s 
quantity and quality of infrastructure, it would have raised its annual growth per capita by about 1 
percent. Hulten (1996) finds that differences in the effective use of infrastructure resources explain one-
quarter of the growth differential between Africa and East Asia, and more than 40 percent of the growth 
differential between low- and high-growth countries. 
 Traditionally, infrastructure services have been viewed as public goods in Africa, with their 
provision entrusted to government monopolies. The overall performance of government-owned 
providers of infrastructure in Africa has been very poor. This sector is characterized by high 
inefficiency, a lack of technological dynamism, and very poor service provision. In addition, the 
provision of infrastructure-related services in most African countries is characterized by high prices and 
long waits between the time of application for services and actual connection. Many African economies 
are also endowed with adverse natural and geographical attributes, such as lack of access to sea ports 
and tropical climates. 
Empirical explorations of infrastructure’s effect on growth and productivity, however, have 
been characterized by ambiguous results with little robustness. The possible endogeneity of 
infrastructure measures has been advanced as a reason for contradictory findings of the impact of public 
                                                 
6 Estache (2005) points out the two main reasons for ignoring the role of infrastructure as one of the most important drivers 
of economic growth in Africa: (a) econometric focus on human capital, and (b) low quality of available data. 13 
 
capital on long-run economic development indicators. Literature has signaled that endogeneity in this 
context might come from three sources: (a) measurement errors stemming from the use of public capital 
figures as proxies for infrastructure; (b) omitted variables, which may arise when there is a third 
variable, unobserved, that affects the infrastructure and growth measure; and (c) the fact that under the 
simultaneous determination of infrastructure and productivity or output, the bias and inconsistency of 
standard estimators would follow where infrastructure provision itself positively responds to 
productivity gains.
7
Various panel data and country studies have tried to address these issues. Röller and Waverman 
(2001) explicitly model and estimate the impact of telecommunications under simultaneity. In a cross-
country panel estimation, Calderón and Serven (2003, 2005) employ generalized method of moments 
(GMM) panel estimation methods to control for the possibility of endogeneity, reporting significant 
improvements in results. Dessus and Herrera (1999) allow for simultaneity in a panel data set for 28 
countries. Country-specific time series also confirm the presence of simultaneity between output and 
infrastructure measures—see Frutos et al. (1998) for Spain, and Fedderke et al. (2005) for South Africa. 
Also for South Africa, Fedderke and Bogetic (2006)—controlling for the potential endogeneity of 
infrastructure in estimation—robustly eliminate nearly all evidence of possible overinvestment in 
infrastructure. Indeed, controlling for the possible endogeneity of infrastructure measures renders the 
impact of infrastructure capital positive. Romp and Haan (2005) indicate that when simultaneity is 
taken into consideration, the elasticity estimates found in earlier studies considerably decrease.  
 Possible reasons for such feedback would arise with increased reliance on the 
private sector for the provision of infrastructure services, or with successful lobbying by industry 
interest groups that experience either positive productivity gains or constraints on performance due to 
infrastructure provision. 
Another possibility behind the ambiguous results obtained from empirical studies of public 
capital impacts on output might simply be that aggregate measures of infrastructure hide the 
productivity impact of infrastructure at a more disaggregated level. A second batch of studies, focusing 
mainly on micro data, reveals the existence of the possible indirect impact of infrastructure on 
economic growth and economic performance beyond the effect of the simple accumulation of capital. 
Thus, for instance, Shioji (2001) finds that the positive impact of infrastructure arises in panel data on 
U.S. and Japanese industries once public capital is properly disaggregated. Agénor and Moreno-
Dodson (2006) point out that improvement in the stock of infrastructure can reduce the adjustment 
costs of private capital by (a) lowering the logistical cost of the investment in private capital, and (b) 
allowing the replacement of unproductive private investments such as electricity generators or 
boreholes and wells with more productive investments in machinery and equipment. This assumption 
has been tested in the context of investment climate assessments (ICAs) with firm-level information. 
Reinikka and Svensson (1999) show that improvements in the infrastructure stock in Uganda make 
                                                 
7 Notice that we avoid using the terms causality or reverse causality, since there is no control group to compare against and 
the temporal dimension is not large enough to consider Granger-causality concepts. Therefore, we use the terms simultaneity 
and identification, which are more appropriate for ICSs. 14 
 
infrastructure services more reliable, reducing the necessity of investing in less productive substitutes 
(such as generators) in order to avoid potential service interruptions, and thus freeing funding of private 
productive investments. 
Relationships at a more disaggregated level tend to be obscured by aggregated data, and are 
unobservable with country-level data. Another channel of infrastructure impact is via improvements in 
labor productivity through (a) improved transport between home and work, and (b) more efficient work 
processes. Another way that better infrastructure might increase labor productivity is through 
improvements in health and education, making existing human capital more efficient, and promoting 
successive investments in human capital (Galiani et al., 2005). 
The effect of infrastructure on firms’  international integration has also been tested. Recent 
literature affirms that improvements in transportation services and infrastructure can lead to 
improvements in export performance. Thus, for instance, Francois and Manchin (2006) explore the role 
that infrastructure plays (among other factors such as policy reforms, institutional development, 
colonial history, development assistance, and general north-south differences) in the different trade 
performances observed in the so-called globalizer countries such as India and China, as well as other 
developing countries (many located in Africa and with a very different story to tell regarding the 
integration of the global economy). Limão and Venables (2001) show that infrastructure is 
quantitatively important in determining transport costs, concluding that poor infrastructure accounts for 
much of the different transport costs observed in coastal and landlocked countries. Bougheas et al. 
(1999), in the context of gravity models, find evidence in the European economy  of a positive 
relationship between the level of infrastructure and the volume of trade. Wilson et al. (2004) consider 
ports, customs, regulations, and e-businesses as proxies of trade-facilitation efforts, finding that the 
scope and benefit of unilateral trade-facilitation reforms are very large, and that the gains fall 
disproportionately to exports. 
In a world where governments compete to attract more FDI inflows through a variety of 
investment and tax incentives and other policy preferences, the availability of good-quality physical 
infrastructure could also increase the inflow of FDI by subsidizing the cost of total investment by 
foreign investors and thus raising the rate of return. The favorable role of physical infrastructure in 
influencing patterns of FDI inflows has been corroborated by recent studies, such as those of Loree and 
Guisinger (1995), Mody and Srinivasan (1996), and Kumar (2001), among others. Multinational 
enterprises may consider the quality of available infrastructure especially important while deciding to 
relocate export-platform production undertaken for efficiency considerations. In other words, the 
quality of physical infrastructure could be an important consideration for  multinationals in their 
location choices, for FDI in general, and for efficiency-seeking production in particular. 
As has been pointed out, the main concern of this paper is to offer a robust assessment of the 
various channels through which infrastructure quality may impact TFP. Thus, instead of the quantity of 
macro variables, we use, as an explanatory variable, the quality of existing infrastructure stock. Instead 
of aggregate infrastructure measures usually included in macro models, such as kilometers of paved 
roads or total number of telephone lines, we incorporate measures that allow us to identify direct 15 
 
relationships between infrastructure and economic performance at a more disaggregated level. 
Additionally, by going down to the firm level, we avoid the endogeneity problems of the macro level 
variables. Nevertheless, micro level data have specific endogeneity problems, and several variables 
cannot be considered to be exogenously determined; for instance, public investment decisions are likely 
to be affected by expected returns on investment, and firms faced with different quality and availability 
of infrastructure services would choose different technologies. The solutions proposed in this 
methodology allow us to obtain a robust assessment of the impact of infrastructure quality on TFP.  
3. Country-level data and their treatment in the study 
Produced by the World Bank, ICSs of private enterprises explore the difficulties that firms located in 
developing countries encounter in starting and running businesses. More precisely, the surveys capture 
firms’  experiences in a range of areas related to economic performance: financing, governance, 
corruption, crime, regulation, tax policy, labor relations, conflict resolution, infrastructure, supplies and 
marketing, quality, technology, training, and so on. For that purpose, we classify IC factors in five 
categories to evaluate the impact of each group on economic performance. In the first group—
infrastructure—we include all related variables such as customs clearance, power and water supply, 
telecommunications (including phone connection and information technology, IT), and transportation. 
In the second group—red tape, corruption, and crime—we include IC factors relating to tax rates, 
conflict resolution, crime, bureaucracy, informalities, corruption, and regulations. The next group 
comprises financial and corporate governance and includes factors related to management, investments, 
informalities in sales and purchases, access to finance, and accountability (or auditing). The last group 
of IC variables includes quality, innovation, and labor skills, as well as quality certifications, 
technology usage, product and process innovation, research and development (R&D), quality of labor, 
training, and managers’ experience and education. The last group—other C variables—are not properly 
a group of IC factors, but a group of other firms’ control characteristics. We classify in this group all 
the factors that may have an important impact on economic performance but are not considered IC 
factors: exports and imports, age, FDI, number of competitors, firm size, and so on. Table A.2 (see the 
Appendix) includes the whole list of IC and C variables, as well as a description of how each is 
measured. Likewise, not all surveys provide the same information on ICSs, although there is a common 
group of variables in each group that is available for all the countries; although the regressions among 
them are slightly heterogeneous, we can use this common group as a benchmark for comparison 
purposes. 
The ICSs provide information on TPF variables,  output (sales), employment, intermediate 
materials, capital stock, and labor costs. Table A.1 includes information on these variables and 
indications of how they were measured. The ICSs do not provide information on prices at the firm 
level, so the production function (PF) variables were deflated by using the World Bank’s country-
specific consumer price index (CPI), base 2000. The information on the net book value of the capital 
stock (NBVC) is not available for Algeria, Kenya, Mali, Senegal, and Uganda; in these cases the 16 
 
NBVC is substituted by the replacement cost of machinery and equipment, which, in the surveys, is 
only available for a single year. We thus recursively estimate the missing values of the NBVC from the 
information on the replacement cost of and the net investment in machinery and equipment by using the 
permanent inventory method, according to which the capital stock at moment t is given by Kit=K it-1(1-
δ)+ Iit. By inverting this formula we can obtain the value of the capital at moment t-1 as Kit-1=(K it - 
Iit)/(1-δ) where Kit is approximated with the replacement cost of machinery and equipment, Iit is the net 
investment in machinery and equipment, and δ





In this paper we focus on the manufacturing sector, and while classifying the establishments by 
their international standard of industrial classification (ISIC) code, we end up with establishments from 
the following eight sectors: (a) food and beverages; (b) textiles and apparels; (c) chemicals, rubber, and 
plastics; (d) paper, printing, and publishing; (e) machinery and equipment/metallic products; (f) wood 
and furniture; (g) nonmetallic products; and (h) other manufacturing.  
Classification of countries by geographical area 
For the classification of countries by groups used in the regression analysis, we take into account the 
following facts: (a) the surveys provide different information on PF variables and on IC and C 
variables; (b) the surveys were carried out in different years during the period 2002–6; (c) the quality of 
the data varies across surveys; and (d) not all the surveys provide panel data information (recall data) 
for the PF variables. Thus, we end up with two types of country databases. For those countries with a 
large enough number of observations available for regression analysis (see column 6 of table 3.1) and 
with panel data information for the PF variables (for more than one year), we carry out the analysis 
country by country. For the countries in which surveys were collected in 2006 (which only offer one 
year of information for PF variables) and the number of firms surveyed was lower than in the previous 
surveys, we follow the estimation strategy of pooling the information according to the similarity of 
geographical and economic factors—thus gaining efficiency in the parametrical estimation of the IC 
parameters (with more observations in the regressions) at the cost of having common IC parameters for 
some countries.  
We end up with two pools of 2006 countries: (a) ECOWAS countries, such as Mauritania, 
Cameroon, Niger, and Burkina Faso; and (b) SADC countries, such as Botswana, Namibia, and 
Swaziland. Finally, since Eritrea has only 179 observations available, we consider this country as a 
special region of Ethiopia and carry out a joint analysis of the two, constituting the third pool of 
countries considered in the analysis. 
 
                                                 
8 The depreciation rate used is 15 percent, a standard percentage commonly applied in other works. Other percentages were 
also used in order to check robustness. Alternatively, to check whether the results were robust for other ways of constructing 
the NBVC, we used the next formula Kit-1=K it(1-ΔIit), where Kit is approximated by the replacement cost and ΔIit=(Iit-Iit-1)/Iit-
1 is the rate of growth of the net investment in machinery and equipment. In both cases the main results were maintained. 17 
 
 
Table A.3 Summary of the investment climate assessment (ICA) surveys, sorted by geographical area 
     Year of 
survey 
Years of production 
function (PF) 
variables 
Total number of 
observations1 
Final number of 
observations available for 
regression analysis2 
North Africa 
Algeria  2002  2000–1  952  706 
Egypt  2004  2001–3  2,931  2,629 
Morocco  2003  2000–2  2,550  2,422 
Economic Community of 
West African States 
(ECOWAS) 
Senegal  2003  2000–2  783  535 
Benin  2004  2001–3  591  475 
Mali  2003  2000–2  462  309 
Cape Verde3  2006  2005  47  47 
Mauritania*  2006  2005  80  80 
Burkina Faso*  2006  2005  51  51 
Niger*  2005  2004  64  48 
Cameroon*  2006  2005  119  118 
Horn of Africa 
Ethiopia**  2002  1999–2001  1,281  1,142 
Eritrea**  2002  2000–1  237  179 
East African Community 
(EAC) 
Kenya  2003  2000–2  852  577 
Uganda  2003  2001–2  900  635 
Tanzania  2003  2000–2  828  561 




Malawi  2005  2004–5  320  288 
Madagascar  2005  2002–4  870  623 
Zambia  2002  1999–2001  564  417 
Lesotho3  2003  2000–2  225  79 
Botswana***  2006  2005  114  112 
Namibia***  2006  2005  106  104 
Swaziland***  2006  2005  70  69 
Mauritius  2005  2002–4  636  417 
South Africa  2003  2001–2  1,737  1,492 
Source: Authors´ calculations; ICA data. 
Note:  
1 Total number of observations is equal to the total number of firms surveyed multiplied by the total number of years. 
2 The observations available for regression analysis are the total number of observations minus the observations with any PF variable 
missing and/ or outlier after the cleaning process. 
3 Countries for which no regression analysis was conducted.  
* Countries pooled for regression analysis: Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Cameroon. 
** Countries pooled for regression analysis: Ethiopia and Eritrea. 
*** Countries pooled for regression analysis: Botswana, Namibia, and Swaziland. 
 
Table A.3 offers an initial overview of the data we use in the analysis. We have data for 26 
countries from five different geographical regions. Cape Verde, Lesotho, and Burundi are special cases. 
The PF information for Lesotho is rather poor and it is impossible to make reliable statistical inferences 18 
 
with only 79 observations. We did not group Lesotho with the pool of SADC countries because the 
survey of this country is from 2003 and the information on the IC and C variables is quite different. 
Burundi presents similar problems—the information on the PF for this country is for a single year 
(2005), and the number of observations is only 101. Although Burundi belongs to the EAC—along 
with Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania—we did not pool Burundi with any of these countries because the 
information on the PF and the IC comes from different years and with different information on the IC 
and C variables. Cape Verde is another country with information for a single year (2006) and with only 
47 observations available for regression analysis. Because of its obvious difference from the rest of the 
ECOWAS countries—different per capita income and its condition as an insular state, as well as other 
geographical considerations—we did not include Cape Verde in this pool. As a result, no regression 
analyses were conducted for Cape Verde, Lesotho, and Burundi. 
By running the regressions country by country we can use as many infrastructure and other IC and 
C variables as are available. This allows us to gain heterogeneity estimating the impact of infrastructure 
on productivity. In addition, we can use more variables as proxies for firm-level, unobservable fixed 
effects, and we do not have to constrain ourselves to the subset of IC variables common to all the 
countries. 
Cleaning the data 
The IC databases are, in some respects, troublesome. From table B.1 (see the Appendix) it is clear that 
out of the total number of establishments surveyed there are a considerable number of observations 
with at least one PF variable missing, and/or with outlier observations in the PF variables.
9
                                                 
9 By outliers we mean those observations with ratios of materials to sales and/or labor cost to sales greater than 1.  
  This 
problem becomes more acute for some countries—such as Algeria, Senegal, Eritrea, Tanzania, and 
Mauritius—where more than half the observations are missing for the regression analysis (see the upper 
panel of table B.1), which results in the sample representativity being lost. To reduce the effects of this 
sample selection bias, we apply a preliminary data-cleaning process that allows us to retrieve a 
considerable number of establishments for the analysis; it is based on a robust simple version of the 
EM-algorithm of Dempster et al. (1977) (for more details see Little and Rubin, 1987; Escribano et al., 
2008). First, we exclude those plants with missing values in all the PF variables—sales, materials, 
capital stock, and labor cost. We convert outlier observations of PF variables into missing observations, 
then proceed as follows: (a) we replace the missing values by the corresponding (cells) industry-region-
size median of the variables keeping from 15 to 20 observations in each cell; (b) if we do not have 
enough observations in some cells we replace them with the corresponding industry-size medians; (c) if 
we still do not have enough observations in those cells we replace them with the region-size medians; 
and (d) if still necessary, in the last step we compute the medians only by size and/or by industry to 
replace those missing values. Table B.1 shows that the number of available observations in all the 
countries considerably increases with the application of this data-cleaning process. Tables B.2.1 and 
B.2.2 (see the Appendix) show the distribution of the observations (by country and year, and by 19 
 
country and industry, respectively) before and after the cleaning process. From these tables it is clear 
that this process does not alter much of the original representativity of the ICSs.  
The importance of infrastructure among IC variables 
As has been previously pointed out, we classify the IC factors in several categories to evaluate the 
impact of each group on economic  performance. The infrastructure group of variables (INFs) is 
intended to be part of the country-specific IC. Within the infrastructure group we consider the next list 
of IC variables: customs clearance, energy, water, telecommunications, ICT, and transportation. Table 
B.4 describes the main INFs used in the empirical analysis. 
The variables listed in table B.4 are common to almost all the countries considered, and are 
therefore intended to be a benchmark for comparison purposes; however, there are other country-
specific variables not listed. For a description of the complete set of variables, along with the countries 
for which they are available and the response rate of the variables, see table B.3 in the Appendix. 
Within each infrastructure subgroup we consider different factors. Thus, in the customs 
clearance group the factor considered is the time required to clear customs for exports and imports, and 
the time to get an import license. In the energy group we consider variables that describe the quality of 
power provision (number and average duration of power outages, and subsequent losses), the use of a 
generator as a substitute for the public provision of power, the price of energy either from the public 
grid or from private generators, and the average time waiting to be hooked up for electricity supply. 
Similarly, for the group of water we consider provision quality, price, the use of alternative supplies of 
water (such as private wells or boreholes), and the time to get water supply. In the telecommunications 
and ICT group, the variable considered is the quality of the phone provision and the time to obtain a 
phone connection, as well as the use of ICT technologies (such as Internet or e-mail) in 
communications with clients and suppliers. The transport group mainly incorporates a description of 
the quality of transportation services and dummy variables for the use of own-transport services (roads, 
transportation for workers, and so on). 
From the econometric point of view we use three types of variables: (a) variables in logs, whose 
coefficients are interpreted as elasticities; (b) variables in percentages, whose coefficients can be 
interpreted as semi-elasticities; and (c) dummy variables, for which coefficients from the regressions 
are interpreted as semi-elasticities. 
Finally, some of the variables in the same group are likely to be correlated since they provide 
similar information; for instance, the number and average duration of power outages and subsequent 
losses. In order to avoid multicolinariety problems we do not simultaneously use all variables in the 







Table B.4 Classification of the main infrastructure variables (INFs) 
   Name of the variable  Description of the variable 
Customs 
clearance  
Days to clear customs to import   Average number of days to clear customs when importing (logs) 
Days to clear customs to export   Average number of days to clear customs when exporting directly (logs) 




Dummy for own power infrastructure  Dummy taking value 1 if the firm provides its own power infrastructure, excluding generators 
Dummy for own generator   Dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm has its own power generator 
Electricity from own generator   Percentage of the electricity used by the plant provided by the own generator 
Cost of electricity from generator  Estimated annual cost of generator fuel as percentage of annual sales 
Cost of electricity from public grid   Average cost per kilowatt-hour (Kw/H) when using power from the public grid (logs) 
Dummy for equipment damaged by 
power fluctuations / Equipment 
damaged by power fluctuations 
Dummy taking value 1 if any machine or equipment was damaged by power fluctuations / Value of the 
losses of machinery and equipment damaged by power fluctuations as a percentage of the net book 
value of machinery and equipment (NBVC) 
Power outages / Average duration of 
power outages / Sales lost due to same 
Total number of (logs) / Average duration of (logs) / Percentage of sales loss due to power outages 
suffered by the plant in the last fiscal year (LFY) (conditional on the plant reports having power outages) 
Power fluctuations / Average duration of 
power fluctuations  
Total number of (logs) / Average duration of (logs) power fluctuations suffered in hours (conditional on 
the plant reports having power fluctuations) 
Wait for electric supply   Number of days waiting to obtain an electricity supply (logs) 
Water  Water outages / Average duration of 
water outages /Losses due to same  
Total number of (logs) / Average duration of (logs) / Percentage of sales lost due to water outages 
suffered by the plant in LFY (conditional on the plant reports having water outages) 
Dummy for own well or water 
infrastructure  
Dummy taking value 1 if the plant has its own or shared borehole or well or builds its own water 
infrastructure 
Water from own well or water 
infrastructure  
Percentage of firm’s water supply from its own or shared well 
Cost of water from own well   Total annual cost of self-provided water as a percentage of total annual sales 
Cost of water from public system   Unit cost of using water from the public water system (logs) 
Wait for a water supply   Number of days waiting for a water supply (logs) 
Telecom. 
and ICT 
Phone outages / Average duration of 
phone outages / Losses due to same 
Total number of (logs) / Average duration of (logs) / Percentage of sales lost due to phone outages 
suffered by the plant in LFY (conditional on the plant reports having phone outages) 
Wait for phone connection   Number of days waiting to obtain a phone connection (logs) 
Dummy for e-mail   Dummy variable taking value 1 if the plant mainly uses e-mail to communicate with clients and suppliers 
Dummy for web page   Dummy variable taking value 1 if the plant uses its own Web page to communicate with clients and 
suppliers 
Transport   Transport failures / Average duration of 
transport failures / Sales lost due to 
same 
Total number (logs) of / Average duration of (logs )/ Percentage of sales lost due to transport failures 
suffered by the plant in LFY (conditional on the plant reporting on transport failures) 
Dummy for own roads   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm provides its own roads 
Dummy for own transportation for 
workers  
Dummy taking value 1 if the firm provides its own transportation for workers 
Dummy for contract with transportation 
company  
Dummy taking value 1 if the firm arranges transport services for the delivery of finished products or raw 
materials by directly contracting with the transportation company 
Dummy for own transportation   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm arranges transport services for the delivery of finished products or raw 
materials with its own transportation 
Products with own transport  Percentage of products delivered with firm’s own transport 
Transport delay  Percentage of times that transport services are late in picking up sales for domestic (or international) 
markets at the plant for delivery 
Shipment losses  Percentage of the consignment value of the products shipped for domestic (or international) 
transportation lost while in transit because of theft, breakage, or spoilage 
Sales lost due to delivery delays  Percentage of domestic (or international) sales lost due to delivery delays from suppliers in LFY 
Low quality supplies   Percentage of domestic inputs/supplies that are of lower than agreed-upon quality 
Source: ICS data. 21 
 
 
4.    Evaluating the impact of infrastructure on total factor productivity (TFP) 
Escribano and Guasch (2005, 2008) relate infrastructure and other IC and C variables with firm-level 
productivity (TFP) according to the following observable fixed-effects system of equations: 
 log log log log log it L it M it K it it Y L M K TFP αα α = + ++                            (4.1a) 
, log j it P it i Di TFP w aD α α = ++ ′ +                                                                 (4.1b)  
ii INF i IC i a INF IC α αε = ′′ ++                                                            (4.1c) 
where, Y is firms’ output (sales), L is employment, M denotes intermediate materials, K is the 
capital stock, INF is a time-fixed vector of observable infrastructure variables, IC is a time-fixed effect 
vector of other investment climate and other control variables, and D is a vector of industry and year 
dummies.  
The usually unobserved time fixed effects ( i a ) of the TFP equation (4.1b) is here proxy by the 
set of observed time-fixed components INF and IC variables of (4.1c) and a remaining unobserved 
random effect ( i ε ). The two random error terms of the system,  i ε   and  it w , are assumed to be 
conditionally uncorrelated with the explanatory L, M, K, INF and IC variables
10
log log log log it L it M it K it P it INF i IC i D i YLMK u INF IC D αα α α α αα = + + + ++ ′ ′′ ++
 of equation (4.2): 
.               (4.2) 
Therefore, the regression equation  (4.2) is representing the conditional expectation  plus a 
composite RE error term equal to  it i it u w ε = + . 
Providing reliable and robust estimates of the impact of infrastructure on productivity is not a 
straightforward task. First, because the  functional form of the PF is not observed and there is no 
available single salient TFP measure. Second, there is an identification issue separating TFP from PF. 
When any PF inputs are influenced by unobserved common causes affecting productivity—such as a 
firm’s fixed effects—there is a simultaneous equation problem in equation (4.1a). Third, we could 
expect that several IC variables have at least some degree of endogeneity, questioning therefore the 
conditional lack of correlation of (4.2). In what follows of this section, we briefly review the solutions 
to these questions suggested in Escribano and Guasch (2005, 2008) and Escribano et al. (2008). 
Estimating infrastructure’s impact on productivity 
TFP or multifactor productivity refers to the effects of any variable different from the inputs—labor 
(L), intermediate materials (M), and capital (K)—affecting the production (Y) process. Since there is no 
                                                 
10 Under this formulation (and other standard conditions) the OLS estimator of the productivity equation (4.2) with robust 
standard errors is consistent, although a more efficient estimator (GLS) is given by the random effects (RE) estimator that 
takes into consideration the particular covariance structure of the error term, 
i it w ε + , which introduces a certain type of 
heteroskedasticity in the regression errors of (4.2).  22 
 
single salient measure of productivity (or logTFPi), any empirical evaluation of the productivity impact 
of INFs might critically depend on the particular productivity measure used. Escribano and Guasch 
(2005, 2008) suggested—following the literature on sensitivity analysis  of Magnus and Vasnew 
(2006)—to look for empirical results (elasticities) that are robust across several productivity measures. 
This is also the approach we follow in this paper. 
In particular, we want the elasticities of INFs on productivity (TFP) to be robust (with equal 
signs and similar magnitudes) for the 10 different productivity measures used. Alternative productivity 
measures come from considering: 
•  Different functional forms of the PFs (Cobb-Douglas and Translog) 
•  Different sets of assumptions (technology and market conditions) to get consistent 
estimators based on Solow’s residuals, ordinary least squares (OLS), or random effects 
(RE), and so on 
•  Different levels of aggregation in measuring input-output elasticities (at the industry level or 
at the aggregate country level) 
Box 4.1 Summary of productivity measures and estimated investment climate (IC) elasticities 
1. Solow´s Residual  Two-step 
estimation 
1.1 Restricted coefficient 
1.2 Unrestricted coefficient 
1.1.a OLS  1.1.b RE 
1.2.a OLS 1.2.b RE 
2 (Pit) measures 
4 (IC) elasticities 
2. Cobb-Douglas  Single-step  
estimation 
2.1 Restricted coefficient 
2.2 Unrestricted coefficient 
2.1.a OLS 2.1.b RE 
2.2.a OLS 2.2.b RE 
4 (Pit) measures 
4 (IC) elasticities 
3. Translog  Single-step  
estimation 
3.1 Restricted coefficient 
3.2 Unrestricted coefficient 
3.1.a OLS 3.1.b RE 
3.2.a OLS 3.2.b RE 
4 (Pit) measures 
4 (IC) elasticities 
Total 
      10 (Pit) measures 
12 (IC) elasticities 
Source: Author’s estimations. 
Note: Restricted coefficient = equal input-output elasticities in all industries. 
Unrestricted coefficient = different input-output elasticities by industry. 
Box 4.1 summarizes the productivity measures used for the IC evaluation. The two-step 
estimation starts from the nonparametric approach based on cost shares from Hall (1990) to obtain 
Solow’s residuals in logs under two different assumptions:
11
log it INF i IC i D i P i it TFP INF C D w αε α αα = ++ ′ ′′ Ι+ + +
 (a) the cost shares are constant for all 
plants located in the same country (restricted Solow residual), and (b) the cost shares vary among 
industries in the same country (unrestricted by industry Solow residual). Once we have estimated the 
Solow residuals (logTFPi) in the first step, in the second step we can estimate equation (4.3) by OLS 
with robust standard errors for the countries that have a single year of data (2006) on PF variables. For 
the remaining 14 countries and for the blocks of countries described in section 3, we can also estimate 
(4.3) by RE to obtain the corresponding IC elasticities and semi-elasticities, 
                              (4.3a) 
                                                 
11 The advantage of the Solow residuals is that they require neither the inputs (L, M, K) to be exogenous nor the input-output 
elasticities to be constant or homogeneous (Escribano and Guasch, 2005 and 2008). The drawback is that they require 
having constant returns to scale (CRS) and, at least, competitive input markets. 23 
 
where  INF  is the observable fixed effects vector of infrastructure variables, and IC  is the 
observable fixed effects vector of other IC and control variables listed in table A.2 in the Appendix. In 
all the panel data regressions, we always control for several sector-industry dummies (Dj, j = 1, 2, . . ., 
qD), and in the cases having more than one year of observations we also include a set of time (Dt, t = 1, 
2, . . ., qT) dummy variables and always a constant term (αP).  
For cross-country comparisons based on TFP we use the concept of demeaned TFP,
12
log it INF i IC i Demeaned TFP INF IC αα = + ′′
 which 
gets rid of the constant term as well as the constant effects by industry and by year, concentrating 
therefore on the part of TFP that is influenced by INF, IC, and the other plant-level control variables, 
.                                    (4.3b) 
In the single-step estimation approach, we consider the parametric estimation by OLS and RE 
of the extended PF (4.2). To address the well-known problem of the endogeneity of inputs, we follow 
the  approach proposed by Escribano and Guasch (2005, 2008). That is, we proxy the usually 
unobserved firm-specific fixed effects (which are the main cause of inputs’ endogeneity) by a long list 
of observed firm-specific fixed effects coming from the ICSs. Controlling for the largest set of IC 
variables and plant characteristics, we can get—under standard regularity conditions—consistent and 
unbiased least squares estimators of the parameters of the PF and the INF and IC elasticities. 
Furthermore, we use two different functional forms of the PF—Cobb-Douglas and Translog—under 
two different assumptions on the input-output elasticities: equal input-output elasticities in all industries 
(restricted case) and different input-output elasticities by industries (unrestricted case). 
Notice that even if we are only interested in assessing the impact of infrastructure on TFP, we 
do not limit the scope of the control analysis to only this subset of IC variables. We include (and 
therefore control for) all the IC factors because of the crucial role IC variables play as proxies for the 
unobserved fixed effects; this is the key feature of this methodology in order to provide robust 
empirical results. If we tried to estimate only the impact of infrastructure, without controlling for the 
other blocks of IC variables, we might get different signs on certain coefficients because of the omitted 
variables problem (Escribano and Guasch, 2008). 
Another econometric problem we have to face when estimating the parameters of the INF and 
IC variables—either from the two-step or single-step procedure—is the possible endogeneity of some 
of these variables. That is, many INF or IC variables are likely to be determined simultaneously along 
with any TFP measure. With these productivity equations, the traditional instrumental variable (IV) 
approach is difficult to implement, given that we only have information for one year, and therefore we 
cannot use the natural instruments for inputs, such as those provided by their own lags. As an 
alternative correction for the endogeneity of the INF and IC variables, we use the region-industry-size 
                                                 
12 Notice that the demeaned TFP concept of equation (4.3b) corresponds to the observable part of the fixed effects equation 
(4.1c). 24 
 
average of firm-plant-level INF and IC variables instead of the crude variables,
13 which is a common 
solution in panel data studies at the firm level
14
Using industry-region-size averages also mitigates the effect of having certain missing 
individual INF and IC observations at the plant level, which—as mentioned in section 3—represent one 
of the most important difficulties of using ICSs. As an alternative, we also follow a second strategy to 
deal with the missing values of some INF and IC variables. In order to keep as many observations in 
the regressions as possible to avoid losing efficiency, when the response rate of the variables is large 
enough, we decided to replace those missing observations with the corresponding industry-region-size 
average.
 (see Veeramani and Goldar, 2004, for other use of 
industry-region averages with IC variables). 
15  Thus, we gain observations, efficiency, and representativity at the cost of introducing 
measurement errors into some variables.
16
The econometric methodology applied for the selection of the variables (INF and IC) goes from 
the general to the specific. The otherwise omitted variables that we encounter—starting from a too-
simple model—generate biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. We start the selection of variables 
with a wide set compounded by up to 90 variables (depending on the country). We avoid 
simultaneously using time variables that provide the same information and are likely to be correlated, 
mitigating the problem of multicollinearity that could otherwise arise. We then start removing the less 
significant variables from the regressions one by one, until we obtain the final set of variables, all 
significant in at least one of the regressions and with parameters varying within a reasonable range of 
values. Once we have selected a preliminary model we test for omitted INF and IC variables. 
 
The robust coefficients of the INF and IC variables in productivity, along with their level of 
significance, are available upon from request. The parameters estimated in the two step procedure with 
restricted input-output elasticites can be found in figures 6.1 to 6.23. 
Infrastructure assessment based on O&P decompositions 
According to the O&P (1996) decomposition, aggregate productivity for a given country, industry, or 
region may be decomposed into two terms: (a) average productivity, and (b) a covariance term 
measuring whether the economy is able to efficiently reallocate  resources from  less productive 
establishments to more productive ones. Once we have estimated a robust set of parameters for the IC 
                                                 
13 Because of the low number of available regions in most of the countries, we had to use the industry-region-size variables 
instead of the region-industry averages. For the creation of cells a minimum number of firms are imposed—there must be at 
least 15 to 20 firms in each industry-region-size cell to create the average, otherwise we apply the region-industry averages. 
If the problem persists, we apply the industry-size or the region-size average.  
14 This two-step estimation approach is a simplified version of an instrumental variable (IV) estimator (two-stage least 
squares, 2SLS). 
15 Notice that this replacement strategy has a straightforward weighted least squares interpretation since we are giving a 
greater weight to those observations with more variance (Escribano et al., 2008). 
16 The measurement error introduces a downward bias in the parameters that depends on the ratio between the variances of 
the variables and the measurement error. Since those explanatory variables are constant within regions, sizes, and industries 
we expect their variances will be small. 25 
 
factors with statistically significant impacts on firms’  productivity, we exploit the exact relation, 
proposed by Escribano et al. (2008a), between the terms of the O&P decomposition, and the IC factors 
affecting productivity. The IC infrastructure variables affect both the average productivity of African 
establishments (or firms) as well as their allocative efficiency component. It is well known that 
competitive markets efficiently allocate resources under certain conditions. But in a world of imperfect 
information a turbulent IC introduces distortions into markets, and, as a result, affects the efficiency of 
the economy as a whole. The allocative efficiency term of the O&P decomposition should therefore 
reflect those imperfections.  
In the second part of this analysis—taking advantage of the robustness of the INF, IC, and C 
elasticities estimated—our aim is to concentrate on the TFP measure that comes from the restricted 
Solow’s residuals in order to evaluate the infrastructure effects on average productivity and on 
allocative efficiency based on the O&P decomposition of aggregate productivity in levels, 
   ,, ˆ cov( , )
Y
q q q q it q it TFP TFP s TFP N = + .                                       (4.4a) 
 Furthermore, we want to exploit the log-linear properties of the following mixed
17
  
  O&P 
decomposition for each of the African countries considered in order to obtain closed form O&P 
decompositions in terms of IC and C variables: 
,, ˆ log log cov( ,log )
Y
q q q it q it q TFP TFP s TFP N = + .                          (4.4b) 
Aggregate log productivity of country q, say (logTFPq), is equal to the sum of the sample 
average log productivity of the establishments of country q, and the covariance between the share of 
sales (s
Y
q) and log productivity of that country (allocative efficiency of country q). The index q could 
also indicate a particular industry, region, size, and so on. The useful additive property of equation (4.2) 
in logarithms allows us to obtain an exact closed form solution of the decomposition of aggregate log 
productivity according to equation (4.5). Following Escribano et al. (2008), we can express aggregate 
log productivity as a weighted sum of the average values of the IC, dummy D variables, the intercept, 
and the productivity average residuals ( ö u ) from (4.2), and the sum of the covariances between the 
share of sales and investment climate variables IC, dummies D, and the productivity residuals ( ö u ): 
, ,,
, , , ,,
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ log cov( , )
ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ               cov( , ) cov( , ) cov( , )
Y
q q INF q IC D q p q it q INF q it q i
Y YY
q IC q it q i q Ds q it i q q it q it
u
u
TFP INF IC D s INF
sI C sD s
N
N NN





                  (4.5) 
where the set of estimated parameters used comes from the two-step TFP estimation, having the 
restricted Solow’s residual as a dependent variable in (4.2).  
From equation (4.5) each INF and IC variable may affect the aggregate log productivity through 
both its average and covariance (with respect to the share of sales). This complements the information 
provided by the marginal effects (INF and IC elasticities). Suppose that an INF variable with a low 
                                                 
17 It is called a mixed Olley and Pakes (O&P) decomposition because in the original O&P decomposition both TFP and the 
share of sales were in levels, while TFP in (4.4b) is in logs (log P).  26 
 
impact—in terms of marginal effects (elasticities)—affects most of the firms in a given country; the 
impact of such an IC variable in terms of average productivity could be very high. It is therefore very 
important for policy analysis to combine the empirical evidence from the estimated IC elasticities on 
productivity with their corresponding INF impact on the two components of O&P decompositions: 
average productivity and allocative efficiency. 
A variable with a negative marginal effect on average productivity (or logTFP) may have either 
a positive or a negative effect on allocative efficiency. If the covariance of that IC variable and the 
market share is positive, then the greater proportion of sales in the hands of establishments with high 
levels of that variable, the larger the negative impact on aggregate productivity will be, therefore 
decreasing the allocative efficiency. In contrast, a negative covariance means that those establishments 
with the highest levels of the IC variable have the lowest market shares, and therefore the negative 
effect of the IC variable on average productivity is somehow compensated through the effect on the 
reallocation of resources among firms.  
By operating in (4.5) Escribano et al. (2008) obtained the next expression, which allows us to 
obtain a direct decomposition of the impacts of each INF and IC variable on aggregate productivity 
(logTFPq): 
,,
, , , ,,
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
100 ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ 100 [ ( , )
log
ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ (, ) (,) (, ) ] .       
Y
IC q IC q D i p i q INF q i q i
q
Y YY
q I C qi qi q D qi i q qi qi
u
u
INF IC D cov s INF
TFP
cov s IC cov s D cov s
N
N NN






                (4.6) 
There are several advantages of using equation (4.6). First, we can compare net contributions by 
isolating the impact of INF and other IC variables from the impact of industry dummies, the intercept, 
and the residuals. Second, we can express what portion of aggregate productivity is explained by INF, 
IC, and C variables (demeaned log TFP), and what proportion is due to the constant term, industry 
dummies, and so on. To make cross-country comparisons based on IC impacts on TFP and to avoid the 
problem of comparing apples and oranges, it is desirable to create an index (demeaned TFP). After 
subtracting the mean (that is, the constant term, time effects, industry effects, and country-specific 
effects) from aggregate productivity we can concentrate on the contributions of IC variables to the 
demeaned TFP.  
Similarly, we can construct the demeaned  counterparts of expressions (4.5) and (4.6) and 
compute the percentage contribution of each INF variable or block of IC variables—as in equations 
(4.7) and (4.8), respectively—obtaining the following demeaned mixed O&P decomposition: 
   , , ,, ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ log cov( , ) ´ cov( , )
YY
q INF q IC q q INF q it q i q IC q it q i Demean TFP INF IC s INF s IC NN αα α α =+ +     (4.7) 
, , ,,
100 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ 100 [ ´ ´ ( , ) ( , )].
log
YY
IC q IC q q INF q i q i q IC q i q i
q
INF IC cov s INF cov s IC
Demean TFP
NN αα α α + = ++      (4.8) 
So far, we have exploited the linear properties of the logarithm form of the mixed O&P 
decomposition of TFP. But the original O&P decomposition is based on TFP and the share of sales (in 27 
 
levels), and is therefore also capturing nonlinear relations between market shares and IC variables 
coming from (4.3a). To know to what extent these nonlinear terms are affecting this relation, we 
perform simulation experiments
18
5. The contribution of infrastructure to the investment climate (IC) of Africa 
 on INF, IC, and C variables, and evaluate the consistency of the 
results with the ones obtained from the previous mixed O&P decomposition—see (4.4b). The IC 
simulations are done variable by variable (one at a time) keeping the rest of the variables constant; that 
is, we propose a scenario in which the level of one of the IC variables improves by 20 percent in all 
establishments (20 percent less power outages, 20 percent less shipment losses, etc). We compute the 
corresponding rate of change of aggregate productivity, average productivity, and allocative efficiency 
caused by such a 20 percent improvement. We repeat the same experiment for the rest of the IC and C 
variables, and, for comparative purposes, we also evaluate the relative group of IC variables. 
In section 4 we described the econometric methodology used in section 6 to assess the impact of 
infrastructure on productivity. We suggested three key elements of empirical evaluations of 
infrastructure and other IC and C impacts on productivity: the marginal productivity effects, the 
percentage contributions of infrastructure to aggregate log productivity (mean and efficient 
components), and the simulations of infrastructure improvements on aggregate productivity (in levels). 
In this section we focus on presenting the results of infrastructure contributions to aggregate 
productivity from simulation experiments. In addition to the results of the econometric analysis, we 
consider African firms’  perceptions of the main obstacles to economic performance. In the first 
subsection the objective is to assess how African firms perceive infrastructure quality. This is followed 
in the next subsections by the results of the econometric analysis, focusing on the infrastructure’s effect 
on productivity after controlling for other IC factors. Finally, to complement the robustness of the 
results we check the consistency of the conclusions obtained from both the IC contributions to average 
log TFP and from the TFP simulation experiments. 
Do African firms perceive infrastructure as an obstacle to growth? 
In ICSs, firms are asked to rate a number of IC factors as obstacles to economic performance. The 
survey options offered are no obstacle, minor obstacle, moderate obstacle, major obstacle, or very 
severe obstacle on a broad range of IC aspects: infrastructure, red tape, corruption and crime, finance, 
and labor skills.  
Figure 5.1 shows the degree to which each group of IC factors is perceived by firms as an 
obstacle to economic development. These perceptions are sorted in descending order by their perceived 
contribution to the total, after being normalized to 100. For example, in panel A of figure 5.1, we 
observe that in Cape Verde 25 percent of firms believe infrastructure to be a major or very severe 
obstacle to economic growth; 40 percent find red tape, corruption, and crime as a major or very severe 
                                                 
18 We are indebted to Ariel Pakes for this suggestion. 28 
 
obstacle; 23 percent finance; and 10 percent a lack of labor skills. The countries in which infrastructure 
is perceived as an especially great obstacle to growth are—in descending order—Cape Verde, Burundi, 
Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Cameroon, Ethiopia, and Niger. Countries where a relatively low number of 
firms perceive infrastructure as a major constraint are Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa, and 
Botswana. 




                            
                        
 
 
          
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from IC data. 
Note: * = Number of questions on perceptions by blocks of IC variables: Infrastructure, 4 questions; red tape, corruption, and crime, 9 
questions; finance and corporate governance, 2 questions; labor skills, 2 questions. 
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The factor group with the largest number of sub-factors is red tape, corruption, and crime. So it 
is not surprising that this has the largest percentage of all. In order to isolate this effect, we normalize 
after computing the mean of each IC factor type. For example, in the infrastructure group there are four 
IC sub-factors (telecommunications, customs, electricity, and transportation), whereas the red tape 
group contains eleven sub-factors. But the importance of infrastructure is very similar across countries, 
although obviously the relative contribution of the red-tape group is more balanced, gaining relatively 
more relevance to the other IC groups. 
In the next subsection the results of the econometric analysis—estimating the relative impact of 
infrastructure  on average productivity using simulations—are compared with firms’  perceptions of 
obstacles to growth. The question of interest is: are the econometric results consistent with firm 
perceptions? 
Impact of infrastructure on productivity  
The impact of infrastructure factors on productivity is evaluated here in terms of their effect on the 
O&P decomposition. Infrastructure’s contribution to the aggregate productivity of each country’s 
manufacturing sector is decomposed into its contribution to (a) average productivity and (b) allocative 
efficiency (the ability of markets to reallocate resources from less productive to more productive 
establishments). 
 
Figure 5.2 presents the two alternative country-by-country O&P decompositions given by 
equations (4.4a) and (4.4b), sorted by aggregate productivity in descending order. The productivity 
measure used to calculate the O&P decomposition is the restricted Solow residual obtained from the 
two-step estimation approach (see section 4). We present two sets of results with O&P decompositions. 
Panel A of figure 5.2 shows the O&P decomposition with the restricted Solow residual in levels, and 
panel B shows the mixed O&P decomposition with the restricted Solow residual, in logs, weighted by 
the share of sales. This is important because the results of the simulations are associated with the O&P 
decomposition in levels, and the results from the percentage contributions to the average use the 
convenient additive property of the TFP equation in logs. Notice that both panels A and B preserve the 
rankings of average productivity, but this is not necessary true for aggregate productivity. The reason is 
clear: aggregate productivity is simply the sum of average productivity and allocative efficiency, and 
this second term depends somewhat on whether we use TFP in levels or in log form.
19
 
 From panel A of 
figure 5.2 we observe a positive reallocation of output. That is, output is moving from less productive 
establishments to more productive ones, since in all the countries the allocative efficiency is positive, 
with the greatest effects found in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Niger, and Eritrea. 
 
 
                                                 
19 For a deeper discussion of this issue see Escribano et al. (2008). 30 
 
Figure 5.2 Olley and Pakes (O&P) decompositions of total factor productivity (TFP) 
 
 
A. Olley and Pakes decomposition of TFP 





                                        
   
 
                        
 




Source: Authors’ calculations from IC data. 
Notes: The Olley and Pakes (O&P) decomposition of TFP in levels is obtained from equation 4.4a of section 4. The mixed O&P 
decomposition is obtained from equation 4.4b. Sales in levels are used to compute the share of sales in both O&P decompositions.  
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Figure 5.3 Demeaned O&P decompositions of TFP 
 
 
A. Demean Olley and Pakes decomposition of TFP 
B. Mixed Demean Olley and Pakes decomposition of TFP 
 
   
 
                                             
                                    
              
                        
 




Source: Authors’ calculations from IC data. 
Notes: The demeaned Olley and Pakes (O&P) decomposition of TFP in levels is given by equation 4.7. It is derived from equation 
4.4a, using as the productivity measure the demeaned counterpart of the restricted Solow residual (see equation 4.3b) in levels. The 
demeaned mixed O&P decomposition comes from equation 4.4b, with the demeaned log-TFP of equation 4.3b in logs. Sales in 
levels are used to compute the share of sales in both O&P decompositions. 
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Notice that we avoid direct comparisons of TFP across countries but we suggested in section 4 
to compare demeaned productivity decompositions (see figure 5.2, panels A and B, ). Remember that 
the demeaned productivity (or demeaned TFP) at the firm level is simply firm-level productivity minus 
the constant term of the productivity equation and the industry and year dummies (see equation 4.7).
20
We obtain the O&P decomposition using the demeaned productivity either in levels or in logs. 
This demeaned TFP set of cross-country comparisons is presented in figure 5.3 . Panel A shows the 
decomposition of the demeaned productivity in levels; it is interpreted as the productivity that stems 
from IC conditions after controlling for all the other elements. The results are not at all surprising since 
they are basically consistent with those provided by the per capita income and by the DBR (2007). 
Rankings based on demeaned productivity are topped by South Africa and Mauritius, closely followed 
by Botswana, Algeria, Egypt, Namibia, and Swaziland. The lowest-ranked countries are those with the 
most antiproductive IC, in other words, those whose IC conditions pose difficulties to economic 
development. These countries are Tanzania, Malawi, Uganda, Benin, Mauritania, and Zambia. 
Symmetrically, as for the regular O&P decompositions, the contribution of the IC to aggregate 
demeaned productivity is decomposed into its contributions to average demeaned productivity and the 
allocative demeaned efficiency term (see equation 4.7). Notice that, in Africa, the allocative efficiency 
component is always lower than the effect of average productivity. Nevertheless, in Madagascar, 
Botswana, Mauritius, and other countries, the IC has a considerable effect on the efficient reallocation 
of resources among establishments. 
 
We assume that all the productivity differences resulting from units of measurement, different deflators, 
and so on are contained in the constant, industry, and time-fixed effects, and therefore what is left in the 
productivity measure are only the TFP effects of the infrastructure, IC, and other C variables. 
Alternatively, this demeaned productivity may be interpreted as a sum of pro-  and anti-
productive infrastructure, as well as other IC and C factors. Examples of pro-productive infrastructure 
factors are the use of e-mail and websites. Negative or anti-productive infrastructure factors include the 
number of power outages, the average duration of water outages, and so on. As a consequence, 
productivity will decrease as the importance of anti-productive factors becomes larger and larger; this 
picture becomes even clearer in panel B of figure 5.4  . The demeaned O&P decomposition of TFP in 
logs (see panel B) shows how aggregate productivity may be negative (in Tanzania, Benin, Malawi, 
and so on) when the negative TFP aspects of IC dominate over the positive (pro-productive IC factors 
weigh more than the negative ones), as in the case of South Africa, Mauritius, Egypt, Botswana, and so 
on. 
In sum, in African countries the IC has important effects on the aggregate productivity of the 
manufacturing industry, and this net effect may be positive or negative depending on which IC aspect 
matters more—the pro-productive or the anti-productive. The aim now is to know to what extent such 
decreases or increases in productivity are due to infrastructure or other IC groups.  
                                                 
20 Obviously, the year dummies are only subtracted from the productivity measure of the countries with panel data. 33 
 
Figure 5.4 Demeaned productivity by groups of IC variables: simulations and average contributions 
 
A. Percentage productivity gains from a 20% improvement in the investment climate conditions 
 
                                                 
                                                
                                         
 
 
                                                
                                               
                                    
 
          
 





Source: Authors’ calculations from IC data. 
Note: The simulations are done variable by variable. The total percentage productivity gain from each group of variables 
(infrastructure; red tape, etc.) is computed as the sum of the individual productivity gains caused by the improvement in the IC 
variables of that group (one by one). Therefore, the final productivity gain should be interpreted in ceteris paribus terms: how much 
does productivity increase when the corresponding variable improves by 20 percent, holding everything else constant?  
The productivity gains and losses from the average investment climate come from the decomposition of the demeaned Olley & Pakes 
decomposition in logs by groups of variables (4.8). The productivity gain or loss from the infrastructure group for each country is 
computed as the sum of the percentage contributions to average log-TFP caused by the average individual infrastructure variables. 34 
 
The same holds for the rest of the groups of IC and C variables.  
Figure 5.4, panel A, provides the decomposition of demeaned productivity in levels using 
simulations of improvements to IC variables. When the IC factor improves by 20 percent it could mean, 
for example, that 20 percent more firms are using e-mail, or that there is a 20 percent reduction in 
power outages, and so on—which implies decreases in the negative IC factors and increases in the 
positive ones. The total effect of improving each IC by 20 percent, maintaining the rest of IC factors 
constant, implies that aggregate productivity could increase in South Africa by 55 percent, in Mauritius 
by 30 percent, and so on. From panel A of figure 5.4 it is clear that there are some economies that are 
more likely to be affected by the IC. These are therefore more sensitive to changes in IC conditions. 
This is the case in Kenya and Benin, where the aggregate productivity could increase by 70 percent and 
85 percent, respectively. At the other extreme are Egypt, Morocco, and Eritrea. Lastly, improvements 
to aggregate productivity come in almost all countries via improvements to average productivity, and, 
to a lesser extent, allocative efficiency, with the exception of Algeria, Kenya, and Benin. The role of 
infrastructure in the composition of aggregate productivity is considerable in all the countries, but is the 
greatest in Uganda, Benin, Malawi, Cameroon, and Zambia. This suggests that these countries are the 
most sensitive to changes in infrastructure quality. 
Panel B of figure 5.4 shows a more static interpretation using the O&P decomposition in logs 
by group of variable. In particular, panel B offers information on the actual and current situation of the 
IC and its effect on aggregate productivity; in other words, gains and losses generated by the average 
IC conditions (O&P decomposition of TFP in logs decomposed by groups of INF, IC, and C variables). 
For example, in South Africa, aggregate demeaned TFP is 0.83 (see panel B of figure 5.3). Out of this 
level of productivity -0.9 is explained by the overall contribution of the infrastructure factors; 0.95 by 
red tape, corruption, and crime; and the rest by the remaining IC and C variables. Notice that in panel B 
the contributions of the different groups are not in absolute value, so the positive effect of the pro-
productive factors compensate for the negative effect of the anti-productive ones. Even taking this into 
account, the overall contributions of the infrastructure group are negative in all the countries, implying 
that the pro-productive infrastructure IC factors never compensate for the negative IC effects, with the 
exception of Kenya (where it is slightly positive) and Madagascar, Ethiopia, and Algeria (where the 
contribution of the infrastructure group is close to zero and almost negligible). As expected, the largest 
and most negative infrastructure effect is found in Benin, followed by Malawi, Uganda, Mauritania, 
Cameroon, and Zambia. 37 
 
efficiency term—see equation (4.8). In this case we sum up the different contributions of the INF, IC, 
and C factors of equation (4.8), but in absolute value so that the negative effects do not compensate for 
the positive ones and vice versa, and we compute the relative contribution of each group within the IC 
group as a whole. Therefore, the relative contribution of the infrastructure group is the sum in absolute 
value of all individual infrastructure variables divided by the total absolute contribution of all INF and 
IC variables—multiplied by 100. The largest relative effects of infrastructure on aggregate log 
productivity are found in Malawi (60 percent), Uganda (50 percent), Benin (50 percent), Zambia (47 
percent), and Ethiopia (46 percent). The lowest contributions are in Kenya, Swaziland, and Botswana. 
A similar ranking is provided by panel B, where the effects on the average log productivity are isolated 
from those from the allocative efficiency, as seen in panel C. Once again, Malawi, Benin, Senegal, 
Uganda, and Ethiopia lead a ranking closed by Mauritius, Egypt, Swaziland, Botswana, and Namibia. 
Panel C offers the results for allocative efficiency. In Malawi, Senegal, Namibia, and Algeria, the 
effects of infrastructure on the efficient reallocation of results among firms appear to be very 
significant, reaching the relative contributions of 54 percent, 48 percent, and 46 percent, respectively.
21
Cross-country comparisons  
 
Table C.1 summarizes the empirical results discussed in previous sections. The first column shows 
ranking of African countries based on per capita income, the second based on the DBR (2007), the third 
column based on quality of overall infrastructure (1 minimum, 7 maximum) given in the ACR (2007), 
the fourth column the demeaned aggregate productivity, and the fifth column shows the ranking of 
firms’ perceptions of the quality of infrastructure (from 23rd being the poorest quality to 1st being the 
best quality in our sample). Columns 6 and 7 show the percentage of absolute contributions of 
infrastructure to average log productivity and to allocative efficiency, with TFP in logs, while columns 
8 and 9 show the percentage absolute contributions of infrastructure to average productivity in levels 
and to allocative efficiency via simulations. 
                                                 
21 It is useful to clarify that the differences between the rankings of the contributions to the aggregate productivity via 
simulations of panel A of figure 5.5 and the rankings of the contributions to the aggregate log productivity of panel A of 
figure 5.6 come mainly from the role of the allocative efficiency. Notice that in figure 5.6 the allocative efficiency term 
based on log TFP does not have the same scale as the efficiency term when TFP is in levels. As a result, since aggregate 
productivity is simply the sum of the average productivity and the efficiency term in levels, the role of the efficiency term 
with TFP in levels will increase with respect to its counterpart in logs and therefore, could alter the rankings of countries 
based on the two alternative measures of aggregate productivity (weighted productivity). 38 
 













% abs. contribution 
(rank)
% abs. contribution 
(rank)
% abs. contribution 
(rank)
% abs. contribution 
(rank)
MUS (1) 32 (2) 2.0 (2) 4.2 (1) 13.9 (2) 26.6 (19) 17.1 (18) 21.8 (6) 12.4 (4)
SWZ (2) 76 (5) 1.4 (7) n.a 22.4 (10) 25.6 (21) 14.3 (20) 27.4 (10) 17.6 (10)
ZAF (3) 29 (1) 2.3 (1) 4 (3) 16.2 (5) 28.6 (18) 19.7 (17) 17.4 (4) 11.0 (2)
BWA (4) 48 (4) 1.7 (3) 3.4 (6) 15.6 (4) 17.5 (22) 7.41 (23) 23.2 (8) 8.8 (1)
DZA (5) 116 (12) 1.5 (4) 2.9 (7) 18.3 (7) 48.6 (7) 31.1 (4) 34.9 (18) 26.4 (17)
NAM (6) 42 (3) 1.5 (6) 4.2 (2) 18.3 (6) 16.5 (23) 32.9 (3) 22.7 (7) 36.7 (20)
EGY (7) 165 (22) 1.5 (5) 3.7 (4) 14.0 (3) 26.0 (20) 23.8 (12) 19.9 (5) 16.1 (8)
MAR (8) 115 (11) 1.1 (9) 3.6 (5) 9.9 (1) 31.3 (15) 16.6 (19) 16.2 (3) 14.8 (6)
CMR (9) 152 (18) 0.8 (16) 1.9 (18) 27.5 (23) 41.6 (10) 25.4 (11) 31.2 (13) 23.2 (13)
MRT (10) 148 (16) 0.6 (19) 2.1 (15) 25.3 (17) 35.4 (11) 21.1 (15) 28.3 (12) 16.2 (9)
SEN (11) 146 (15) 0.9 (12) n.a 22.7 (11) 58.5 (3) 40.9 (2) 52.1 (21) 42.2 (22)
BEN (12) 137 (13) 0.6 (20) 2.1 (11) 25.6 (18) 59.9 (2) 12.4 (21) 33.3 (17) 23.3 (14)
KEN (13) 83 (6) 1.0 (11) 2.8 (8) 25.6 (19) 30.3 (17) 19.9 (16) 26.1 (9) 23.2 (12)
MLI (14) 155 (19) 0.9 (14) 2.1 (14) 21.6 (9) 42.7 (9) 26.8 (9) 42.5 (19) 33.5 (19)
UGA (15) 107 (9) 0.6 (21) 2 (17) 23.3 (12) 58.4 (4) 29.8 (5) 45.4 (20) 42.0 (21)
BFA (16) 163 (21) 0.8 (15) 2.1 (12) 26.9 (22) 35.3 (12) 27.0 (8) 27.6 (11) 12.0 (3)
ZMB (17) 102 (8) 0.7 (18) n.a 24.0 (14) 50.6 (6) 26.8 (10) 15.4 (2) 15.1 (7)
TZA (18) 142 (14) 0.2 (23) 2.7 (9) 24.3 (15) 34.1 (14) 28.3 (6) 32.3 (15) 29.1 (18)
NER (19) 160 (20) 0.8 (17) n.a 26.2 (20) 34.7 (13) 11.1 (22) 31.6 (14) 22.1 (11)
MWI (20) 110 (10) 0.4 (22) 2.1 (13) 24.5 (16) 65.9 (1) 45.8 (1) 53.7 (22) 55.2 (23)
MDG (21) 149 (17) 1.4 (8) 2 (16) 23.5 (13) 30.6 (16) 27.9 (7) 11.1 (1) 14.3 (5)
ETH (22) 97 (7) 1.0 (10) 2.3 (10) 26.7 (21) 52.6 (5) 21.9 (14) 33.2 (16) 25.0 (15)
ERI (23) 170 (23) 0.9 (13) n.a 20.7 (8) 46.1 (8) 22.5 (13) 54.7 (23) 25.3 (16)



















Perc. Contributions of infrastructure to 
log-productivity
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using ICA data, DBR (2007), ACR (2007), and Penn World Table. 
Note: n.a = not available. 
The rankings presented in the first five columns are very consistent. In particular, the ranking 
based on demeaned aggregate productivity (column 4) shows a clear positive correlation to per capita 
GDP and with the ranking based on the DBR rankings. From the results of the rankings obtained from 
the first five columns we find two groups of African countries, as was suggested by looking at the 
growth rates of per capita GDP (see figure 1.2, panel B). That is: (a) countries in the north and south of 
Africa are relatively more successful, and (b) countries from the central-east and central-west regions of 
Africa are relatively less successful. 
The last four columns show two alternative measures of the percentage absolute contribution of 
infrastructure to productivity, along with the ranking in parentheses. In particular, column 6 shows a 
negative correlation between the ranking based on the contribution of IC to average log TFP and per 
capita GDP and also with the ranking based on the DBR, indicating that low infrastructure quality is 
one of the key growth bottlenecks in Africa. The results show a great homogeneity among the rankings 
in the first four columns and the results from the econometric analysis. Thus, for instance, Mauritius is 
ranked 1st in terms of per capita income and quality of overall infrastructure in the ACR (2007), 2nd 
according to the DBR (2007) and firms’ perceptions, 19th (out of 23) according to the impact of the 
INF variables on the average log productivity, and 18th (out of 23) with respect to the allocative 
efficiency in logs. In these cases the correlation with firm growth is negative, signaling again that 
infrastructure quality is an important growth bottleneck in Africa. 39 
 
Egypt and Morocco are interesting cases. Both countries show a relatively high quality of 
infrastructure according to the ACR and perception rankings, and the results of the econometric 
analysis confirm this. Egypt is 4th and Morocco is 5th in the rankings based on demeaned aggregate 
productivity, and both have one of the lowest contributions of infrastructure to TFP. 
Countries with the poorest infrastructure quality, according to ACR (2007) and firms’ 
perceptions, are Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Ethiopia. Once again this is consistent with the 
econometric analysis done for these countries, showing a great negative influence of infrastructure on 
productivity. Cameroon and Burkina Faso are ranked among the countries with the highest contribution 
of infrastructure to average productivity. The influence of infrastructure on Ethiopia’s manufacturing 
sector productivity is also very high, with a relative contribution equal to 52.6 percent of the total IC 
effect.  
The following set of figures provides some additional evidence on the relation between 
measures of countries’  economic performance and TFP based on our econometric analysis. The 
previous conclusions become more apparent by looking at the cross-plots. Figure 5.7 shows a clear 
positive correlation between GDP per capita and demeaned aggregate productivity, with a correlation 
coefficient equal to 0.81. Notice that this positive relationship has a decreasing dispersion as per capita 
income grows; that is, for those African countries with a per capita GDP lower than 10 percent of that 
of the United States, demeaned aggregate productivity presents a more heterogeneous behavior. The 
conclusion obtained from figures 5.8 and 5.9 are similar. Those countries that are high in the ranking 
based on ease of doing business (DBR) also have a large demeaned aggregate productivity, with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.77. The same is true for the positive relationship between the quality of 
overall infrastructure and the ACR (2007)—the more productive the manufacturing firm is, the higher 
the contribution of overall infrastructure quality to TFP (correlation coefficient equal to 0.76). 
A question of interest is whether those countries with the lowest demeaned aggregate 
productivity levels are also those with the greatest impact of infrastructure on firm’s perceptions, on 
average productivity, and on allocative efficiency. Figures 5.10 and 5.12 provide clear answers to these 
questions. Figure 5.10 shows the negative correlation between the mixed demeaned aggregate 
productivity and firm’s perceptions of growth bottlenecks, with a correlation coefficient of 0.76. The 
absolute contribution of infrastructure to both average log productivity and average productivity via 
simulations decreases as the demeaned aggregate productivity increases. This relation is stronger in the 
case of the absolute percentage contribution to the average log productivity since the corresponding 
coefficients of correlations are -0.60 (figure 5.11) and -0.49 (figure 5.12). 42 
 
6. Country-by-country results 
In the preceding section we evaluated the relative weight of infrastructure among IC variables. In this 
section the objective is to present a summary of the main results, country by country, focusing on the 
impact of the individual infrastructure factors or variables. We measure the strength of infrastructure’s 
impact on TFP through three different procedures: (a) elasticities or semi-elasticities, (b) simulations, 
and (c) evaluation of the IC regressions impact on the sample mean of the variables. 
These three sets of results provide complementary information. The elasticities and semi-
elasticities measure the impact of a change in an independent variable (infrastructure factors or other IC 
and C variables) on the dependent variable (productivity). But elasticities and semi-elasticities are not 
directly comparable.  
On the other hand, simulations measure how the dependent variable changes from scenario A, 
in which the infrastructure and other IC and C factors are as observed by the survey, to scenario B, in 
which one of the infrastructure factors improves by, say, 20 percent. From this we can make the 
following assertions: If the number of power outages suffered by firms in country X is reduced by 20 
percent, then the average productivity (or the allocative efficiency) could increase by Y  percent, 
holding everything else constant.  
Finally, the evaluation at the sample means of the regression variables, as opposed to the 
simulations, is a static exact decomposition of the terms of the mixed O&P decomposition. We can 
evaluate the contributions of all the INF, IC, and C factors to the sample mean of average log 
productivity, identifying the relative importance of each infrastructure variable (for example, losses due 
to the number of water outages or transport failures) in net terms or in absolute terms. 
The next subsection focuses on the results of each of the 23 countries. The results are presented 
in a series of country-specific figures 6.1–6.23. The figures also report the results for the productivity 
equation. The first panel of each figure shows the elasticities and semi-elasticities; the second and third 
panels focus on the relative contribution of the INF variables to the average log productivity and to the 
allocative efficiency in logs; and the fourth and fifth panels present the results of the simulations (that 
is, how much the average productivity and the allocative efficiency would increase if we improve the 
INF variables).  
Note that the results on the elasticities and semi-elasticities are not comparable since they use 
different measurement scales. For purposes of comparison we should rely on the simulations and on the 
results of the contributions to the average. 
In the interest of space, we focus only on the major results for each country. 44 
 
Figure 6.3 Impact of infrastructure on productivity in Botswana 
 
Figure 6.4 Impact of infrastructure on productivity in Burkina Faso 
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6.1 Infrastructure impacts on TFP by country 
High-growth countries in southern Africa 
Mauritius (MUS). Mauritius is the top-ranked in terms of per capita GDP and demeaned aggregate 
productivity, and the second according to the DBR (2007) and firms’ perceptions of the quality of 
infrastructure (Table C.1). The relative contribution of infrastructure to average log productivity is 26.6 
percent—one of the lowest among the African countries considered (see figure 5.5, panel B, and figure 
6.14, panel B). The most important constraint on productivity comes from the number of days to clear 
customs for exports (17 percent on average) (see figure 6.14); 5.2 percent is due to the use of IC 
technologies (positive factor); and low-quality provision of electricity and water accounts for only 2 
percent of the average log productivity.  
Swaziland (SWZ). Swaziland is ranked second in terms of per capita GDP (Table C.1). 
Productivity of firms is negatively affected by shipment losses in customs, the number of power 
outages, and the average duration of transport by road (see figure 6.20). These results are common to 
Namibia and Botswana since the countries are pooled together for estimation. The use of generators has 
a positive sign, meaning that it stimulates productivity. Country-specific results for Swaziland show 
that the largest contribution to average log productivity comes from problems in customs during the 
export process (10 percent), and from the number of power outages (9 percent). 
South Africa (ZAF). South Africa is ranked third based on per capita GDP and demeaned 
aggregate productivity (Table C.1). Productivity is negatively affected by the days to clear customs to 
import, the sales lost due to power outages, the number of water outages, the time waiting for an 
electricity supply, and sales lost due to delivery delays. Therefore, the low quality of the customs 
services, electricity services, and water affects productivity performance at the firm level in South 
Africa. The contribution to average log TFP of electricity provision is 6.9 percent, and the contribution 
of water provision is 5.7 percent. Time wasted in customs while importing accounts for 9.4 percent of 
the average log productivity. Lastly, problems in transport services represent 5.7 percent of average log 
productivity (see figure 6.19).  
Botswana (BWA). Botswana is ranked fourth based on per capita income (DBR, 2007) and on 
perceptions and sixth in terms of demeaned aggregate productivity. The productivity of firms located in 
Botswana is affected by shipment losses in customs while exporting (negative), power outages 
(negative), the percentage of electricity that comes from firm’s own generators (positive), and the 
average duration of transport by road (negative) (see panel A of figure 6.3 and panel B of figure 5.5). 
These marginal effects are common to Namibia and Swaziland since the countries are pooled together 
for estimation. Country-specific results show that the largest contributor to both average log 
productivity and to allocative efficiency is shipment loss in customs while exporting (panel B). 
Simulations show that the largest productivity improvement comes from reduction in power outages 
(panel D of figure 6.3). That is, according to our simulations, if the number of power outages suffered 
by firms in Botswana were reduced by 20 percent, average productivity could increase by 2.1 percent. 56 
 
Namibia (NAM). Namibia is ranked sixth in terms of per capita GDP and ACR (2007) (Table 
C.1). Productivity of firms is negatively affected by shipment losses in customs while exporting, the 
number of power outages, and the average duration of transport by road (see figure 6.16). These results 
are common to Botswana and Swaziland since the countries are pooled together for estimation. 
Country-specific results show that the impact of infrastructure on the productivity of manufacturing 
firms in Namibia mainly comes from problems in customs while exporting—this factor represents 9 
percent of the average log productivity. Problems from electricity provision (power outages) and from 
use of alternative power infrastructure (such as a generator) represent 2.2 percent and 3 percent of the 
average log productivity, respectively, in absolute terms (figure 6.16).  
High-growth countries in North Africa 
Algeria (DZA). Algeria is ranked fifth in terms of per capita GDP, and seventh in terms of firm 
perceptions and demeaned aggregate productivity. The results on the productivity impact  of 
infrastructure (see figure 6.1) show the total effect on absolute value is as large as 48.6 percent of 
average log TFP. The quality of infrastructure variables affecting TFP are: cost of exports, having an 
own generator, number of power outages, losses due to water outages, having an own well, the cost of 
water from the public system, having e-mail, and low-quality supplies. The largest and most positive 
effect comes from having e-mail, which could represent 14.5 percent of average log TFP. 
Egypt (EGY). Egypt is ranked seventh based on per capita GDP, sixth in terms of ACR (2007), 
fourth in terms of demeaned aggregate TFP, and third in firms’ perceptions of infrastructure quality. 
From the econometric analysis, the contribution of infrastructure to the average log productivity in 
Egypt is only 26 percent. The main infrastructure factors affecting firms’ productivity are the average 
duration of water and power outages (both with negative effects), the percentage of firms with their 
own generator (positive effect), the dummy for own transportation (positive), shipment losses in 
exports (negative), and days of inventory of the main supply (negative) (figure 6.6).  
Morocco (MAR). The perceptions of the managers of the Moroccan firms suggest that 
infrastructure is not a major concern when compared to other IC constraints; it is ranked first in Table 
C.1. But according to figure 6.15, the contribution of infrastructure to average log productivity is 31.3 
percent, with the largest impacts coming from (a) the average time to clear customs to import, and (b) 
the time wasted to obtain a phone connection. A 20 percent reduction of average customs delays for 
imports could increase average productivity by 1.6 percent and allocative efficiency by 0.4 percent. 
Notice, that the ranking based on the econometric analysis (demeaned aggregate productivity) is 
consistent with the ranking based on per capita GDP (see Table C.1), which establishes that Morocco is 
in eighth position, not first. 
Low-growth countries in central-west Africa 
Cameroon (CMR). Cameroon is rank ninth in term of per capita GDP, which is somehow surprising if 
we compare it with the results of the rest of the rankings based on DBR (2007), ACR (2007), firms’ 
perceptions, and demeaned aggregate productivity. We found that the productivity of manufacturing 57 
 
firms in Cameroon is reduced by the following factors: number of days required to clear customs for 
imports, average duration of power and of water outages, shipment losses, and time waiting for a phone 
connection (panel A of figure 6.5). These factors are common to Mauritania, Burkina Faso, and Niger 
since the countries are pooled together for estimation purposes. Country-specific results show that the 
largest contributions to average log productivity come from the number of days waiting to clear 
customs, duration of power outages, and from the time waiting for a phone connection (panel B of 6.5). 
Infrastructure represents 41.6 percent of average log TFP.  
Mauritania (MRT). Mauritania ranks 10th in terms of per capita GDP, 13th in term of the total 
absolute contribution of infrastructure to average log productivity, 17th in terms of firm perceptions, 
and 15th in terms of demeaned aggregate productivity. These results are common to Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Niger, Ethiopia, and Eritrea since those countries are pooled together for estimation 
purposes. Delays in customs while importing represent 22 percent of average log productivity and 12 
percent of allocative efficiency. In terms of simulation, a 20 percent improvement in this variable could 
cause a 13.9 percent increase in average productivity and a 7.8 percent one in allocative efficiency. 
Low-quality provision of electricity and water and its indirect costs also reduce average productivity in 
Mauritania (see figure 6.13).  
Senegal (SEN). Senegal reveals a high infrastructure impact on the TFP of manufacturing 
firms. The percentage contribution of infrastructure to the average log productivity of this country is 
58.5 percent; the indirect costs stemming from the low-quality provision of electricity represent 9.3 
percent of this (see figure 6.18). The use of own-power infrastructure partially alleviates the negative 
impact of the low quality of electricity provision. The relative importance of problems in transport 
services (such as low-quality supplies) is very high; this variable represents 23.4 percent of average log 
productivity and 14 percent of allocative efficiency. A 20 percent reduction in the percentage of low-
quality supplies received may cause a 3.2 percent increase in average productivity. Notice that the 
simulation of a 20 percent improvement in the percentage of low-quality supplies received causes a 
decrease in allocative efficiency of -0.4 percent. The reason for this phenomenon is clear: the allocative 
efficiency is simply the covariance between productivity at the firm level and share of sales. Therefore, 
a negative rate of change of the allocative efficiency indicates that the firms receiving a larger share of 
low-quality supplies are those with the largest market shares. 
Benin (BEN). Benin is ranked 12th in per capita GDP, 11th in terms of demeaned aggregate 
productivity, and 13th in terms of DBR (2007). The time waiting for phone connections and to clear 
customs in order to export are the two factors that most negatively contribute to average log 
productivity (see panel B of figure 6.2). An independent 20 percent improvement in these two variables 
could increase average productivity by 3.8 percent and 4.3 percent, respectively (panel D of figure 6.2). 
The same holds for the allocative efficiency term (panels C and E). 
Mali (MLI). Mali is ranked 14th in per capita GDP terms, in demeaned aggregate productivity, 
and in the ACR (2007). The total contribution of infrastructure to average log productivity in Mali is 
42.7 percent. The low quality of electricity, water, and phone provision accounts for almost 32 percent 58 
 
of the average log productivity. The use of firms’ own roads is a factor that increases productivity 
(figure 6.12).  
Burkina Faso (BFA). Burkina Faso ranks  16th and 12th in terms of per capita GDP and 
demeaned aggregate TFP, respectively. The main infrastructure problems are clearing customs while 
importing, the average duration of power and water outages, shipment losses, and time waiting to 
obtain a phone connection. These results are common to Mauritania, Cameroon, and Niger since these 
countries are pooled for estimation. In particular, for Burkina Faso, all of these factors reduce 
productivity at the firm level (see figure 6.4) and can contribute to 35 percent of average log TFP.  
Niger (NER). Niger is one of the poorest countries in our sample: it ranks 19th based on per 
capita income, and managers’  perceptions show a great concern regarding quality of current 
infrastructure (20th in the rank). The absolute contribution of infrastructure to average log productivity 
is 34.7 percent, with 20.7 percent due to problems  clearing customs while importing, 9.4 percent due to 
the average time wasted in obtaining a phone connection, and 4.5 percent due to the cumulated negative 
effect of the low-quality provision of electricity and water and the poor transport system (see figure 
6.17).  
Low-growth countries in central-east Africa 
Kenya (KEN). Kenya ranked 13th in per capita GDP, 6th in terms of DBR (2007), and 8th in terms of 
demeaned aggregate productivity. The results of the productivity equation in Kenya show multiple 
interrelationships between productivity at the firm level, on one hand, and infrastructure, on the other. 
Factors such as the use of generators, the cost of electricity from the public grid, water outages, sales 
lost due to power outages, and so on, reduce productivity at the firm level (see figure 6.9). Although the 
contribution to the average log productivity of any of these factors is over 6 percent, infrastructure as a 
whole accounts for 30 percent of average log productivity, and for 19.9 percent of allocative efficiency 
(which illustrates the major influence infrastructure has on Kenyan firms’ productivity).  
Uganda (UGA). Uganda is ranked 15th in per capita GDP and 17th in demeaned aggregate 
productivity. Uganda’s average log productivity is strongly influenced by infrastructure conditions, 
representing 58.4 percent. The two main factors affecting average productivity are the time to clear 
customs and the provision of electricity (figure 6.22, panel D). 
Zambia  (ZMB).  Zambia ranks 17th in terms of per capita GDP, 14th in terms of firm 
perceptions, and 18th in terms of the ACR (2007) .The contribution of the cost of electricity from the 
public grid to average log productivity in Zambia is 32.5 percent. The contribution of the average 
duration of power outages to average log TFP is 9.1 percent (see figure 6.23). The total contribution of 
infrastructure to average TFP is 50.6 percent. 
Tanzania (TZA). Tanzania is 18th based on per capita GDP, 14th in terms of DBR (2007), and 
15th in terms of firm perceptions. The absolute contribution of infrastructure to average log 
productivity in Tanzania is 34.1 percent. Out of this, 14.8 percent is due to time wasted waiting for 
water supply and 5.5 percent is due to the number of transport outages (figure 6.21).  59 
 
Malawi (MWI). Malawi is ranked 20th in per capita GDP terms and 22nd in terms of ACR 
(2007). The econometric evidence shows that the aggregate productivity of Malawian’s manufacturing 
firms are dramatically affected by infrastructure quality (83 percent of average log TFP). Delays in 
clearing customs while importing account for 25 percent of the average log productivity. A 20 percent 
improvement in this variable could increase the average productivity by 6 percent and the allocative 
efficiency by 1.5 percent (see panels D and E of figure 6.11). Symmetrically, productivity decreases as 
the number of power outages increases; the percentage contribution of this variable to average log 
productivity is 9.2 percent and to the allocative efficiency is 3.5 percent. The cost of electricity from 
firms’ own generators is another antiproductive factor. Water provision also impacts the productivity of 
Malawian firms (figure 6.11).  
Madagascar (MDG). Madagascar is ranked 21st in per capita GDP terms, and 16th and 17th in 
terms of demeaned aggregate productivity and DBR (2007), respectively. How infrastructure may 
impact firm-level productivity is clear from the results obtained in figure 6.10. The factors related to 
electricity supply are intimately linked to productivity. Water costs and the number of phone outages 
also reduce productivity at the firm level. The total contribution of infrastructure to average log 
productivity in Madagascar is 31 percent and to allocative efficiency is 28 percent. 
Ethiopia (ETH). Ethiopia is ranked 22nd in terms of per capita GDP and 21st in terms of firms’ 
perceptions. The productivity of Ethiopian manufacturing firms is negatively affected by the days to 
clear customs to import, the cost of electricity from the public grid, shipment losses while in transit, and 
the percentage of supplies that are of lower than agreed-upon quality. Positive effects on productivity 
come from the percentage of electricity from firms’ own generators and from the days of inventory of 
the main supply. These results are common to Eritrea since the countries are pooled together for 
estimation. The largest contribution to the average log productivity is by the days of inventory of main 
supply, days to clear customs to import, the cost of electricity from the public grid, and the electricity 
from firms’ own generators (figure 6.8). In total, infrastructure represents 32 percent of average log 
TFP, which seems too low. This might indicate that pooling with Eritrea for estimation of IC elasticities 
might not be a good idea in this case. 
Eritrea (ERI). Eritrea is the last country in the ranking, in 23rd position in terms of per capita 
GDP. The total number of days waiting to clear customs to import, the cost of electricity from the 
public grid, shipment losses, and low-quality supplies are the factors with negative effects on firms’ 
productivity (see figure 6.7). Remember that these results are common to Ethiopia since the countries 
are pooled together for estimation. The cost of energy from the public grid accounts for a 22.9 percent 
of average log productivity, almost 50 percent more than the second factor (days to clear customs to 
export) in order of importance. In total, infrastructure represents 48 percent of average log TFP. 
6.2 Summary of the main empirical results 
The aim of this subsection is to summarize the main empirical results obtained, country by country, 
including the absolute percentage contribution of the infrastructure group of variables to the sample 60 
 
means of productivity in logs. The customs clearance subgroup includes those variables related to the 
ease or difficulty of clearing customs when exporting or importing. Within provision of electricity we 
have grouped all the variables related to low-quality provision of electricity (number of power outages, 
power fluctuations, cost of electricity, and so on). Use of power infrastructure is intended to enclose all 
the variables related to the use of alternative sources of energy, such as generators. Similarly, the 
subgroups provision of water and provision of phone connections includes all the variables related to 
the quality of the provision of these utilities, whereas use of water infrastructure includes the use of 
firms’ own wells or boreholes to replace the public provision of water. Obviously, use of ICT takes into 
account the use of ICT in firms’ commercial operations. Lastly, transport services contains all variables 
relating to the quality of transportation services, such as shipment losses in transit, transport delays, 
delivery delays, and so on. Own transport infrastructure includes the use of own transportation for 
products or workers. 
Figure 6.24 shows the prominent influence of low-quality electricity provision on average log 
productivity in the different countries considered in this report. The percentage absolute contribution of 
this group of variables to average log productivity ranges from 34.1 percent in Zambia to 0.3 percent in 
Morocco, being a negative effect in all cases. Only in Tanzania was the low quality of electricity 
provision not statistically significant, probably due to the significant and very influential effect of water 
provision in this country. The low quality of electricity  and the continuous outages are partially 
alleviated by the use of own-power infrastructure, as the positive effect of the group use of power 
infrastructure shows. 
Another group of variables with a statistically high impact on average log productivity is 
customs clearance. The contributions of this group are negative and very large in most countries, 
indicating a clear and pervasive constraining effect of the time wasted in customs when importing or 
exporting. 
 
Figure 6.24 Infrastructure’s impact on average log productivity by key factors (I) 
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Source: Author’s calculations with IC data. 
Note: Customs clearance includes: days to clear customs to export and import; shipment losses in customs; inspections in customs; wait for an import 
license. Provision of electricity includes: power outages; avg. duration of power outages; losses due to power outages, wait for an electricity supply; 
power fluctuations; avg. duration of power fluctuations; cost of electricity from the public grid; cost of electricity from private system. Use of power 
infrastructures includes: dummy for own generator; electricity from own generator; dummy for own power infrastructures (excl. generators). Provision of 
water includes: water outages; avg. duration of water outages; losses due to water outages, wait for a water supply; cost of water from the public grid; 
cost of water from private system. Use of water infrastructures includes: dummy for own water infrastructures; water from own well. Provision of phone 
includes: phone outages; avg. duration of phone outages; losses due to phone outages, wait for a phone connection. Use of ICT includes: dummy for e-
mail; dummy for webpage. Transport services includes: sales lost due to transport delays; sales lost due to delivery delays; shipment losses; low quality 
supplies; transport delays. Own transport infrastructures include: dummy for own roads; dummy for own transportation for workers; products with own 
transport. Other: inventories, illegal payments to obtain public utilities. 
 
Regarding provision of water, the relative importance of this group of variables is lower when 
compared to the provision of electricity; nevertheless, there are some cases (such as Tanzania, Mali, 
and Kenya) where the contribution of this group of variables is very high, even compared to the 
provision of electricity. As with the provision of electricity, the use of alternative water infrastructure 
such as boreholes or wells has a positive impact on plants’ productivity—an effect that only appears to 
be significant when there is a negative effect of water provision, suggesting the existence of a 
replacement effect between the public provision of water and alternative supplies of water. 
The poor quality of phone provision is negatively related to productivity in 14 countries; 
nevertheless, the quantitative contribution of this group of variables is, in general, lower than the 
impact of the electricity provision. Benin is an exception. The contribution to the average log 
productivity of telephone provision in this country is 40.8 percent—more than 20 times the contribution 
of electricity provision, which is only 2 percent. The use of IC technologies is positively related to 
productivity, but the use of these technologies was only significant in the productivity regressions of six 
countries: Malawi, Algeria, Tanzania, Kenya, Morocco, and Mauritius, with the largest impacts in 
Algeria (14.5 percent) and Mauritius (5.2 percent). 
Problems with product transport are negatively related to productivity in all the cases, with the 
exception of Botswana, Swaziland, and Namibia, for which no variables for this group were significant 
in productivity regressions. The largest impacts of this subgroup of variables were seen in Senegal, 62 
 
Tanzania, Madagascar, South Africa, and Zambia; nevertheless, the contributions of transport services 
to average log productivity are relatively lower than the impact of the provision of electricity or the 
customs clearance subgroups. On the other hand, the use of own-transport infrastructure stimulates 
productivity growth; in all the cases in which any variable belonging to this subgroup was significant in 
the productivity regressions, it appeared with a positive sign. But the positive effects on productivity of 
these factors were concentrated in only seven countries: Malawi, Benin, Senegal, Eritrea, Tanzania, 
Kenya, and Egypt. 
Figure 6.25  provides similar information, but, in this case, we have grouped the different 
infrastructure factors in only five groups: customs clearance, electricity, water, telecommunications 
and ICT, and transportation. From this figure the high influence of electricity factors become even 
clearer. When we include the provision of electricity and use of generators or power infrastructure into 
a single group, the resulting block of electricity factors can explain more than half of average log 
productivity in Uganda, Ethiopia, Zambia, Eritrea, Swaziland, and Botswana. The water group is 
relatively important in Tanzania, Kenya, and Egypt. The customs clearance group gains importance in 
those countries with a more patent export orientation, such as Mauritius, Botswana, and Namibia. 
Finally, as has been signaled, the transportation subgroup explains more than half of the whole 
infrastructure impact on average log productivity in Senegal and Madagascar. 
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Source: Author’s calculations with IC data. 
Note: For a description of the variables contained in each group see footnote in Figure 6.24 
 
Figure 6.26 reports the absolute percentage contribution of infrastructure by key factors via 
simulations. The results are fully consistent with the ones provided by figure 6.24. The relative weights 
of the electricity factors dominate in more than half the countries, and the water and 
telecommunications and ICT subgroups tend to play a secondary role in explaining average 
productivity when compared to electricity. The main difference with respect to figure 6.24 is the lower 
relative weight of the customs clearance group. Once again, it should be pointed out that the 63 
 
information provided by the simulations complements the results from the evaluation of the sample 
average of log productivity. In this case, we are talking about a cumulative effect, all other things being 
equal, since we evaluate the change in the average productivity when one of the INFs changes. 
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Source: Author’s calculations with IC data. 
Note: For a description of the variables contained in each group see footnote in Figure 6.24 
 
The summary of results is complemented by the analysis of allocative efficiency. Figures 6.27 
and 6.28 show that the impact of infrastructure on allocative efficiency is equally distributed among the 
different infrastructure factors. The impact of water is, in this case, larger than in the case of average 
productivity, while the impact of energy provision is considerably less—gaining relative importance 
with the use of own generators. The positive effect of the use of own generators on allocative efficiency 
indicates that those firms that accumulate a larger proportion of market sales are also the firms that use 
their own generators. The same holds for the use of IC technologies and the use of own-water 
infrastructure. The customs clearance group has important implications for the allocative efficiency of 
Namibia, Mauritania, and Botswana. Finally, the quality of transport services plays a secondary role in 
explaining the behavior of allocative efficiency in the different countries included in our sample. 
Figure 6.27 Infrastructure impact on allocative efficiency in logs by key factors (I) 
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Source: Author’s calculations with IC data. 
Note: For a description of the variables contained in each group see footnote in Figure 6.24 
 
Figure 6.28 organizes the different subgroups of infrastructure factors into five key groups. 
From this figure, the important contribution of the electricity subgroup becomes even clearer. 
Transportation explains more than 50 percent of the allocative efficiency in logs of Morocco. Once 
again, the relative importance of the water, telecommunications, and ICT subgroups is lower when 
compared to the contribution of electricity and customs clearance. 
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For Africa’s awaited growth resurgence to occur, a broad range of factors—political, institutional, and 
economic—must be improved. The World Bank’s landmark Africa Competitiveness Reports (2004 and 
2007) focus on problems that inhibit economic growth. It is agreed that improving Africa’s 
infrastructure is a crucial step toward penetrating international markets and meeting the goals of 
continuous growth and poverty reduction.  
Infrastructure quality has a pervasive influence on all areas of an economy. Low-quality 
infrastructure and limited transport and trade services increase logistical and transaction costs, 
rendering otherwise competitive products uncompetitive, as well as limiting rural production and 
people’s access to markets—with adverse effects on economic activity and poverty. A large number of 
empirical studies illustrate the impact of infrastructure on economic performance. All suggest that 
Africa’s infrastructure gap is an important growth bottleneck, with a negative impact on productivity 
and the overall competitiveness of the region. Using the methodology of Escribano and Guasch (2005, 
2008) and Escribano et al. (2008), several studies have found empirical evidence—in cases such as 
Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Turkey, and several Southeast Asian countries—that improvements 
in investment climate conditions in general, and in infrastructure quality in particular, may lead to 
important gains in productivity and in other economic performance measures: employment, real wages, 
exporting activities, and inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI).  
Approach and methods 
This paper provided a systematic, empirical assessment of the impact of infrastructure quality on the 
TFP of African manufacturing firms. We applied micro-econometric techniques to investment climate 
surveys of 26 African countries to gauge the impact of infrastructure quality on TFP.  
For each country we estimated, by regression techniques, the impact of infrastructure quality 
based on 10 different productivity measures and showed that the results were robust once we controlled 
for other observable fixed effects (red tape, corruption and crime, finance, innovation and labor skills, 
and so on) obtained from the investment climate surveys (see Escribano and Guasch, 2005, 2008).  
We pooled data from the investment climate surveys only for the few African countries for 
which we did not have sufficient observations for estimation purposes. Otherwise, we performed a 
country-by-country estimation to reveal firm and industry information by country. After pooling the 
data from several countries, the econometric results were then suitably disaggregated following the 
method of Olley and Pakes (1996) (Escribano et al., 2008), which allowed us to make country-specific 
evaluations of the impact of investment-climate quality on aggregate TFP, average TFP, and allocative 
efficiency.  
We ranked the African countries in the study according to several aggregate indices: per capita 
income, ease of doing business, firm perceptions of growth bottlenecks, and the recent concept of 66 
 
demeaned productivity (demeaned TFP), which overcame the problem of comparing apples and 
oranges when doing TFP cross-country comparisons (Escribano et al., 2008). We found the concept of 
demeaned productivity very useful because it is highly correlated with per capita income, ease of doing 
business indices, firm’s perceptions of growth bottlenecks, and  the results of the Africa 
Competitiveness Reports. Furthermore, the information obtained from the investment-climate 
determinants of demeaned TFP provided a much deeper insight into the firm-level investment-climate 
infrastructure elements that are constraining productivity growth in African countries. 
We distinguished two clear blocks of countries in Africa.  
The first block comprised countries with faster, steadier growth rates. These are mainly in the 
south, including Mauritius, Swaziland, South Africa, Botswana, Namibia, and Lesotho. The block also 
included Algeria, Morocco, and Egypt from the north, and Cape Verde and Cameroon from Central 
Africa. In southern Africa Botswana, Namibia, and Swaziland, were pooled for estimation purposes. 
In the second block were Mauritania, Senegal, Benin, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso in the 
central-west; and Uganda, Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi, Burundi, Madagascar, Ethiopia, and 
Eritrea in the central-east. These countries have experienced lower and more irregular growth rates, 
with periods of both positive increase and persistent decrease in per capita income. Pooled for 
estimation purposes were the West African states (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mauritania, and Niger) 
and Eritrea and Ethiopia. 
Of the 26 African countries analyzed, Mauritius was, in 1950, the country with the highest per 
capita income (measured in terms of per capita gross domestic product, GDP), followed closely by 
South Africa, and, by a larger gap, Namibia and Algeria. But the per capita income levels in 2003 were 
somewhat different; Mauritius was still ranked first, followed by Swaziland, South Africa, and 
Botswana—and, by a wider gap—Algeria, Cape Verde, Egypt, and Morocco. Mauritius and Botswana 
experienced the highest sustained per capita income growth during recent years. Lesotho’s rate is the 
median, splitting the study into two blocks. 
To better understand the convergence or divergence of trends, we plotted the per capita income 
of each African country relative to the per capita income of the United States. Convergence was 
observed only in Mauritius, Swaziland, and Botswana. For all other study countries, including South 
Africa, per capita income was found to be diverging from the United States, while, in a few (Egypt, 
Morocco, and Cape Verde) the ratio was stable. While persistently positive GDP growth allowed 
Mauritius’s per capita income to reach 45 percent of the United States’ in 2003, this was clearly the 
exception (together with Swaziland and Botswana). For the rest of the countries, including South 
Africa, relative per capita income was much lower in 2003 than in 1960 (indicating a divergence). In 
fact, the 2003 per capita income of several countries was no larger than 5 percent of the per capita 
income of the United States. As expected, labor productivity was the main factor explaining this 
divergence, given that labor force participation has a steady influence. Since total factor productivity 
(TFP) is usually a key factor explaining the evolution of labor productivity, in this paper we used 
investment climate surveys to identify the main infrastructure-related TFP bottlenecks in Africa.  67 
 
The per capita income rankings were correlated with the rankings obtained from the World 
Bank’s 2007 Doing Business  report. In 2007 Mauritius, Swaziland, South Africa, Botswana, and 
Namibia ranked 32nd, 76th, 29th, 48th, and 42nd
 in the world based on the ease-of-doing-business 
indicators. This index considers questions such as the number of days required to start a business and 
the ease of dealing with licenses, registering a property, trading across borders, employing workers, and 
so on. Other 2007 rankings include 83rd for Kenya, 97th for Ethiopia, 165th for Egypt, and 170th for 
Eritrea. 
We showed the percentage of firms that perceived telecommunications, electricity, customs 
clearance, and transport as major obstacles to their economic performance. Only in Benin, Kenya, and 
Zambia did more than 50 percent of firms identify telecommunications as a severe obstacle. 
Meanwhile, the quality of electricity provision is a major problem for more than 50 percent of firms in 
more than half of the countries in our sample. In Burundi, Cameroon, Benin, Burkina Faso, and Cape 
Verde, the percentage of firms considering electricity as a severe or very severe obstacle exceeded 80 
percent; on the other hand, only 20 percent of firms in Morocco, South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia 
considered electricity a severe obstacle. Customs clearance was considered an acute problem in Benin, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal, and Algeria. Finally, transportation was considered a severe obstacle by 
more than 70 percent of firms in Burkina Faso and Benin. 
The World Bank’s 2007 Africa Competitiveness Report evaluated a wide range of factors 
related to economic activity, with infrastructure among them. Once again there were clearly different 
performance levels across the two blocks of countries. While in Namibia, South Africa, Botswana, 
Egypt, and Morocco, the quality of infrastructure exceeded the approval level, in the remaining 
countries this quality was rated low in most cases. The same held for the disaggregated results, 
including the number of telephone lines and the quality of ports, air transport, and electricity supply. 
The difference between the two blocks becomes even more apparent when looking at the cross-
plots between GDP per capita relative to the United States and firms’  perceptions. A preliminary 
analysis of the cross-plots suggests two points: first, that there is an intuitive and negative relation 
between income level and infrastructure constraints; and, second, that the division of the two blocks of 
countries remains intact, showing now the largest dispersion in the constraint perceptions for the lowest 
per capita income group. 
Findings 
Among the countries of the high-income-growth block, infrastructure has a low impact on TFP (see 
panel B of figures 5.5 and 5.6 and panel A of figure 6.24). Red, tape, corruption, and crime dominate 
over infrastructure in countries such as Mauritius, Egypt, and South Africa (figure 5.5, panel B). 
Infrastructure quality has a high impact on TFP in the countries of the low-income-growth block (see 
panel B of figures 5.5 and 5.6 and panel A of figure 6.24), but the impact is very negative (see panel B 
of figures 5.3 and 5.4), identifying important bottlenecks for TFP growth. 68 
 
We found much heterogeneity among individual infrastructure factors affecting countries in 
both the high- and low-growth blocks (see figure 6.26). Among related factors that most influence the 
average productivity TFP of African firms are:  
•  Poor-quality  electricity  provision, which affects mainly poor countries, such as Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Mali, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia, and Kenya. It also affects countries that are growing 
faster, in relative terms, such as Botswana, Namibia, and Swaziland. 
•  Problems dealing with customs  during importing or exporting affects mainly fast-growing 
countries, such as Mauritius, Morocco, and Swaziland. But low quality of customs also affects 
slow-growing countries, such as Niger, Mauritania, Cameroon, Malawi, Burkina Faso, and 
others.  
•  Losses from transport interruptions  affect mainly slower-growing countries, such as 
Madagascar, Kenya, Tanzania, and Senegal. 
•  Water outages  affect mainly slower-growing countries, such as Tanzania, Kenya, Burkina 
Faso, Mauritania, Niger, and Mali. But it also affects some of the faster-growing countries, 
such as Egypt. 
 Of the infrastructure determinants that most influence the allocative efficiency of African firms 
there is also some heterogeneity across countries.  
•  Poor-quality electricity provision affects the allocative efficiency of mainly poor countries, 
such as Zambia, Mali, Uganda, Eritrea, and Kenya. 
•  Problems dealing with customs  while importing or exporting affects mainly slow-growing 
countries, such as Mauritania, Niger, and Cameroon. But it also affects the allocation 
efficiency of countries that are growing fast, such as Morocco, Namibia, and Mauritius.  
•  Transport services affects the allocative efficiency of mainly slower-growing countries, such 
as Madagascar, Senegal, and Tanzania. 
•  Water provision affects the allocative efficiency of mainly slower-growing countries, such as 
Tanzania, Kenya, and Mali.  
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Appendix: Tables  
Table A.1  General information on firms and industries and on production function (PF) variables 




(a) Food and beverages; (b) textiles and apparels; (c) chemicals, rubber, and plastics; (d) paper, 
printing, and publishing; (e) machinery and equipment/metallic products; (f) wood and furniture; (g) 
nonmetallic products; and (h) other manufacturing. 
Size classification  Small firms: less than 20 employees; medium firms in between 20 and 99 employees; large firms 
more than 99 employees. 
Country/Region 
classification 
1) Algeria: Region A, Region B, Region C, Region D  
2) Benin: South (coastal), rest of country (rainforest)  
3) Botswana: Francistown, Gaborone  
4) Burkina Faso: Ouagadougou, rest of country 
5) Burundi: Bujumbura  
6) Cameroon: Bafoussam, Douala, Yaounde 
7) Cape Verde: Mindelo, Praia  
8) Eritrea: Eritrea 
9) Ethiopia: Addis Ababa, Awasa, Bahir Dar, Dire Adwa, Mekele, Nazareth, Gondar, Adigrat, Harar, 
Adwa, rest of country  
10) Kenya: Nairobi, rest of country 
11) Madagascar: Antananarivo, rest of country  
12) Malawi: Blantyre, Lilongwe, rest of country 
13) Mali: Bamako, rest of country 
14) Mauritania: Noauadhibou, Nouakchott  
15)  Mauritius: Port Louis, Beau Bassin, Vacoas Phoenix, Curepipe, Quatre Bornes, other 16) 
Morocco: Settat, Nador, Casablanca, Rabat, Fes, Tanger 
17) Namibia: Walvis Bay, Windhoek 
18) Niger: Maradi, Niamey  
19) Senegal: Dakar, rest of country 
20) South Africa: Gauteng, Kwazulu, Natal, Western Cape, Eastern Cape 
21) Swaziland: Matsapha, Manzini, Mbabane 
22)  Tanzania: Dar es Salaam, Kilimanjaro, Tanga/Arusha, Lake Victoria, South, Zanzibar; 23) 
Uganda: Central, North East, South West 
24) Lesotho: Maseru, rest of country 
25) Egypt: Cairo, Suez Channel, Qualyubia, Menoufiya, Alexandria, Nile Delta, Sharkiya, Lower 
Egypt 




Sales  Used as the measure of output for the PF estimation. Sales are defined as total annual sales. The 
series are deflated by using the consumer price index (CPI), base 2000. 
Employment  Total number of permanent (full-time) and temporal (full-time) workers.  
Total hours worked 
per year  Total number of employees multiplied by the average hours worked per year. 
Materials  Total costs of intermediate and raw materials used in production (excluding fuel). The series are 
deflated by using the CPI deflator, base 2000. 
Capital stock 
Net book value of machinery and equipment (NBVC); for those countries which the net book value is 
not available it is replaced by the replacement cost of machinery and equipment. The series are 
deflated by using the CPI deflator, base 2000. 
User cost of capital  The user cost of capital is defined in terms of the opportunity cost of using capital; it is defined as the 
15 percent of the value of the capital stock. 
Labor cost  Total expenditures on personnel, deflated by using the CPI deflator, base 2000. 
Source: IC data. 
Note: All figures are in U.S. dollars.   74 
Table A.2.1  Definition of investment climate (IC) variables; infrastructure 
Name of the variable  Description of the variable 
Days to clear customs to import   Average number of days to clear customs when importing. 
Longest number of days to clear 
customs to import   Longest number of days to clear customs when importing. 
Days to clear customs to export   Average number of days to clear customs when exporting directly. 
Longest number of days to clear 
customs to export   Longest number of days to clear customs when exporting directly. 
Cost to clear customs to export 
Total cost to clear customs for a typical consignment as a percentage of the consignment value (including 
payments to clearing agents, storage fees, container handling fees, and gifts or informal payments to customs 
officials). 
Inspections in customs  Percentage of establishment’s exports that were physically inspected during last financial year (LFY). 
Shipment losses in customs to export  Percentage of the consignment value of the products shipped to be exported that was lost while in transit because 
of breakage or spoilage. 
Dummy for profit from export facilities   Dummy taking value 1 if the plants enjoy a export facility such as customs duty drawback, duty suspension on 
imported inputs, profit tax exemption, and so on. 
Cost of exports   Percent of the value of export earnings was transport costs. 
Dummy for public mechanism to cover 
risks in exports  Dummy taking value 1 if the firm has a public mechanism to cover risk of nonpayment of exported products. 
Dummy for outside clearing agent for 
imports   Dummy variable taking value 1 if the firms uses an agent to facilitate customs clearance for imports. 
Average number of days to clear an 
outgoing container through port  Average time of clearing an outgoing container through a port clear (including preshipment inspection). 
Cost to clear an outgoing container 
through port   Average cost of clearing an outgoing container through a port clear (including preshipment inspection). 
Average number of days to clear an 
incoming container through port  Average time of clearing an incoming container through a port clear (including preshipment inspection). 
Cost to clear an incoming container 
through port   Average cost of clearing an incoming container through a port clear (including preshipment inspection). 
Dummy for own power infrastructure  Dummy taking value 1 if the firm provides its own power infrastructure, excluding generators. 
Dummy for own generator   Dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm has its own power generator. 
Electricity from own generator   Percentage of the electricity used by the plant provided by a own generator. 
Cost of electricity from generator   Estimated annual cost of generator fuel as percentage of annual sales. 
Cost of electricity from public grid   Average cost per kilowatt-hour (KwH) when using power from the public grid. 
Dummy for equipment damaged by 
power fluctuations  Dummy taking value 1 if any machine or equipment was damaged by power fluctuations. 
Equipment damaged by power 
fluctuations 
Value of the losses of machinery and equipment damaged by power fluctuations as a percentage of the net book 
value of machinery and equipment (NBVC). 
Power outages   Total number of power outages suffered by the plant in LFY. 
Average duration of power outages   Average duration of power outages suffered in hours, conditional on the pant reports having power outages. 
Power fluctuations   Total number of power fluctuations suffered by the plant in LFY. 
Average duration of power fluctuations   Average duration of power fluctuations suffered in hours, conditional on the plant reports having power 
fluctuations. 
Sales lost due to power outages   Losses due to power outages as a percentage of total annual sales, conditional on the plant reports having power 
outages.  
Water outages   Total number of water outages suffered by the plant in LFY. 
Average duration of water outages   Average duration of water outages suffered in hours, conditional on the plant reports having water outages. 
Sales lost due to water outages   Losses due to water outages as a percentage of total annual sales, conditional on the plant reports having power 
outages.  
Dummy for own well or water 
infrastructure   Dummy taking value 1 if the plant has its own or shared borehole or well, or builds its own water infrastructure.  
Water from own well or water  Percentage of firm’s water supply from its own or shared well.   75 
infrastructure  
Cost of water from own well   Total annual cost of self-provided water as a percentage of total annual sales. 
Cost of water from public system   Unit cost of using water from the public water system. 
Phone outages   Total number of phone outages suffered by the plant in LFY. 
Average duration of phone outages   Average duration of phone outages suffered in hours, conditional on the plant reports having water outages. 
Losses due to phone outages  Losses due to phone outages as a percentage of total annual sales, conditional on the plant reports having power 
outages.  
Transport failures   Total number of transport failures suffered by the plant in LFY. 
Average duration of transport failures  Average duration of transport failures suffered in hours, conditional on the plant reports having water outages. 
Sales lost due to transport failures  Losses due to transport failures as a percentage of total annual sales, conditional on the plant reports having 
power outages.  
Source: IC data.   76 
Table A.2.1  Definition of IC variables; infrastructure (cont.) 
Name of the variable  Description of the variable 
Average duration of transport  Time in hours that it takes to ship the inputs transported by road from the point of origin to the establishment. 
Public postal service interruptions  Total number of public postal service interruptions suffered by the plant in LFY. 
Average duration of public postal service 
interruptions 
Average duration of public postal service interruptions suffered in hours, conditional on the plant reports having 
water outages. 
Sales lost due to public postal service 
interruptions 
Losses due to public postal service interruptions as a percentage of total annual sales, conditional on the plant 
reports having power outages.  
Dummy for own roads   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm provides its own roads. 
Dummy for own transportation for 
workers   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm provides its transportation for workers. 
Dummy for own waste disposal   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm provides its own waste disposal. 
Dummy for contract with transportation 
company  
Dummy taking value 1 if the firm arranges transport services for the delivery of finished products, or raw 
materials by direct contract with transportation company. 
Dummy for own transportation   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm arranges transport services for the delivery of finished products, or raw 
materials with its own transportation. 
Products with own transport  Percentage of products delivered with firm’s own transport. 
Transport delay, outgoing domestic 
merchandise 
Percentage of times that transport services are late in picking up sales for domestic markets at the plant for 
delivery. 
Transport delay, outgoing export 
merchandise   Percentage of times that transport services are late in picking up sales for exports at the plant for delivery. 
Transport delay, incoming domestic 
merchandise 
Percentage of times that transport services are late in dropping off supplies from domestic sources at the plant 
for delivery. 
Transport delay, incoming export 
merchandise   Percentage of times that transport services are late in dropping off direct imports at the plant for delivery. 
Shipment losses, domestic   Percentage of the consignment value of the products shipped for domestic transportation lost while in transit 
because of theft, breakage, or spoilage. 
Shipment losses, exports   Percentage of the consignment value of the products shipped for international transportation lost while in transit 
because of theft, breakage, or spoilage. 
Dummy for e-mail   Dummy variable taking value 1 if the plant mainly uses e-mail to communicate with clients and suppliers. 
Dummy for Web page   Dummy variable taking value 1 if the plant uses its own Web page to communicate with clients and suppliers. 
Wait for phone connection   Number of days waiting to obtain a phone connection. 
Dummy for gifts to obtain a phone 
connection   Gifts expected or requested to obtain a phone supply. 
Wait for electric supply   Number of days waiting to obtain an electricity supply. 
Dummy for gifts to obtain a electric 
supply   Gifts expected or requested to obtain an electrical connection. 
Wait for a water supply   Number of days waiting for a water supply. 
Dummy for gifts to obtain a water supply  Gifts expected or requested to obtain a water supply. 
Wait for an import license   Number of days waiting for an import license. 
Dummy for gifts to obtain an import 
license   Gifts expected or requested to obtain an import license. 
Low quality supplies   Percentage of domestic inputs/supplies that are of lower than agreed-upon quality. 
Sales lost due to delivery delays, 
domestic   Percentage of domestic sales lost due to delivery delays from suppliers in LFY. 
Sales lost due to delivery delays, imports   Percentage of exports lost due to delivery delays from suppliers in LFY. 
Transport delays in domestic sales   Percentage of domestic sales lost due to delays in transportation services in LFY. 
Transport delays in international sales   Percentage of exports lost due to delays in transportation services in LFY. 
Illegal payments to obtain public utilities   Amount (as a percentage of total annual sales) spent by a typical establishment in “unofficial payments” for 
public utilities (that is, power, water and sewage, and telephone). 
Days of inventory of main supply   Average number of days (measured in production days) that the main input is available on stock. 
Days of inventory of finished goods   Average number of days (measured in production days) that the main output is available on stock.   77 
Source: IC data. 
Table A.2.2    Definition of IC variables; red tape, corruption, and crime 
Name of the variable  Description of the variable 
Manager’s time spent in bureaucratic issues   In typical week percentage of manager’s time spent dealing with bureaucratic issues. 
Payments to deal with bureaucratic issues   Total payments as a percentage of total annual sales to “speed up” bureaucratic issues. 
Illegal payments to obtain licenses   Amount (as a percentage of total annual sales) spent by a typical establishment in “unofficial payments” for 
licenses from government institutions, for example, a city council. 
Illegal payments to tax administration  Amount (as a percentage of total annual sales) spent by a typical establishment in “unofficial payments” to tax 
administration. 
Wait for a construction permit   Days waiting to obtain a construction permit. 
Dummy for gifts to obtain a construction 
permit   Gifts expected or requested to obtain a construction permit. 
Wait for an operating license   Days waiting to obtain a main operating license. 
Gifts to obtain an operating license   Gifts expected or requested to obtain a main operating license. 
Sales declared to taxes   Percentage of total annual sales that a typical firm operating in plant’s sector reports for tax purposes. 
Workforce declared to taxes   Percentage of total workforce that a typical firm operating in plant’s sector reports for tax purposes. 
Days in inspections   Total number of inspections from regulatory agencies received by the plant in LFY. 
Dummy for gifts in inspections   Dummy taking value 1 if any informal gift or payment were requested during inspections from regulatory agencies. 
Dummy for lawyer/consultant to help deal 
with permissions 
Dummy taking value 1 if the plant uses/used a lawyer and/or consultant to help obtaining all the permissions and 
licenses needed to operate/enter the market.  
Payments to obtain a contract with the 
government   Payments to obtain a contract with the government as a percentage of contract value. 
Dummy for law-influencing firm   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm seeks to influence local or national laws. 
Overdue payments to private customers   Percentage of total sales to private enterprises that involved overdue payments in LFY. 
Overdue payments to state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs)  Percentage of total sales to government agencies or SOEs that involved overdue payments in LFY. 
Weeks to resolve a case of overdue 
payment   Percentage of overdue payments that required the action of a court to be solved. 
Overdue payments in courts   Percentage of total sales to private enterprises that involved overdue payments that were resolved in courts in LFY. 
Weeks to resolve an overdue payment in 
courts   Weeks that it takes to resolve a typical case of overdue payment in courts 
Security expenses   Security expenses as a percentage of annual total sales. 
Dummy for security expenses   Dummy taking value 1 if the plant has security expenses. 
Illegal payments in protection   Cost in illegal payments to avoid violence, for example to criminal organizations. 
Dummy for payments in protection   Dummy taking value 1 if the plant has cost in illegal payments to avoid violence. 
Cost to avoid pilferage from workers   Cost in illegal payments to reduce pilferage by workers. 
Dummy for cost to avoid pilferage from 
workers   Dummy taking value 1 if the plant has costs to reduce pilferage by workers. 
Crime losses   Crime losses as a percentage of annual total sales in LFY. 
Dummy for crime losses   Dummy taking value 1 if the plant has experienced losses due to criminal attempts in LFY. 
Crimes reported to police   Percentage of criminal attempts reported to the police. 
Crimes solved by police   Percentage of criminal attempts solved by the police. 
Days of production lost due to civil unrest  Total number of production days lost due to civil unrest during LFY. 
Days of production lost due to absenteeism  Total number of production days lost due to employees absenteeism during LFY. 
Dummy for tax exemption   Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the labor regulation has affected plant’s employment decisions. 
Dummy for lawsuit in the last 3 years  Dummy taking value 1 if the plant had any lawsuit during the last 3 years   78 
Dummy for “gifts” for credit   Dummy if the firm had to offer a gift or an informal payment to get a credit. 
Dummy for interventionist labor regulation  Dummy taking value 1 if plant’s decisions on hiring and/or firing workers have been influenced by labor regulations. 
Total days spent with licenses   Total number of days that were spent dealing with licenses LFY. 
Dummy for accountant to accomplish taxes  Dummy if the firm uses an accountant or consultant to accomplish taxes. 
Dummy for gifts to tax inspectors  Dummy if the firm had to offer a gift or an informal payment to tax inspectors. 
Gifts to tax inspectors   Amount (as a percentage of total annual sales) paid to tax inspectors in gifts and/or irregular payments. 
Dummy for labor conflicts   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm had any conflict with employees during LFY. 
Average time to hire a skilled worker  Average days that it takes to hire a skilled production worker. 
Dummy for conflicts with suppliers  Dummy taking value 1 if the firm had any conflict with suppliers during LFY. 
Dummy for conflicts with clients   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm had any conflict with clients during LFY. 
Cost of entry   Cost of entry to the market in terms of licenses and permissions needed. 
Dummy for consultant to help deal with 
permissions  Dummy taking value 1 if the firm uses consultants and/or lawyers to help deal with licenses and permissions. 
Source: IC data.   79 
Table A.2.3  Definition of IC variables; finance and corporate governance 
Name of the variable  Description of the variable 
Dummy for trade chamber   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm belongs to a trade chamber or association. 
Dummy for credit line   Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm has access to a credit line or overdraft facility. 
Credit unused  Percentage of the overdraft that is not being used currently.  
Dummy for loan   Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm has access to a loan line. 
Dummy for loan with collateral   Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm has access to a loan line with collateral (conditional on having a loan line). 
Value of the collateral   Value of the collateral as a percentage of the loan value (conditional on having a loan with collateral). 
Interest rate of the loan   The interest rate applied to the last loan. 
Dummy for short-term loan  Duration of the loan in years. 
Borrowings in foreign currency   Percentage of firm’s borrows denominated in a foreign currency. 
Dummy for external auditory   Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm has its annual statements externally audited. 
Owner of the lands   Percentage of the lands in which the plant operates owned by the firm. 
Owner of the buildings   Percentage of the buildings in which the plant operates owned by the firm. 
Dummy for owner of the buildings   Dummy taking value 1 if the almost all the buildings in which the plant operates are owned by the firm. 
Dummy for owner of the buildings and 
lands  Dummy taking value 1 if the almost all the lands in which the plant operates are owned by the firm. 
Largest shareholder   Percentage of firm’s capital owned by the largest shareholder. 
Working capital financed by internal 
funds   Percentage of firm’s working capital financed by internal funds. 
Working capital financed by commercial 
banks   Percentage of firm’s working capital financed by funds from private domestic banks. 
Working capital financed by foreign 
commercial banks   Percentage of firm’s working capital financed by funds from foreign banks. 
Working capital financed by leasing   Percentage of firm’s working capital financed by leasing. 
Working capital financed by state 
services  
Percentage of firm’s working capital financed by funds from state services (for example, Brazilian Development 
Bank, BNDES; Mexican labor and income generation program, PROGER; and so on). 
Working capital financed by supplier or 
customer credit   Percentage of firm’s working capital financed by trade credit (supplier or customer credit). 
Working capital financed by credit cards   Percentage of firm’s working capital financed by credit card. 
Working capital financed by equity   Percentage of firm’s working capital financed by equity, sale of stock. 
Working capital financed by family/friends   Percentage of firm’s working capital financed by funds from family or friends. 
Working capital financed by informal 
sources   Percentage of firm’s working capital financed by funds from informal sources (for example, money lender). 
Working capital financed by other funds   Percentage of firm’s working capital financed by other funds. 
New investments financed by internal 
funds   Percentage of new investments in new lands, buildings, or machinery financed by internal funds. 
New investments financed by commercial 
banks  
Percentage of new investments in new lands, buildings, or machinery financed by funds from private domestic 
banks. 
New investments financed by foreign 
commercial banks   Percentage of new investments in new lands, buildings, or machinery financed by funds from foreign banks. 
New investments financed by leasing   Percentage of new investments in new lands, buildings, or machinery financed by leasing. 
New investments financed by state 
services  
Percentage of new investments in new lands, buildings, or machinery financed by funds from state services (for 
example, BNDES, PROGER, and so on). 
New investments financed by supplier or 
customer credit  
Percentage of new investments in new lands, buildings, or machinery financed by trade credit (supplier or 
customer credit). 
New investments financed by credit cards   Percentage of new investments in new lands, buildings, or machinery financed by credit card. 
New investments financed by equity   Percentage of new investments in new lands, buildings, or machinery financed by equity, sale of stock. 
New investments financed by 
family/friends   Percentage of new investments in new lands, buildings, or machinery financed by funds from family or friends.   80 
New investments financed by informal 
sources  
Percentage of new investments in new lands, buildings, or machinery financed by funds from informal sources (for 
example money lender). 
New investments financed by other funds   Percentage of new investments in new lands, buildings, or machinery financed by other funds. 
Share of net profits reinvested   Share of net profits reinvested in the firm in the LFY. 
Sales bought on credit   Percentage of establishment’s inputs that were purchased on credit in LFY. 
Dummy for inputs bought on credit   Days that it takes for the establishment to pay off the supply credit. 
Inputs bought on credit   Percentage of establishment’s total sales that were bought on credit during LFY. 
Source: IC data.   81 
Table A.2.3     Definition of IC variables; finance and corporate governance (cont.) 
Name of the variable  Description of the variable 
Time to pay off the credit for inputs   Average days that it takes to pay off the credits. 
Inputs bought on credit with delayed 
payment  Share of inputs bought on credit. 
Wait to clear a check   Total number of days needed on average to clear a check from the establishment’s financial institution. 
Charges to clear a check  Average fee charged for a check. 
Wait to clear a domestic currency wire  Total number of days needed on average to clear a domestic currency wire from the establishment’s financial 
institution. 
Charges to clear a domestic currency 
wire  Average fee charged for a domestic currency wire. 
Wait to clear a foreign currency wire  Total number of days needed on average to clear a foreign currency wire from the establishment’s financial 
institution. 
Charges to clear a foreign currency wire  Average fee charged for a foreign currency wire. 
Wait to clear a letter of credit  Total number of days needed on average to clear a letter of credit from the establishment’s financial institution. 
Charge to clear a letter of credit  Average fee charged for a letter of credit. 
Delay of payments of domestic clients   Total number of days needed on average to clear a payment from a domestic customer. 
Charges to get payments from domestic 
clients   Average fee charged to clear a payment of a domestic customer. 
Delay of payments of foreign clients   Total number of days needed on average to clear a payment from a foreign customer. 
Charges to get payments from foreign 
clients   Average fee charged to clear a payment of a foreign customer. 
Dummy for current or saving account   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm has a checking or saving account. 
Dummy for foreign current or saving 
account   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm has a foreign checking or saving account. 
Dummy for accountant   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm uses an accountant to finish annual statements. 
Source: IC data.   82 
Table A.2.4  Definition of IC variables; quality, innovation, and labor skills 
Name of the variable  Description of the variable 
Dummy for foreign technology   Dummy taking value 1 if the plant uses technology licensed from a foreign-owned company. 
Dummy for International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) quality certification  Dummy taking value 1 if the firm has any kind of quality certification. 
Sales with warranty   Percentage of sales bought with warranty. 
Dummy for new product   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm developed a major new product line during LFY. 
Dummy for product improvement   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm improved an existing product line during LFY. 
Dummy for discontinued product line  Dummy taking value 1 if the firm discontinued at least one product line during LFY. 
Dummy for equipment improvement   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm improved the equipment during LFY. 
Dummy for R&D   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm had expenses in R&D during LFY. 
R&D expenditures   R&D expenditures as a percentage of annual total sales. 
Workers engaged in design/R&D   Percentage of workers in staff engaged in R&D and design tasks. 
Dummy for subcontracted R&D   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm subcontracted R&D activities during LFY. 
Royalties expenditures   Total expenses in royalties as a percentage of total annual sales. 
Dummy for new technology   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm introduced a new technology that substantially changed the way that the main 
product is produced. 
Dummy for joint venture   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm agreed a new joint venture with foreign partner during LFY. 
Dummy for new license agreement   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm obtained a new license agreement during LFY. 
Dummy for outsourcing  Dummy taking value 1 if the firm outsourced a major production activity that was previously conducted in-house 
during LFY. 
Dummy for in-house production   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm brought in-house a major production activity that was previously outsourced during 
LFY. 
Dummy for new plant   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm opened a new plant during LFY. 
Dummy for closed plant   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm closed an existing plant during LFY. 
Staff—management   Percentage of management in staff. 
Staff—professional workers   Percentage of professional production workers in staff. 
Staff—skilled workers   Percentage of skilled production workers in staff. 
Staff—unskilled workers   Percentage of unskilled production workers in staff. 
Staff—nonproduction workers   Percentage of nonproduction workers in staff. 
Staff—foreign nationals   Percentage of foreign national workers in staff. 
Average education of staff   Average number of years of education of staff. 
Average tenure of staff   Average number of years of experience of staff. 
Average age of staff   Average age of staff. 
Dummy for training   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm provides formal (either internal or external) training to its employees. 
Training to skilled workers   Percentage of skilled workers receiving formal (either internal or external) training. 
Training to unskilled workers   Percentage of unskilled workers receiving formal (either internal or external) training. 
Training to production workers  Percentage of production workers receiving formal (either internal or external) training.   83 
Training to nonproduction  Percentage of nonproduction workers receiving formal (either internal or external) training. 
Weeks of training for skilled workers   Weeks of training received by skilled workers. 
Weeks of training for unskilled workers   Weeks of training received by unskilled workers. 
Workforce with computer   Percentage of workforce using a computer at job. 
University staff   Percentage of staff with at least 1 year of university education. 
Dummy for university staff  Percentage of staff that regularly uses computer at job. 
Manager education   Dummy taking value 1 if the manager of the establishment has a bachelor degree or higher education level. 
Manager’s experience   Years of experience of the manager in the same industry before joining the establishment. 
Source: IC data.   84 
Table A.2.5  Definition of variables; other control variables 
Name of the variable  Description of the variable 
Age   Age of the firm. 
Dummy for incorporated company   Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm is an incorporated company. 
Dummy for limited company   Dummy that takes value 1 if the firm is a limited company. 
Dummy for SOE   Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant is a SOE. 
Dummy for foreign direct investment 
(FDI)   Dummy that takes value 1 if any part of firm’s capital is foreign. 
Dummy for holdings   Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has holdings or operations in other countries. 
Share of the local market   Percentage of local market that is made up by the sales of the establishment. 
Share of the national market   Percentage of national market that is made up by the sales of the establishment. 
Dummy for direct exports   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm exports more than 10% of the total annual sales. 
Share of exports   Share of exports over total annual sales. 
Exporting experience   Number of years of exporting experience. 
Dummy for direct imports   Dummy taking value 1 if the firm imports more than 10% of the total purchases of intermediate materials. 
Share of imports   Share of imported inputs over total purchases of intermediate materials. 
Number of competitors   Total number of competitors in the local market of the establishment’s main product line. 
Capacity utilization   Percentage of capacity utilized. 
Trade union   Percentage of workforce unionized 
Dummy for privatized firm   Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm was previously state-owned.  
Dummy for industrial zone   Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm is located in an industrial zone.  
Days of production lost due to strikes   Total number of production days lost due to strikes. 
Dummy for small firm  Dummy taking value 1 if the firm has less than 20 employees. 
Dummy for medium firm  Dummy taking value 1 if the firm has in between 20 and 100 employees. 
Dummy for large firm  Dummy taking value 1 if the firm has more than 100 employees. 
Workers infected by HIV    Percentage of workers infected by HIV/AIDS. 
Dummy for negative impact of HIV    Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the HIV/AIDS epidemic has negatively affected the firm through absenteeism 
of workers or high staff turnover. 
Cost in HIV-prevention programs    Medical expenses for staff (HIV/AIDS related) as percentage of total sales. 
Source: IC data.   85 
 
Table B.1  Total number of observations available for the PF variables before and after cleaning missing values and outliers  
Percentage over total number of observations in parentheses 
   Northern Africa  Western Africa—Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)  Horn of Africa 
   DZA  EGY  MAR  SEN  BEN  MLI  MRT  BFA  CPV  NER  CMR  ETH  ERI 
Total number of observations  952  2,931  2,550  783  591  462  80  51  47  64  119  1281  237 
a) Before cleaning 
Missing observations  605 (63.5)  1,543 (52.6)  95 (3.73)  513 (65.5)  199 (33.6)  211 (45.6)  1 (1.25)  1 (1.96)  0  49 (76.5)  2 (1.68)  150 (11.7)  171 (72.1) 
of which:                           
firms with one PF variable missing  419 (44.0)  1,009 (34.4)  29 (1.14)  189 (24.1)  146 (24.7)  39 (8.44)  0  1 (1.96)  0  11 (17.1)  1 (0.84)  33 (2.58)  88 (37.1) 
firms with two PF variables missing  0  34 (1.16)  1 (0.04)  88 (11.2)  18 (3.05)  25 (5.41)  1 (1.25)  0  0  2 (3.13)  0 (0.00)  9 (0.70)  2 (0.84) 
firms with three PF variables missing  0  319 (10.8)  2 (0.08)  57 (7.28)  8 (1.35)  18 (3.90)  0  0  0  25 (39.0)  0 (0.00)  7 (0.55)  30 (12.6) 
firms with four PF variables missing  186 (19.5)  181 (6.18)  63 (2.47)  179 (22.8)  27 (4.57)  129 (27.9)  0  0  0  11 (17.1)  1 (0.84)  101 (7.88)  51 (21.5) 
                                         
Outliers  62 (6.51)  131 (4.47)  103 (4.04)  29 (3.70)  42 (7.11)  10 (2.16)  0  0  0  1 (1.56)  0  83 (6.48)  10 (4.22) 
of which:                           
outliers in materials  24 (2.52)  78 (2.66)  69 (2.71)  23 (2.94)  31 (5.25)  5 (1.08)  0  0  0  0  0  83 (6.48)  4 (1.69) 
outliers in labor cost  21 (2.21)  33 (1.13)  18 (0.71)  3 (0.38)  4 (0.68)  3 (0.65)  0  0  0  1 (1.56)  0  0  4 (1.69) 
outliers in both materials and labor cost  17 (1.79)  20 (0.68)  16 (0.63)  3 (0.38)  7 (1.18)  2 (0.43)  0  0  0  0  0  0  2 (0.84) 
                                         
Available observations after replacing 
(outliers and missing excluded)  316 (33.1)  1,317 (44.9)  2,352 (92.2)  253 (32.3)  364 (61.5)  242 (52.3)  79 (98.7)  50 (98.0)  47 (100.)  14 (21.8)  117 (98.3)  1,048 (81.8)  61 (25.7) 
b) After cleaning 
Missing observations  198 (20.8)  225 (7.68)  71 (2.78)  179 (22.8)  42 (7.11)  129 (27.9)  0  0  0  11 (17.1)  1 (0.84)  101 (7.88)  51 (21.5) 
of which:                           
firms with one PF variable missing  12 (1.26)  9 (0.31)  8 (0.31)  0  9 (1.52)  0  0  0  0  0 (0.00)  0 (0.00)  0 (0.00)  0 (0.00) 
firms with two PF variables missing  0  0  0  0  2 (0.34)  0  0  0  0  0 (0.00)  0 (0.00)  0 (0.00)  0 (0.00) 
firms with three PF variables missing  0  34 (1.16)  0  0  1 (0.17)  0  0  0  0  0 (0.00)  0 (0.00)  0 (0.00)  0 (0.00) 
firms with four PF variables missing  186 (19.5)  182 (6.21)  63 (2.47)  179 (22.8)  30 (5.08)  129 (27.9)  0  0  0  11 (17.1)  1 (0.84)  101 (7.88)  51 (21.5) 
                                         
Outliers  60 (6.30)  82 (2.80)  65 (2.55)  69 (8.81)  77 (13.0)  24 (5.19)  0  0  0  5 (7.81)  0  38 (2.97)  7 (2.95) 
of which:                           
outliers in materials  16 (1.68)  46 (1.57)  35 (1.37)  48 (6.13)  58 (9.81)  22 (4.76)  0  0  0  4 (6.25)  0  38 (2.97)  2 (0.84) 
outliers in labor cost  18 (1.89)  10 (0.34)  14 (0.55)  12 (1.53)  8 (1.35)  0 (0.00)  0  0  0  1 (1.56)  0  0 (0.00)  3 (1.27) 
outliers in both materials and labor cost  26 (2.73)  26 (0.89)  16 (0.63)  9 (1.15)  11 (1.86)  2 (0.43)  0  0  0  0 (0.00)  0  0 (0.00)  2 (0.84) 
                                         
Available observations after replacing 
(outliers and missing excluded)  706 (74.1)  2,629 (89.7)  2,422 (94.9)  535 (68.3)  475 (80.3)  309 (66.8)  80 (100)  51 (100.)  47 (100)  48 (75.0)  118 (99.1)  1,142 (89.1)  179 (75.5) 
Source: IC data. 
Note: The PF variables are: sales, materials, capital stock, and labor cost; the total number of hours worked per year are not included here. For the countries with panel data, the 
total number of observations is equal to the total number of firms surveyed, multiplied by the total number of years. For the countries with cross-sectional data the total number of 
observations is equal to the total number of firms surveyed. Outliers are defined as those observations with the ratio of materials to sales and/or labor cost to sales greater than 1. 
By useful observations we mean those observations available to run regression and to make statistical inference. Missing observations and/or outliers in sales, materials, or labor 
cost are therefore not initially considered useful available observations.   86 
Table B.1 (cont.) Total number of observations available for the PF variables before and after cleaning missing values and outliers  
Percentage over total number of observations in parentheses) 
   Eastern Africa—East African 
Community (EAC excl. Burundi)  Southern Africa—Southern African Development Community (SADC incl. Burundi) 
MUS  ZAF 
   KEN  UGA  TZA  MWI  MDG  ZMB  BDI  BWA  LSO  NAM  SWZ 
Total number of observations  852  900  828  320  870  564  102  114  225  106  70  636  1737 
   a) Before cleaning 
Missing observations  426 (50.0)  652 (72.4)  457 (55.1)  106 (33.1)  456 (52.4)  153 (27.1)  0 (0.00)  4 (3.51)  187 (83.1)  5 (4.72)  3 (4.28)  340 (53.4)  487 (28.0) 
of which:                            
firms with one PF variable missing  112 (13.1)  288 (32.0)  189 (22.8)  76 (23.7)  184 (21.1)  26 (4.61)  0  3 (2.63)  38 (16.8)  5 (4.72)  2 (2.85)  117 (18.4)  241 (13.8) 
firms with two PF variables missing  48 (5.63)  40 (4.44)  75 (9.06)  8 (2.50)  62 (7.13)  0  0  0  7 (3.11)  0  1 (1.42)  37 (5.82)  37 (2.13) 
firms with three PF variables missing  62 (7.28)  95 (10.5)  32 (3.86)  0 (0.00)  30 (3.45)  6 (1.06)  0  0  12 (5.33)  0  0  13 (2.04)  11 (0.63) 
firms with four PF variables missing  204 (23.9)  229 (25.4)  161 (19.4)  22 (6.88)  180 (20.6)  121 (21.4)  0  1 (0.88)  130 (57.7)  0  0  173 (27.2)  198 (11.4) 
                                         
Outliers  53 (6.22)  41 (4.56)  55 (6.64)  10 (3.13)  40 (4.60)  20 (3.55)  2 (1.96)  1 (0.88)  6 (2.67)  1 (0.94)  0  28 (4.40)  34 (1.96) 
of which:                              
outliers in materials  46 (5.40)  19 (2.11)  25 (3.02)  9 (2.81)  20 (2.30)  18 (3.19)  2 (1.96)  1 (0.88)  0 (0.00)  1 (0.94)  0  9 (1.42)  12 (0.69) 
outliers in labor cost  4 (0.47)  16 (1.78)  19 (2.29)  1 (0.31)  17 (1.95)  2 (0.35)  0 (0.00)  0 (0.00)  5 (2.22)  0  0  14 (2.20)  14 (0.81) 
outliers in both materials and labor cost  3 (0.35)  6 (0.67)  11 (1.33)  0 (0.00)  3 (0.34)  0 (0.00)  0 (0.00)  0 (0.00)  1 (0.44)  0  0  5 (0.79)  8 (0.46) 
                                         
Available observations after replacing 
(outliers and missing excluded)  377 (44.2)  232 (25.7)  325 (39.2)  208 (65.0)  383 (44.0)  391 (69.3)  109 (106.)  100 (87.7)  37 (16.4)  100 (94.3)  67 (95.7)  271 (42.6)  1,229 (70.7) 
   b) After cleaning 
Missing observations  205 (24.0)  234 (26.0)  164 (19.8)  22 (6.88)  181 (20.8)  122 (21.6)  0 (0.00)  1 (0.88)  131 (58.2)  0 (0.00)  1 (1.42)  174 (27.3)  199 (11.4) 
of which:                            
firms with one PF variable missing  0  5 (0.56)  3 (0.36)  0  1 (0.11)  0  0  0  1 (0.44)  0  0  1 (0.16)  1 (0.06) 
firms with two PF variables missing  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
firms with three PF variables missing  1 (0.12)  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
firms with four PF variables missing  204 (23.9)  229 (25.4)  161 (19.4)  22 (6.88)  180 (20.6)  122 (21.6)  0 (0.00)  1 (0.88)  130 (57.7)  0 (0.00)  1 (1.42)  173 (27.2)  198 (11.4) 
                                         
Outliers  70 (8.22)  35 (3.89)  106 (12.8)  10 (3.13)  66 (7.59)  25 (4.43)  1 (0.98)  1 (0.88)  16 (7.11)  2 (1.89)  0  46 (7.23)  47 (2.71) 
of which:                            
outliers in materials  64 (7.51)  13 (1.44)  74 (8.94)  4 (1.25)  35 (4.02)  25 (4.43)  0 (0.00)  1 (0.88)  2 (0.89)  1 (0.94)  0  28 (4.40)  18 (1.04) 
outliers in labor cost  2 (0.23)  14 (1.56)  12 (1.45)  4 (1.25)  22 (2.53)  0  1 (0.98)  0  6 (2.67)  1 (0.94)  0  11 (1.73)  13 (0.75) 
outliers in both materials and labor cost  4 (0.47)  8 (0.89)  20 (2.42)  2 (0.63)  9 (1.03)  0  0  0  8 (3.56)  0 (0.00)  0  7 (1.10)  16 (0.92) 
                                         
Available observations after replacing 
(outliers and missing excluded)  577 (67.7)  635 (70.5)  561 (67.7)  288 (90.0)  623 (71.6)  417 (73.9)  101 (99.0)  112 (98.2)  79 (35.1)  104 (98.1)  69 (98.5)  417 (65.5)  1,492 (85.9) 
Source: IC data. 
Note: As for previous table.   87 
Table B.2.1   Representativity of PF variables before and after cleaning missing values and outliers, by country and year 
      1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  Total 
      #Obs  Perc. 
available  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs 
Algeria 
Original sample        952     952                            1,904 
Without replacing        552  42.0  562  41.0                         1,114 
With replacing        700  26.5  712  25.2                         1,412 
Benin 
Original sample              197     197     197                591 
Without replacing              112  43.1  123  37.6  129  34.5             364 
With replacing              143  27.4  164  16.8  168  14.7             475 
Botswana 
Original sample                                      114     114 
Without replacing                                      109  4.4  109 
With replacing                                      113  0.9  113 
Burkina Faso 
Original sample                                      51     51 
Without replacing                                      50  2.0  50 
With replacing                                      51  0.0  51 
Burundi 
Original sample                                      102     102 
Without replacing                                      100  2.0  100 
With replacing                                      101  1.0  101 
Cameroon 
Original sample                                      119     119 
Without replacing                                      117  1.7  117 
With replacing                                      118  0.8  118 
Cape Verde 
Original sample                                      47     47 
Without replacing                                      47  0.0  47 
With replacing                                      47  0.0  47 
Egypt 
Original sample              977     977     977                 2,931 
Without replacing              631  35.4  686     0  100              1,317 
With replacing              795  18.6  902     932  4.6              2,629 
Eritrea 
Original sample  79     79     79                            237 
Without replacing  0  100  38  51.9  23  70.9                         61 
With replacing  50  36.7  62  21.5  67  15.2                         179 
Ethiopia 
Original sample  427     427     427                            1,281 
Without replacing  316  26.0  344  19.4  388  9.1                         1,048 
With replacing  351  17.8  377  11.7  414  3.0                         1,142 
Kenya 
Original sample        284     284     284                       852 
Without replacing        110  61.3  119  58.1  131  53.9                    360 
With replacing        185  34.9  185  34.9  215  24.3                    585 
Lesotho 
Original sample        75     75     75                       225 
Without replacing        9  88.0  12  84.0  16  78.7                    37 
With replacing        20  73.3  26  65.3  33  56.0                    79 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with IC data. 
Note: Original sample includes all establishments surveyed. Without replacing includes establishments without missing values and/or outliers in PF variables. With replacing 
includes establishments without missing values and/or outliers in the PF variables.   88 
Table B.2.1 (cont.) Representativity of PF variables before and after cleaning missing values and outliers, by country and year 
      1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  Total 
      #Obs  Perc. 
available  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs 
Madagascar 
Original sample                    290     290     290           870 
Without replacing                    113  61.0  134  53.8  136  53.1        383 
With replacing                    183  36.9  212  26.9  228  21.4        623 
Malawi 
Original sample                          160     160           320 
Without replacing                          93  41.9  115  28.1        208 
With replacing                          136  15.0  152  5.0        288 
Mali 
Original sample        154     154     154                       462 
Without replacing        62  59.7  78  49.4  102  33.8                    242 
With replacing        74  51.9  93  39.6  142  7.8                    309 
Mauritania 
Original sample                                      80     80 
Without replacing                                      79  1.3  79 
With replacing                                      80  0.0  80 
Mauritius 
Original sample                    212     212     212           636 
Without replacing                    77  63.7  97  54.2  97  54.2        271 
With replacing                    122  42.5  142  33.0  153  27.8        417 
Morocco 
Original sample        850     850     850                       2,550 
Without replacing        754  11.3  794  6.6  804  5.4                    2,352 
With replacing        780  8.2  813  4.4  829  2.5                    2,422 
Namibia 
Original sample                                      106     106 
Without replacing                                      100  5.7  100 
With replacing                                      104  1.9  104 
Niger 
Original sample                                      64     64 
Without replacing                                      14  78.1  14 
With replacing                                      48  25.0  48 
Senegal 
Original sample        261     261     261                       783 
Without replacing        59  77.4  84  67.8  110  57.9                    253 
With replacing        135  48.3  183  29.9  217  16.9                    535 
South Africa 
Original sample        579     579     579                       1,737 
Without replacing        373  35.6  406  29.9  450  22.3                    1,229 
With replacing        457  21.1  498  14.0  537  7.3                    1,492 
Swaziland 
Original sample                                      70     70 
Without replacing                                      67  4.3  67 
With replacing                                      69  1.4  69 
Tanzania 
Original sample        276     276     276                       828 
Without replacing        113  59.1  124  55.1  88  68.1                    325 
With replacing        193  30.1  205  25.7  163  40.9                    561 
Uganda 
Original sample        300     300     300                       900 
Without replacing        102  66.0  112  62.7  154  48.7                    368 
With replacing        169  43.7  249  17.0  277  7.7                    695 
Zambia 
Original sample  188     188     188     0                       564 
Without replacing  114  39.4  127  32.4  150  20.2  0                       391 
With replacing  126  33.0  136  27.7  155  17.6  0                       417 
Source: Author’s elaboration with IC data. 
Note: As for first part of table.   89 
Table B.2.2   Representativity of PF variables before and after cleaning missing values and outliers, by country and industry 
      Food and beverages  Textiles and apparels  Chemicals, rubber, 
and plastics 





Wood and furniture  Nonmetallic 
products  Other manufacturing 
Country     #Obs  Perc. 
available  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs  Perc. 
Algeria 
Original sample  204     372     404     308     440           144     32    
Without replacing  114  44.1  200  46.2  280  30.7  162  47.4  256  41.8        98  31.9  4  87.5 
With replacing  174  14.7  258  30.6  332  17.8  204  33.8  320  27.3        114  20.8  10  68.8 
Benin 
Original sample  120           36     135     66     189           45    
Without replacing  71  40.8        29  19.4  75  44.4  37  43.9  125  33.9        27  40.0 
With replacing  98  18.3        34  5.6  110  18.5  48  27.3  147  22.2        39  13.3 
Botswana 
Original sample  12     27     0                             75    
Without replacing  12  0.0  26  3.7  0                             71  5.3 
With replacing  12  0.0  27  0.0  0                             74  1.3 
Burkina Faso 
Original sample  14                 12                       25    
Without replacing  13  7.1              12  0.0                    25  0.0 
With replacing  14  0.0              12  0.0                    25  0.0 
Burundi 
Original sample  19     24                                   59    
Without replacing  18  5.3  24  0.0                                58  1.7 
With replacing  19  0.0  24  0.0                                58  1.7 
Cameroon 
Original sample  31           17     19     11     18           23    
Without replacing  31  0.0        17  0.0  18  5.3  11  0.0  18  0.0        22  4.3 
With replacing  31  0.0        17  0.0  18  5.3  11  0.0  18  0.0        23  0.0 
Cape Verde 
Original sample  12                             16           19    
Without replacing  12  0.0                          16  0.0        19  0.0 
With replacing  12  0.0                          16  0.0        19  0.0 
Egypt 
Original sample  468     915     453           672     174     249          
Without replacing  225  51.9  393  57.0  219  51.7        303  54.9  67  61.5  110  55.8       
With replacing  416  11.1  815  10.9  414  8.6        602  10.4  152  12.6  230  7.6       
Eritrea 
Original sample  54     51                 18                 114    
Without replacing  14  74.1  11  78.4              8  55.6              28  75.4 
With replacing  38  29.6  39  23.5              15  16.7              87  23.7 
Ethiopia 
Original sample  285     279                 618                 99    
Without replacing  233  18.2  207  25.8              531  14.1              77  22.2 
With replacing  258  9.5  240  14.0              557  9.9              87  12.1 
Kenya 
Original sample  249     141     144           147                 171    
Without replacing  99  60.2  69  51.1  62  56.9        57  61.2              73  57.3 
With replacing  172  30.9  95  32.6  97  32.6        91  38.1              130  24.0 
Lesotho 
Original sample  54     102                                   69    
Without replacing  17  68.5  8  92.2                                12  82.6 
With replacing  31  42.6  24  76.5                                24  65.2 
Source: Author’s elaboration with IC data. 
Note: As for previous table.   90 
Table B.2.2   Representativity of PF variables before and after cleaning missing values and outliers, by country and industry (cont.) 









Wood and furniture  Nonmetallic 
products  Other manufacturing 
Country     #Obs  Perc. 
available  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs  Perc.  #Obs  Perc. 
Madagascar 
Original sample  150     267     108     93     60     192                
Without replacing  77  48.7  106  60.3  57  47.2  51  45.2  24  60.0  68  64.6             
With replacing  110  26.7  175  34.5  76  29.6  76  18.3  44  26.7  142  26.0             
Malawi 
Original sample  112           70           42     48           48    
Without replacing  72  35.7        52  25.7        30  28.6  27  43.8        27  43.8 
With replacing  101  9.8        66  5.7        42  0.0  40  16.7        39  18.8 
Mali 
Original sample  153     30     69     33     66     54     57          
Without replacing  82  46.4  8  73.3  29  58.0  19  42.4  47  28.8  23  57.4  34  40.4       
With replacing  97  36.6  14  53.3  47  31.9  27  18.2  56  15.2  30  44.4  38  33.3       
Mauritania 
Original sample  27                       12     13           28    
Without replacing  26  3.7                    12  0.0  13  0.0        28  0.0 
With replacing  27  0.0                    12  0.0  13  0.0        28  0.0 
Mauritius 
Original sample  117     219     72     54     93     33     18     30    
Without replacing  53  54.7  97  55.7  32  55.6  32  40.7  29  68.8  20  39.4  8  55.6  0  100.0 
With replacing  86  26.5  139  36.5  47  34.7  50  7.4  63  32.3  23  30.3  9  50.0  0  100.0 
Morocco 
Original sample  216     1,722     414           147                 51    
Without replacing  196  9.3  1,584  8.0  383  7.5        140  4.8              49  3.9 
With replacing  205  5.1  1,635  5.1  390  5.8        142  3.4              50  2.0 
Namibia 
Original sample  18     5                                   83    
Without replacing  18  0.0  5  0.0                                77  7.2 
With replacing  18  0.0  5  0.0                                81  2.4 
Niger 
Original sample  18                 14                       32    
Without replacing  6  66.7              0  100.0                    8  75.0 
With replacing  12  33.3              12  14.3                    24  25.0 
Senegal 
Original sample  279     69     147     108     75     48     57          
Without replacing  78  72.0  20  71.0  55  62.6  48  55.6  19  74.7  15  68.8  18  68.4       
With replacing  186  33.3  46  33.3  106  27.9  73  32.4  49  34.7  29  39.6  45  21.1       
South Africa 
Original sample  189     180     285     159     561     147     66     150    
Without replacing  131  30.7  107  40.6  187  34.4  120  24.5  435  22.5  102  30.6  43  34.8  104  30.7 
With replacing  162  14.3  144  20.0  241  15.4  137  13.8  498  11.2  131  10.9  50  24.2  129  14.0 
Swaziland 
Original sample  14     20                                   36    
Without replacing  12  14.3  19  5.0                                36  0.0 
With replacing  13  7.1  20  0.0                                36  0.0 
Tanzania 
Original sample  243     93     102     75     87     195     33          
Without replacing  108  55.6  29  68.8  42  58.8  33  56.0  26  70.1  68  65.1  19  42.4       
With replacing  168  30.9  58  37.6  69  32.4  55  26.7  65  25.3  117  40.0  27  18.2       
Uganda 
Original sample  366     45     75     69     63     162     120          
Without replacing  148  59.6  22  51.1  17  77.3  19  72.5  33  47.6  74  54.3  55  54.2       
With replacing  292  20.2  37  17.8  58  22.7  44  36.2  53  15.9  120  25.9  91  24.2       
Zambia 
Original sample  273     69     63           75                 84    
Without replacing  188  31.1  54  21.7  44  30.2        52  30.7              53  36.9 
With replacing  201  26.4  58  15.9  50  20.6        54  28.0              54  35.7 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with IC data. Note: As for first part of table. 
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Table B.3.1   Response rate of infrastructure IC variables in the final sample 
   Northern Africa  Western Africa—ECOWAS  Horn of 
Africa 
Eastern Africa—
EAC   Southern Africa—SADC (incl. Burundi) 
MUS  ZAF 
   DZA  EGY  MAR  SEN  BEN  MLI  MRT  BFA  CPV  NER  CMR  ETH  ERI  KEN  UGA  TZA  MWI  MDG  ZMB  BDI  BWA  LSO  NAM  SWZ 
Days to clear customs to import   53.6  23.7  70.5  58.7  32.1  41.1  47.5  41.2  51.1  60.0  52.9  23.7  73.7  61.1 
 
23.3  66.3 
 
64.5  37.6  74.1  76.0  67.0  48.6  65.2  69.8 
Longest number of days to clear customs 
to import   52.3  23.3  70.4  57.3  32.1  41.7  47.5  41.2  51.1  60.0  52.9  23.4  72.6  35.6 
 
22.4 
   
64.5  37.6  73.2  74.7  66.0  48.6  63.8  69.1 
Days to clear customs to export   4.0  18.7  58.4  21.3  17.0  15.9  12.5  23.5  4.3  16.3  26.9  6.3  12.8  50.0 
 
41.9  67.0 
 
31.7  1.0  16.1  42.7  23.6  37.1  55.4  59.1 
Longest number of days to clear customs 
to export   4.0  18.3  58.4  21.3  17.0  15.9  12.5  23.5  4.3  16.3  26.9  6.3  12.3  18.0 
 
40.8  23.3 
 
31.7  1.0  16.1  40.0  23.6  37.1  55.4  58.4 
Cost to clear customs to export  99.4 
         
12.5  19.6  2.1  7.5  26.9 
               
1.0  13.4 
 
18.9  37.1 
   
Inspections in customs      62.7 
     
13.8  25.5  4.3  80.0  39.5 
               
2.0  14.3 
 
20.8  35.7 
   
Shipment losses in customs to export              13.8  25.5  4.3  16.3  37.8 
               
2.0  17.0 
 
24.5  37.1 
   
Dummy for profit from export facilities         47.2  21.2 
 
16.3  25.5  4.3  17.5  39.5  5.2  12.8  57.7  18.9  26.1  23.3  28.9 
           
65.9 
 
Cost of exports                         99.5 
                           92 
 
Dummy for public mechanism to cover 
risks in exports        47.0  21.8  20.1 
                 
43.6  24.7 
                 
Dummy for outside clearing agent for 
imports         65.0  34.9  20.7  100.0  39.2  51.1  61.3  53.8 
   
59.1  26.6  98.0 
 
43.7  66.4  2.0  17.0 
 
24.5  37.1  68.6 
 
Average number of days to clear an 
outgoing container through port            46.9 
             
28.9  12.3 
   
29.4 
               
Cost to clear an outgoing container through 
port                             22.7  10.6 
                     
Average number of days to clear an 
incoming container through port                            55.1  22.5 
   
42.5 
               
Cost to clear an incoming container 
through port                             34.6  20.0 
                     
Dummy for own power infrastructure (excl. 
generator)        99.2 
 
99.0 
             
98.0  100.0 
                     
Dummy for own generator   98.1  99.9  99.6  99.2  100.0  95.5  100.0  98.0  100.0  80.0  100.0  99.7  100.0  97.4  100.0  96.6  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  92.0  98.1  98.6 
   
Electricity from own generator   98.9  99.8  99.1  89.7  84.5  97.4  100.0  96.1  100.0  75.0  95.8  12.1  97.2  93.5  99.5  0.0  93.4  99.0  98.8  100.0  98.2  82.7  96.2  97.1 
   
Cost of electricity from generator         37.3  24.4  39.8 
         
93.5  89.4  60.1  32.9  76.7  18.8 
 
95.0 
             93 
 
Cost of electricity from public grid         73.3 
 
93.2 
         
2.8  22.9  89.7  88.0 
           
58.7 
       
Dummy for equipment damaged by power 
fluctuations        97.9  95.6  97.4 
               
95.4  95.3 
 
98.7 
               
Equipment damaged by power fluctuations        83.2 
 
93.9 
               
91.7  93.7 
 
70.1 
               
Power outages   99.2  96.6  32.5  80.0  87.0  86.7  100.0  98.0  100.0  75.0  95.8  97.1  96.1  89.3  85.7  76.6  90.6  82.2  100.0  97.0  99.1  74.7  96.2  98.6  98.1  65.1 
Average duration of power outages     86.6  32.9  86.5  84.0  85.8  100.0  96.1  95.7  71.3  86.6  92.4  96.1  88.5  81.9  75.5  92.4  98.2  100.0  97.0  100.0  84.0  96.2  97.1  97.1  64.2 
Power fluctuations         64.4 
   
88.8  74.5  97.9  62.5  90.8 
   




95.9  93.1  90.2 
 
89.6  88.6  95.4 
 
Average duration of power fluctuations         68.4 
                 
73.3  77.3 
     
100.0 
             
Sales lost due to power outages   99.2  77.0  33.3 
 
83.4  85.8 
             
94.1  88.8  62.3 
 
91.2  98.8 
   
73.3 
     
51.1 
Water outages   99.2  54.6  6.8  86.7  79.6  94.2  68.8  98.0  95.7  70.0  97.5  91.3  96.1  87.2  77.2  33.5  89.2  93.4  100.0  50.5  97.3  70.7  50.0  95.7  95.0  29.9 
Average duration of water outages     49.6  7.6  86.5  79.2  93.5  68.8  98.0  91.5  68.8  97.5 
   
81.4  76.1  32.6  90.6  94.9  99.5  50.5  97.3  73.3  50.0  95.7  95.7  29.5 
Sales lost due to water outages   99.4  50.7  7.1  86.7  65.1  93.5 
                 
22.2  85.8  96.8 
     
65.3 
   
94.2  20.2 
Dummy for own well or water infrastructure   94.1 
   
5.1  100.0  100.0 
         
99.7  100.0  94.9  97.8  97.5 
 
100.0  100.0  50.5  97.3 
 
50.0  95.7 
   94 
 
Water from own well or water infrastructure     51.8  100.0  96.6  99.8  99.7  68.8  84.3  95.7  73.8  95.8 
   
90.7  100.0  95.2  71.9  100.0 
     
90.7 
       
Cost of water from own well         71.2  68.5  76.7 
             
43.3  48.8  52.4 
 
67.9 
               
Cost of water from public system   68.7 
                       
52.0 
                       
Phone outages   98.9 
 
7.4  94.3  81.3  87.7 
         
87.2  96.1  92.1  58.4  17.5 
 
87.2  100.0 
   
60.0 
   
97.4  36.4 
Average duration of phone outages       8.1  93.9  77.1  87.7 
             
92.1  57.5  15.7 
 
87.5  100.0 
   
62.7 
   
96.6  36.1 
Losses due to phone outages      4.0  94.5 
 
86.1 
                 
10.7 
         
40.0 
   
70.3  25.9 
Transport failures       7.3  29.7 
 
33.0 
                 
13.2  89.9 
 
100.0 
   
62.7 
     
30.1 
Average duration of transport failures      7.6  29.5 
 
33.0 
                 
11.3  90.6 
 
99.3 
   
62.7 
     
29.7 
Sales lost due to transport failures      8.1  29.1 
 
36.2 
                 
8.4  83.7 
       
64.0 
     
21.8 
Average duration of transport                                        100.0  88.4 
 
91.5  98.6 
   95 
 
Public postal service interruptions                                            57.3 
     
21.6 
Average duration of public postal service 
interruptions                                            50.7 
     
21.2 
Sales lost due to public postal service 
interruptions                                            2.7 
     
15.2 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with IC data. 
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Table B.3.1   Response rate of infrastructure IC variables in the final sample (cont.) 
   Northern Africa  Western Africa—ECOWAS  Horn of 
Africa 
Eastern Africa—
EAC   Southern Africa—SADC (incl. Burundi) 
MUS  ZAF 
   DZA  EGY  MAR  SEN  BEN  MLI  MRT  BFA  CPV  NER  CMR  ETH  ERI  KEN  UGA  TZA  MWI  MDG  ZMB  BDI  BWA  LSO  NAM  SWZ 
Dummy for own roads         99.2  100.0  100.0 
             
96.8  100.0  98.0 
 
100.0 
           
98.8 
 
Dummy for own transportation for 
workers         99.2  100.0  100.0 
             
96.8  100.0  98.0 
 
100.0 
           
98.8 
 
Dummy for own waste disposal         99.2  100.0  99.7 
             
94.3  100.0  98.0 
 
100.0 
           
98.8 
 
Dummy for contract with transportation 
company         96.6  96.8  99.0 
             
92.3  81.3  78.2 
 
100.0 
           
98.8 
 
Dummy for own transportation     99.9  100.0  96.6  96.8  99.0  100.0  98.0  97.9  80.0  100.0 
   
92.3  81.3 
   
100.0 
 
100.0  100.0 
 
98.1  98.6  98.6 
 
Products with own transport    99.2 
       
100.0  98.0  95.7  77.5  100.0 
         
95.8 
   
100.0  100.0 
 
98.1  98.6  72.9 
 
Transport delay, outgoing domestic       93.1 
 
53.4 
               
90.3  60.9 
                     
Transport delay, outgoing export       77.9 
 
43.7 
               
88.1  53.1 
                     
Transport delay, incoming domestic       94.4 
 
78.8 
               
89.3  58.6 
                     97 
 
Transport delay, incoming international       86.4 
 
44.7 
               
87.0  50.7 
                     




13.8  100.0  97.9  75.0  99.2  98.3  100.0  83.6  21.9  91.1  100.0  98.7  100.0  2.0  17.0  86.7  24.5  37.1  95.9  99.7 
Shipment losses, exports     28.8 
   
54.2 
               
67.2  9.9 
 
100.0  65.5 
           
91.8 
 
Dummy for e-mail   89.3  99.9  72.5  98.9  100.0  98.4  100.0  98.0  100.0  80.0  100.0  99.9  100.0  97.4  100.0  96.2  100.0  100.0  99.3  100.0  100.0  98.7  98.1  98.6  99.5  100.0 
Dummy for Web page   85.7  99.8  97.3  99.2  100.0  99.4  100.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  100.0  99.9  100.0  96.6  100.0  94.8  100.0  100.0  99.3  100.0  100.0  98.7  98.1  98.6  96.9  100.0 
Wait for phone connection   31.7  13.1  97.5  55.6  53.8  73.5  30.0  21.6  19.1  23.8  16.0  34.3  33.5  61.3  42.8  23.1  48.3  23.8 
 
6.9  24.1  36.0  38.7  20.0  43.9  39.9 
Dummy for gifts to obtain a phone 
connection   0.0  12.6 
 
56.8  56.1  74.1  30.0  23.5  100.0  23.8  16.8 
   
66.0  43.1  30.8  49.3  26.0 
 
13.9  25.9  42.7  38.7  24.3  42.7  39.9 
Wait for electric supply   4.2  9.1  94.6  42.7  58.4  69.9  18.8  13.7  8.5  17.5  10.1  27.2  29.6  48.8  52.6  24.0  29.2  14.3 
 
15.8  11.6  25.3  23.6  11.4  27.1  33.7 
Dummy for gifts to obtain a electric 
supply     9.2 
 
44.0  58.4  70.6  18.8  15.7  100.0  16.3  10.1 
   
50.2  54.2  30.2  28.1  14.0 
 
15.8  12.5  37.3  23.6  11.4  27.8  33.7 
Wait for a water supply     4.8  94.2  25.5  47.9  65.4  13.8  11.8  6.4  12.5  5.9 
       
17.7  11.5  6.3 
 
0.0  9.8  20.0  14.2  7.1  11.8  30.1 
Dummy for gifts to obtain a water supply    4.6 
 
29.1  48.9  65.7  15.0  11.8  100.0  11.3  6.7 
       
25.8  11.8  5.8 
 
0.0  9.8  32.0  14.2  7.1  12.0  30.1 98 
 
Wait for an import license     9.4 
 
26.9  27.3  49.5  10.0  21.6  19.1  37.5  33.6 
   
46.6  17.8  14.0  22.9  3.2  15.6  19.8  14.3  25.3  21.7  15.7  8.4  26.9 
Dummy for gifts to obtain an import 
license     9.1 
 
32.2  29.4  54.7  11.3  21.6  100.0  38.8  31.1 
   
47.4  18.7  25.2  22.6  5.8 
 
19.8  16.1  33.3  20.8  18.6  8.4  27.1 
Low quality supplies   99.4  100.0  98.6  89.7  96.4  97.4 
         
99.1 
 
96.6  94.6  96.8  95.5  99.2  99.5 
   
86.7 
   
97.6  99.7 
Sales lost due to delivery delays, 
domestic   99.4 
 
98.7  75.4  21.8  92.6 
         
99.1 
 
92.9  94.3  85.9  27.8  86.7  99.3 
   
88.0 
   
92.1  99.3 
Sales lost due to delivery delays, imports         42.7  93.7  40.1 
             
76.3  30.2 
 
2.1  48.5 
               
Transport delays in domestic sales       63.6  75.2  86.8  92.9 
             
90.7  94.0  86.0 
 
86.7 
               
Transport delays in international sales       62.4  43.0  93.7  41.1 
             
75.1  30.2 
   
48.8 
               
Illegal payments to obtain public utilities         62.7  86.8 
               
62.3  31.7 
                     




98.4  100.0  94.1  97.9  72.5  98.3  85.3 
 
78.1  91.5  81.9  94.1 
 
99.3  100.0  99.1  86.7  97.2  94.3  95.2  99.0 
Days of inventory of finished goods         85.1 
 
98.4 
         
99.6  39.7  96.6  85.7  82.8 
 
90.7 
           
96.4  0.0 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with IC data. 99 
 
Table B.3.2   Response rate of red tape, corruption, and crime IC variables in the final sample 
   Northern Africa  Western Africa—ECOWAS  Horn of 
Africa 
Eastern Africa—
EAC   Southern Africa—SADC (incl. Burundi) 
MUS  ZAF 
   DZA  EGY  MAR  SEN  BEN  MLI  MRT  BFA  CPV  NER  CMR  ETH  ERI  KEN  UGA  TZA  MWI  MDG  ZMB  BDI  BWA  LSO  NAM  SWZ 
Manager’s time spent in bureaucratic issues   99.4 
 
99.6  83.8  92.9  94.2  100.0  90.2  100.0  76.3  99.2  97.8  98.3  93.1  97.6  96.6  97.9  95.8  100.0  100.0  98.2  92.0  98.1  97.1  98.1  99.1 
Payments to deal with bureaucratic issues   20.6  97.6 
 
78.3  88.2  93.9  75.0  45.1  89.4  43.8  68.1 
   
78.5  55.3  90.0  53.5  96.6  77.0  92.1  84.8  72.0  74.5  91.4  80.8  93.3 
Illegal payments to obtain licenses         63.2 
                 
62.1  31.2 
                     
Illegal payments to tax administrators         60.4 
                                           
Days spent with regulation agencies                        98.7  23.5 
                         
Cost dealing with regulation agencies                        76.2  11.7 
                         
Wait for a construction permit   99.4 
 
89.4  20.4  30.0  54.4  12.5  7.8  19.1  11.3  4.2 
   
24.3  24.1  9.7  21.5 
   
1.0  6.3  18.7  17.0  4.3 
 
16.1 
Dummy for gifts to obtain a construction permit         21.1  32.4  57.9  12.5  7.8  100.0  11.3  5.9 
   
27.5  25.2  2.0  22.6 
   
1.0  8.0  32.0  18.9  7.1 
 
16.4 
Wait for an operating license     24.0  96.8  20.6  38.7  56.6  5.0  9.8  12.8  25.0  83.2 
   
81.6  98.6  67.3  34.0 
   




Gifts to obtain a operating license     24.3 
 
24.8  40.3  63.4  5.0  9.8  100.0  25.0  78.2 
   
79.4  97.0  100.0  36.5 
   
9.9  68.8  53.3  35.8  31.4 
 
26.1 
Sales declared to taxes   33.2  98.4  98.1  78.1  90.1  96.4  95.0  94.1  87.2  76.3  96.6 
   
87.9  69.9  90.9  83.7  98.9  77.5  100.0  98.2  64.0  95.3  98.6  86.3  94.3 
Workforce declared to taxes   99.4  98.5 
   
91.6 
 
96.3  94.1  91.5  71.3  95.8 
         
81.3  100.0 
 
100.0  100.0 
 
94.3  94.3  86.1 
 
Days in inspections     99.9  99.6  91.8  100.0  90.9  87.5  98.0  100.0  73.8  95.8  99.6  98.3  96.0  99.7  95.3  99.3  75.3  100.0  84.2  49.1  82.7  24.5  70.0  95.9  97.8 
Dummy for gifts in inspections     100.0 
 
88.2  89.1  66.7  87.5  82.4  74.5  57.5  61.3 
   
60.5  40.6  90.5  92.7  35.2  96.6  84.2  49.1  12.0  27.4  75.7  6.5  79.1 
Dummy for lawyer/consultant to help deal with 
permissions          38.7 
                         
62.8 
             
Payments to obtain a contract with the 
government   99.4  98.6 
 
47.6  89.9  89.0  73.8  68.6  93.6  40.0  49.6 
   
49.6  53.5  64.8  94.8  98.7 
 
91.1  87.5  41.3  72.6  92.9  88.7  74.1 
Dummy for law-influencing firm         99.8  100.0  100.0 
             
96.2  99.8  95.9 
 
0.0  100.0 
   
93.3 
     
99.8 
Overdue payments to private customers   99.4  91.9  98.9  91.0  96.6  96.8  100.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  100.0 
   
90.7  98.3  43.8  96.9  96.1  99.3  100.0  100.0  68.0  98.1  98.6  95.4  98.6 
Overdue payments to SOEs     99.4  44.8 
                   
51.0  26.9  31.8 
 




Weeks to resolve a case of overdue payment     49.9  57.6  70.9  77.9  85.4 
             
82.2  49.8  47.8 
 
87.6  79.1 
   
50.7 
   
85.1  93.4 
Overdue payments in courts   99.4  97.1  60.6  92.6  64.1  96.8  100.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  100.0 
   
29.8  18.3  10.0 
 
96.1  47.0 
   
41.3 
   
88.0  93.8 
Weeks to resolve an overdue payment in 
courts     11.8  14.4  17.1  19.7  51.8 
             
26.7  9.6  10.4  18.4  4.3  23.3 
   
14.7 
   
14.4  36.4 
Security expenses   68.7 
 
97.2  88.2  81.9  96.1  38.8  82.4  87.2  26.3  82.4  97.4  48.6  93.7  96.4  93.0  94.8  97.3  99.8  39.6  30.4  64.0  28.3  42.9  77.0  99.5 
Dummy for security expenses   68.1 
 
97.2  88.2  81.9  96.1  100.0  100.0  97.9  80.0  100.0  97.4  48.6  93.7  96.4  93.0  94.8  97.3  99.8  100.0  100.0  64.0  98.1  98.6  77.0  99.5 
Illegal payments in protection       85.6  65.9  83.2  93.2 
             
90.1  91.7  86.6  96.2  98.7  100.0 
         
72.2  99.5 
Dummy for payments in protection       85.6  65.9  83.2  93.2 
             
90.1  91.7  86.6  94.8  98.7  100.0 
         
70.3  99.5 
Cost to avoid pilferage from workers                             90.7 
                       
Dummy for cost to avoid pilferage from 
workers                             90.7 
                       
Crime losses   99.4 
 
96.4  89.9  97.7  94.8  98.8  100.0  100.0  76.3  97.5  95.2 
 
92.1  99.7  36.5  87.2  97.0  99.8  99.0  98.2  44.0  97.2  98.6  95.7  98.6 102 
 
Dummy for crime losses   99.4 
 
96.4  89.9  97.7  94.8  100.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  100.0  95.2 
 
92.1  99.7  36.5  73.6  97.0  99.8  100.0  100.0  58.7  98.1  98.6  79.9  98.6 
Crimes reported to police       6.5  44.2  17.6  75.4 
         
11.6 
 
27.5  33.9  64.6  70.8  22.5  82.7 
   
61.3 
   
15.6  81.9 
Crimes solved by police       6.0  18.1  13.2  40.5 
         
8.9 
 
27.7  28.0  34.9  66.0  22.0  65.9 
   
38.7 
   
16.1  69.4 
Days of production lost due to civil unrest  99.4 
   
96.4  87.4  94.2 
         
98.4 
     
1.3  99.0  99.5  100.0 
   
58.7 
   
95.0  92.4 
Days of production lost due to absenteeism    97.6 
 
93.7  88.0  96.1 
         
98.0 
       
97.6  98.1  98.8 
   
68.0 
   
87.3  88.6 
Dummy for tax exemption                         97.5  97.2 
       
98.1 
           
95.4 
 
Dummy for lawsuit in the last 3 years          91.8 
                       
99.8 
               
Dummy for ”gifts” for credit           96.2 
                                         
Dummy for interventionist labor regulation    100.0 
   
70.8 
 
7.5  96.1  97.9  80.0  96.6  100.0 
       
99.0 
   
0.0  7.1 
 
3.8  12.9 
   
Total days spent with licenses                                       86.8 
             103 
 
Dummy for accountant to accomplish taxes                                      100.0 
             
Dummy for gifts to tax inspectors                                      100.0 
             
Gifts to tax inspectors                                       100.0 
             
Dummy for labor conflicts                         92.5 
                           
Average time to hire a skilled worker                        91.5 
                           
Dummy for conflicts with suppliers                        98.9 
                           
Dummy for conflicts with clients                         99.6 
                           
Cost of entry                         20.8  10.6 
                         
Dummy for consultant to help deal with 
permissions                        20.9 
                           




Table B.3.3   Response rate of finance and corporate governance IC variables in the final sample 
   Northern Africa  Western Africa—ECOWAS  Horn of 
Africa 
Eastern Africa—
EAC   Southern Africa—SADC (incl. Burundi) 
MUS  ZAF 
   DZA  EGY  MAR  SEN  BEN  MLI  MRT  BFA  CPV  NER  CMR  ETH  ERI  KEN  UGA  TZA  MWI  MDG  ZMB  BDI  BWA  LSO  NAM  SWZ 
Dummy for trade chamber   99.2  99.9  99.1  99.4  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  100.0  100.0 
 
82.2  100.0  98.4  99.7  99.5  100.0 
   
93.3 
   
99.5  99.7 
Dummy for credit line   97.9  99.6  100.0  99.4  96.8  99.7 
         
98.9  98.9  95.3  100.0  94.3  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  89.3  98.1  98.6  98.1  100.0 
Credit unused  97.9  99.9  100.0  91.2  21.2  95.5  100.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  100.0 
       
94.3  64.6  97.6  99.3 
   
82.7 
   
83.0  74.6 
Dummy for loan   100.0  100.0  100.0  96.6  96.2  98.7  100.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  100.0  99.5  98.9  91.3  100.0  44.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  98.1  98.6  97.6  100.0 
Dummy for loan with collateral   100.0  97.7  53.2  99.8  27.1  100.0  17.5  13.7  31.9  11.3  16.8  94.7  45.3  44.7  21.6  44.0  99.3  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  14.7  98.1  98.6  97.4  88.9 
Value of the collateral   87.0  99.7  44.8  79.6  20.8  90.0  100.0  98.0  100.0  75.0  98.3  62.2  38.0  34.4  18.6  41.7  89.9  97.8  100.0  12.9  21.4 
 
27.4  14.3  87.3  89.3 
Interest rate of the loan   94.7 
 
44.5  93.3  26.3  95.8  100.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  100.0 
   
40.1  20.0  44.0  97.2  97.9  98.8  100.0  97.3  13.3  97.2  98.6  94.7  66.0 
Dummy for short-term loan    21.0  52.4  62.9  75.6  67.0 
               
5.2  18.6  97.6  81.5 
 
100.0  100.0  100.0  98.1  98.6  98.3  100.0 
Borrows in foreign currency   99.4  99.9 
 
93.9  40.1  93.2  100.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  100.0 
   
77.7  95.4  85.0  96.5  22.0  70.3  100.0  100.0  18.7  98.1  98.6 
 
95.5 
Dummy for external auditory       99.1  99.8  97.7  100.0  100.0  98.0  100.0  77.5  95.8  99.4  98.9  98.0  100.0  99.8  100.0  100.0  100.0 
   
88.0 
   
98.8  98.6 105 
 
Owner of the lands         97.1  90.3  80.6 
             
94.5  96.9  88.2  100.0 
 
100.0  100.0  100.0  92.0  98.1  98.6  91.6  99.8 
Owner of the buildings         98.7  100.0  91.3 
             
95.5  99.4  95.7  100.0 
 
100.0 
   
90.7 
   
95.2  99.5 
Dummy for owner of the buildings                         99.7 
                           
Dummy for owner of the buildings and 
lands    98.0 
       
100.0  92.2  95.7  80.0  94.1  99.2 
                           
Largest shareholder   99.4  100.0  96.6  93.7  95.0  96.1  100.0  100.0  97.9  80.0  99.2  16.1  16.8  95.7  95.1  95.7  97.2  95.8  99.3  100.0  100.0  98.7  94.3  95.7  96.6  98.6 
Working capital financed by internal 
funds   89.9  100.0  99.8  95.8  96.6  93.9  100.0  100.0  97.9  80.0  99.2  98.5  98.9  93.1  99.8  94.3  98.6  99.5  99.0  100.0  99.1  80.0  98.1  98.6  93.3  99.0 
Working capital financed by commercial 
banks   89.9  100.0  99.8  95.8  96.6  93.9 
         
98.5  98.9  93.1  99.8  94.3  98.6  99.5  99.0  100.0  99.1  80.0  98.1  98.6  93.3  99.0 
Working capital fin. by foreign 
commercial banks     100.0  99.8  95.8  96.6  93.9 
         
98.5 
 
93.1  99.8  94.3  98.6  99.5  99.0 
   
80.0 
   
93.3  99.0 
Working capital financed by leasing     100.0  99.8  95.8  96.6  93.9 
         
98.5 
 
93.1  99.8  94.3  98.6  99.5  99.0 
   
80.0 
   
93.3  99.0 
Working capital financed by state 
services     100.0  99.8  95.8  96.6  93.9  100.0  100.0  97.9  80.0  99.2  98.5  98.9  93.1  99.8  94.3  98.6 
 
99.0 
   
80.0 
     
99.0 
Working capital fin. by supplier or 
customer credit   89.9  100.0  99.8  95.8  96.6  93.9 
         
98.5  98.9  93.1  99.8  94.3  98.6  99.5  99.0  100.0  99.1  80.0  98.1  98.6  93.3  99.0 106 
 
Working capital financed by credit cards     100.0  99.8  95.8  96.6  93.9 
             
93.1  99.8  94.3  98.6  99.5  99.0 
   
80.0 
   
93.3  99.0 
Working capital financed by equity     100.0  99.8  95.8  96.6  93.9  100.0  100.0  97.9  80.0  99.2  98.5  98.9  93.1  99.8  94.3  98.6  99.5  99.0 
   
80.0 
   
93.3  99.0 
Working capital financed by 
family/friends   89.9  100.0  99.8  95.8  96.6  93.9  100.0  100.0  97.9  80.0  99.2  98.5  98.9  93.1  99.8  94.3  98.6  99.5  99.0  100.0  99.1  80.0  98.1  98.6  93.3  99.0 
Working capital financed by informal 
sources     100.0  99.8  95.8  96.6  93.9 
         
98.5  98.9  93.1  99.8  94.3  98.6  99.5  99.0  100.0  99.1  80.0  98.1  98.6  93.3  99.0 
Working capital financed by other funds     73.3  99.8  95.8  96.6  93.9  35.0  96.1  93.6  77.5  80.7  98.5 
 
93.1  99.8  94.3  98.6  70.9  99.0 
   
80.0 
   
93.3  99.0 
New investments financed by internal 
funds   62.8  73.3  90.5  90.3  85.3  77.7  35.0  96.1  93.6  77.5  80.7  42.6  77.1  70.6  66.6  60.8  68.8  70.9  71.2  51.5  48.2  56.0  56.6  62.9  79.9  89.6 
New investments financed bcommercial 
banks   62.8  73.3  90.5  90.3  85.3  77.7 
         
42.6  77.1  70.6  66.6  60.8  68.8  70.9  71.2  51.5  48.2  56.0  56.6  62.9  79.9  89.6 
New investments fin. by foreign 
commercial banks     73.3  90.5  90.3  85.3  77.7 
         
42.6 
 
70.6  66.6  60.8  68.8  70.9  71.2 
   
56.0 
   
79.9  89.6 
New investments financed by leasing     73.3  90.5  90.3  85.3  77.7 
         
42.6 
 
70.6  66.6  60.8  68.8  70.9  71.2 
   
56.0 
   
79.9  89.6 
New investments financed by state 
services     73.3  90.5  90.3  85.3  77.7  35.0  96.1  93.6  77.5  80.7  42.6 
 
70.6  66.6  60.8  68.8 
 
71.2 
   
56.0 
     
89.6 
New investments fin. by supplier or 
customer credit   62.8  73.3  90.5  90.3  85.3  77.7 
         
42.6 
 
70.6  66.6  60.8  68.8  70.9  71.2  51.5  48.2  56.0  56.6  62.9  79.9  89.6 107 
 
New investments financed by credit 
cards     73.3  90.5  90.3  85.3  77.7 
             
70.6  66.6  60.8  68.8  70.9  71.2 
   
56.0 
   
79.9  89.6 
New investments financed by equity     73.3  90.5  90.3  85.3  77.7  35.0  96.1  93.6  77.5  80.7  42.6  77.1  70.6  66.6  60.8  68.8  70.9  71.2 
   
56.0 
   
79.9  89.6 
New investments financed by 
family/friends   62.8  73.3  90.5  90.3  85.3  77.7  35.0  96.1  93.6  77.5  80.7  42.6  77.1  70.6  66.6  60.8  68.8  70.9  71.2  51.5  47.3  56.0  56.6  62.9  79.9  89.6 
New investments financed by informal 
sources     73.3  90.5  90.3  85.3  77.7 
         
42.6  77.1  70.6  66.6  60.8  68.8  70.9  71.2  51.5  48.2  56.0  57.5  62.9  79.9  89.6 
New investments financed by other funds     75.5  90.5  90.3  85.3  77.7 
         
42.6 
 
70.6  66.6  60.8  68.8  70.9  71.2 
   
56.0 
   
79.9  89.6 
Share of net profits reinvested     99.8  96.9  83.0  69.1  92.9  100.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  100.0 
   
90.1  79.1  90.5  76.7  78.0  68.1 
   
82.7 
   
95.0  98.3 
Sales bought on credit         97.9 
 
95.1 
         
100.0 
 
94.5  99.5  97.3  100.0  98.4  100.0  100.0  100.0  84.0  98.1  98.6 
   
Dummy for inputs bought on credit     99.4 
 
99.8  99.4  99.7  100.0  100.0  100.0  78.8  99.2 
   
95.3  99.8  98.4 
 
99.5  98.6 
             
Inputs bought on credit         96.2  57.4  97.7 
             
85.6  99.8  97.9  99.3  99.0 
 
100.0  98.2 
 
98.1  97.1 
   
Time to pay off the credit for inputs                             87.4  62.0  61.7 
 
99.0 
               108 
 
Inputs bought on credit with delayed 
payment        68.8 
                                           
Wait to clear a check       99.6 
 
88.0 
           
77.2  97.2 
   
81.2 
 
95.3  99.0 
   
61.3 
   
96.9  90.8 
Charges to clear a check                        52.0  86.0 
   
37.9 
   
74.6 
   
14.7 
     
11.4 
Wait to clear a domestic currency wire      99.2 
 
87.2 
           
43.2  21.8 
   
52.1 
 
88.6  76.0 
   
32.0 
   
80.6  86.4 
Charges to clear a domestic currency 
wire                        28.1  19.0 
   
36.0 
   
58.0 
   
13.3 
     
9.7 
Wait to clear a foreign currency wire      96.1 
 
63.9 
           
11.8  10.1 
   
34.5 
 
61.3  82.3 
   
48.0 
   
83.0  68.9 
Charges to clear a foreign currency wire                        6.0  10.1 
   
6.3 
   
64.7 
   
6.7 
     
10.9 
Wait to clear a letter of credit                                      25.7 
           
47.3 
Charge to clear a letter of credit                                      18.9 
           
8.1 
Delay of payments of domestic clients         91.8 
 
96.4 
             
83.6  95.3 
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Charges to get payments from domestic 
clients         70.3 
 
84.8 
             
48.2  71.0 
                     
Delay of payments of foreign clients         51.2 
 
31.7 
             
48.6  22.2 
                     
Charges to get payments from foreign 
clients         36.6 
 
20.4  100.0  98.0  97.9  80.0  100.0 
   
28.5  16.7 
                     
Dummy for current or saving account     99.6 
                     




100.0  100.0 
 
98.1  98.6 
   
Dummy for foreign current or saving 
account                               99.2 
 
100.0 
                 
Dummy for accountant         99.8  95.0  99.4 
                     
100.0 
               
Source: Authors’ elaboration with IC data. 
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Table B.3.4   Response rate of quality, innovation, and labor skills IC variables in the final sample 
   Northern Africa  Western Africa—ECOWAS  Horn of 
Africa 
Eastern Africa—
EAC   Southern Africa—SADC (incl. Burundi)  MUS  ZAF 
   DZA  EGY  MAR  SEN  BEN  MLI  MRT  BFA  CPV  NER  CMR  ETH  ERI  KEN  UGA  TZA  MWI  MDG  ZMB  BDI  BWA  LSO  NAM  SWZ 
Dummy for foreign technology     99.0  99.3  97.3  100.0  99.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  53.8  99.2 
   
91.3 
 
98.4  100.0  100.0  98.6  100.0  100.0  94.7  98.1  98.6  99.5  100.0 
Dummy for ISO quality certification    100.0  99.1  99.6  99.4  100.0  98.8  98.0  100.0  56.3  100.0  100.0  97.2  98.0 
 
97.9  98.6  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  93.3  98.1  98.6  99.5  99.3 
Sales with warranty                         99.9 
                           








98.4  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  89.3  97.2  98.6  98.8  99.7 




100.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  99.2 
   
94.7 
 
98.4  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  90.7  97.2  98.6  99.5  99.7 
Dummy for discontinued product line                                                    99.7 
Dummy for equipment improvement                                   100.0 
                 
Dummy for R&D     99.8 
 
87.0  98.1  89.3  100.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  100.0  98.7  78.8  89.9 
 
99.1  100.0 
                 
R&D expenditures     100.0 
 
69.5  81.9  80.9  100.0  100.0  97.9  80.0  96.6  95.4  40.2  74.3 
 
91.1 
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Workers engaged in design/R&D                         97.3 
                           
Dummy for subcontracted R&D         97.5 
             
100.0 
                           
Royalties expenditures                         98.4 
                           
Dummy for new technology   37.4 
 
100.0  99.8  100.0 
               
96.4  100.0  98.4 
 
100.0  100.0 
   
90.7 
   
99.5  99.7 
Dummy for joint venture     99.9  99.8 
                       
98.4 
   
100.0 
   
86.7 
     
99.7 
Dummy for new license agreement     100.0  99.4 
                       
98.4  100.0 
 
100.0 
   
88.0 
     
99.7 
Dummy for outsourcing    100.0  99.5 
                       
98.4  100.0 
 
100.0  100.0  100.0  77.3  98.1  98.6 
 
99.7 
Dummy for in-house production       99.5 
                       
97.9  100.0 
 
100.0 
   
76.0 
     
99.5 
Dummy for new plant                                                     99.7 
Dummy for closed plant                                                     99.7 
Staff—management       100.0  97.1  98.7  99.4 
         
88.1  100.0  91.3  97.6  93.0  97.6  97.1  100.0 
   
78.7 
     
100.0 112 
 
Staff—professional workers   68.7  99.5  100.0  95.6  98.9  98.4 
         
88.2  98.3  91.5  97.6  62.3  98.3 
 
99.3 
   
57.3 
   
82.0  100.0 
Staff—skilled workers   68.7  99.5  100.0  95.4  98.7  98.7  100.0  100.0  100.0  72.5  97.5  87.9  100.0  91.5  97.6  84.3  97.6  97.1  100.0  100.0  99.1  65.3  97.2  98.6  80.3  100.0 
Staff—unskilled workers   68.7  99.5  100.0  95.4  98.7  98.7  100.0  100.0  100.0  72.5  97.5  87.6  98.3  90.9  98.1  66.7  96.9  96.6  100.0  100.0  99.1  64.0  97.2  98.6  77.5  100.0 
Staff—nonproduction workers   68.7  99.5  100.0  95.4  98.9  98.4 
         
87.0  100.0  91.5  98.1  70.3  96.9  96.6  100.0 
   
57.3 
   
76.7  100.0 
Staff—foreign nationals       96.4  0.0 
                 





   
78.7 
     
99.3 
Average education of staff                         95.2 
                           
Average tenure of staff                         94.3 
                           
Average age of staff                         95.4 
                           
Dummy for training   97.1  99.8  99.5  99.4  92.6  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  100.0  96.8  93.3  93.3  100.0  85.9  99.3  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  92.0  98.1  98.6  96.6  100.0 
Training to skilled workers   89.1  99.2  98.4  25.3  55.7  23.9  100.0  100.0  100.0  78.8  100.0  98.7  8.9  87.7  91.5  93.0  97.2  98.2  100.0 
   
89.3 
   
81.8  97.6 
Training to unskilled workers   89.1  98.9  97.5  23.0  23.1  17.2  100.0  100.0  100.0  78.8  100.0  98.6  14.5  76.9  79.2  89.4  97.9  99.2  99.0 
   
84.0 
   
74.3  95.5 
Training to production workers    99.2  96.7 
                               
100.0  100.0 
 
98.1  98.6 
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Training to nonproduction    98.7  96.7 
                               
100.0  100.0 
 
96.2  98.6 
   
Weeks of training for skilled workers         16.0  22.1  19.1  100.0  80.4  70.2  72.5  79.8 
   
75.9  91.0  69.8  88.2  97.8  94.2 
   
86.7 
   
87.5  96.0 
Weeks of training for unskilled workers         4.4  8.6  3.2  100.0  80.4  70.2  70.0  79.8 
   
56.7  79.2  55.6  69.1  98.1  78.9 
   
82.7 
   
83.0  91.2 
Workforce with computer   99.4 
 
98.7  98.1  100.0  99.4 
             
83.4  99.5  97.5 
   
98.6 
         
84.2  84.8 
University staff     97.1  100.0  80.8  90.8  79.3 
         
96.8  91.6  79.1  97.0  89.4 
 
74.3  96.9 
   
77.3 
     
99.8 
Dummy for university staff              100.0  96.1  91.5  62.5  99.2 
               
100.0  99.1 
 
96.2  97.1 
   
Manager’s education     99.9  99.2  96.4  32.1  99.4  100.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  100.0  99.1  100.0  98.0  99.1 
 
99.3  26.3  99.3  100.0  100.0  92.0  98.1  98.6  100.0  99.8 
Manager’s experience     99.8  98.8  83.0  98.1  98.4  100.0  98.0  100.0  76.3  99.2  99.7  100.0  66.4  79.7  80.1  96.5 
 
98.8  100.0  100.0  77.3  98.1  98.6  74.6  99.8 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with IC data. 
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Table B.3.5   Response rate of other control C variables in the final sample 
   Northern Africa  Western Africa—ECOWAS  Horn of 
Africa 
Eastern Africa—
EAC   Southern Africa—SADC (incl. Burundi) 
MUS  ZAF 
   DZA  EGY  MAR  SEN  BEN  MLI  MRT  BFA  CPV  NER  CMR  ETH  ERI  KEN  UGA  TZA  MWI  MDG  ZMB  BDI  BWA  LSO  NAM  SWZ 
Age   99.4  99.7  100.0  99.2  99.6  99.7  100.0  100.0  100.0  33.8  100.0  100.0  100.0  97.4  99.4  98.9  97.9  99.7  99.3  100.0  100.0  100.0  98.1  95.7  98.8  99.8 
Dummy for incorporated company   98.5  99.4  99.9  99.8  100.0  99.7  100.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  98.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  98.1  98.6  96.4  100.0 
Dummy for limited company   99.2  99.4  99.9  99.8  100.0  99.7  100.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  100.0  100.0 
 
98.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  98.1  98.6  100.0  100.0 
Dummy for SOE   98.7  100.0  100.0  99.2  100.0  99.7  100.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  98.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  94.7  98.1  98.6  100.0  100.0 
Dummy for FDI   98.7  100.0  100.0  99.2  100.0  99.7  100.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  100.0  98.6  100.0  98.0  100.0  97.9  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  94.7  98.1  98.6  100.0  100.0 
Dummy for holdings         99.8  100.0  99.7 
         
100.0 
 
94.1  100.0  20.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
   
98.7 
   
98.8  100.0 
Share of the local market   41.0 
 
64.1  53.5  82.4  83.8  93.8  62.7  83.0  61.3  92.4 




     
96.0  98.2  57.3  90.6  81.4 
 
92.9 
Share of the national market   36.6 
 
63.2  52.4  83.0  79.3  90.0  66.7  72.3  60.0  84.0 
   
94.5  62.2  86.9  82.3  49.4  75.8  98.0  96.4  40.0  88.7  81.4  57.3  93.3 
Dummy for direct exports   97.5  99.7  99.9  96.4  95.8  87.4  100.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  100.0  98.9  100.0  65.0  99.5  98.9  99.3  99.7  100.0  100.0  100.0  86.7  98.1  98.6  97.6  99.5 
Share of exports   97.5  99.7  99.9  96.4  95.8  87.4  100.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  100.0  98.9  100.0  94.5  99.5  98.9  99.3  99.7  100.0  100.0  100.0  86.7  98.1  98.6  97.6 
 
Exporting experience   97.7  97.4  99.9  94.9  92.4  91.9  100.0  100.0  100.0  72.5  100.0  98.0 
 
92.1  17.8  27.2  99.3  31.9  98.8  100.0  99.1  89.3  97.2  94.3  97.6 
 
Dummy for direct imports     97.9  100.0  90.1  97.9  92.9  68.8  100.0  100.0  80.0  100.0  98.9  100.0  92.9  92.6  93.6  99.0  97.6  92.6  78.2  100.0  100.0  98.1  98.6  93.8  97.4 
Share of imports     99.9  100.0  90.1  97.9  92.9  100.0  100.0  100.0  80.0  100.0  97.9  100.0  94.1  93.7  94.8  99.3  99.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  93.3  98.1  98.6  93.8 
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Number of competitors   94.3  83.2 
   
95.0 
           
65.4 
 
94.5  98.6  96.1  99.3  72.4  63.5 
   
86.7 
   
72.7  99.5 
Capacity utilization   95.2  99.7  99.2  82.7  97.7  98.4  100.0  96.1  91.5  53.8  99.2  87.0  100.0  90.1  94.8  99.5  97.6  95.2  99.8  100.0  98.2  89.3  95.3  94.3  97.1  98.1 
Trade union   99.4  95.9  97.3  95.6  97.5  98.7  98.8  100.0  100.0  76.3  100.0  98.6  93.9  91.3  99.4  91.6  100.0  94.7  86.3  100.0  100.0  64.0  97.2  95.7  97.1  99.1 
Dummy for privatized firm   97.7  98.1 
 
97.3  98.5  98.7 
         
95.6  100.0  89.5 
 
93.7  97.6  96.8  100.0 
   
98.7 
   
96.9  100.0 
Dummy for industrial zone     99.9  100.0  99.2  99.2  99.7  100.0  96.1  100.0  80.0  98.3  97.6  100.0  98.0  100.0  98.6  99.3 
   
100.0  100.0 
 
98.1  98.6  99.5  0.0 
Days of production lost due to strikes   99.4  97.4 
 
96.4  87.4  95.5 
         
98.8 
 
89.7  98.9  1.6  65.3  99.5  100.0 
   
65.3 
   
95.0  92.6 
Workers infected by HIV         68.2  65.1  57.0 
             
56.3 
   
98.3  70.0 
           
80.8  35.4 
Dummy for negative impact of HIV         64.4  76.7  90.6  100.0  98.0  97.9  80.0  99.2  99.9 
 
84.0  94.3  94.8  91.0  64.8 
 
98.0  100.0  62.7  93.4  98.6  88.2  100.0 
Cost in HIV-prevention programs         67.0  75.8  75.1 
         
99.9 
 
19.0  66.3  48.7  87.5  78.5 
           
90.9  44.7 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with IC data. 